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Preface
What does all this have to do with education? I encounter this
question quite often, and I consider it to he challenging as I am in-
deed seeking a degree in education and take some pride in being a
teacher's teacher— the next step above master teacher. There is con-
siderable doubt that I ever answer this question well, but I try the
task often enough to have rehearsed a niomber of approaches. The de-
lights of the mind are hard to satisfy but easy to nourish, so, if I
manage to intrigue a few into the love of technical detail, I will be
content because tremendous accomplishments can come from a few good
people.
Education is an undisciplined profession. There is no set of
principles to which every teacher can agree which in any way constrain
practice. I take it to be self evident that organizations of teachers
usually produce statements that are so general that any set of teaching
practices can be accepted in the curriculum. Indeed, affective educa-
tors seem to delight in the fact that it is possible to teach without
any content at all since students always bring some knowledge with
them. The attempt to define a ciirriculum in behavioral objectives
failed because performance is not knowledge, and competency testing
has an equally dim future since what is learned does not have a direct
relationship to what is taught. Without the principles of a discipline,
it is not possible to evaluate teaching or to compare two teachers or
to specify what is to be taught. By educational evaluation we usually
mean a sampling of what has been learned by the student with very rare
VI
measurement on the teaching 'itself. By curriculiam planning we usually
mean a listing of whatever subjects we feel like teaching or think
necessary with very rare interest in metacurric\ilar criteria— that is,
criteria which allow the selection of the better curriculum from alter-
natives .
To be a little less extreme, certain subject areas like mathema-
tics and the sciences seem better at specifying a consistent body of
knowledge in a curriculum such that some information is necessary be-
fore other information can be learned. In these areas the structure of
the whole seems related to the composition of each of its parts. It is
comforting for me, at least, to watch these integrated areas of curri-
culum grow as if alive, improving with each generation of students be-
coming teachers. It is no idle coincidence that many of the best
teachers in a university have been so active with their subject material
that they have never felt the need for a course in instructional method
or have been unimpressed by their introduction to education as a formal
study
.
In spite of what I’ve just said, I believe there is good reason
why education itself as an object of study should be among the last to
come under systematic formal control. Psychology has yet to develop a
central paradigm comparable to those in physics, chemistry, or molec-
ular biology; and yet, education will need a psychological description
of how the mind acquires knowledge before it can specify principles of
curriciilum which uniformly apply from calculus to dadaism. A theory
Vll
mind which is sufficiently complete to relate knowledge to
learning in an empirically testable manner seems to be a prerequisite
to at least part of the problem of educational discipline. Language
has been considered as the primary mental ability, and I have sought
the best formal treatment of language as a good place to begin improve-
ments in educational theory and practice. At the least, I expect early
childhood education and the special education of the disabled to bring
accomplishments to the field of teaching which will help to reach the
general goals of education.
I know I cannot explain to everyone the value I see in what I do.
I can be satisfied if a few will grasp it and help me explain it and
perhaps push the formal description of himian ability a little further.
To those in the teaching profession who do not see the need for formal
discipline, I doubt there is anything I can say that will convince them.
Without disciplined constraint on practice there is nothing we can do
to effect each other. Talented teachers who recognize the art of escor-
ting a learning mind should not fear formalism and the approach of those
bearing machines with them: art in practice survives effective improve-
ment. No one lightly dismisses the art of doctoring since science in-
creased the standard of effective practice, and education should fare
at least as well since it perhaps involves a larger population. In the
long run, the fine arts may prove to be the last refuge for those who
abhor technicalities of the sciences— formalism might never have a
motive for reaching into these fields of human endeavor.
Fall 1979 116 Montague
Road
Amherst
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ABSTRACT
A Descriptive Method for Child Language Disability:
The Formal Semantics
,
Logic
,
and Syntax of Small Languages
September I98O
Stan Kulikovs i II
Ed.D. University of Massachusetts
This is a case study of the language abilities of five people.
They each present a different problem for methods of analytic descrip-
tion and grammar construction. The major goal is to present a formal
treatment of language disability, but some formal improvements in early
child language are necessary along the way. The basic data are com-
plete verbatim transcripts in most of the case studies. Four transcript
samples of a young girl, aged 23 months, are presented to study the
developments over a month of early syntactical phrase structures. The
stable abilities of four adolescents are studied: one to illustrate
details of transcriptional method; another to represent a language delay;
another for a simple disorder; and the last may be a complex disorder or
perhaps a language deviation.
The formalization of early child language and disabilities given
herein primarily concerns the relationship between syntax and semantics.
The lack of formal pragmatics is noted, although a few involvements with
intensional logic and specified set-theoretical models are suggested.
IX
The grammatical analysis is defined upon an arbitrary artificiad lan-
guage, and two fragmentary samples from published literat\ire also are
given to illustrate the earlier formal treatments with pivot grammar
and also transformational phrase structure.
Like these earlier formal treatments, this study attempts to place
empirical data within a systematic theoretical structure. In the man-
ner of scientific advancements, this descriptive method accounts for
all of the data which were the basis for the earlier formal treatments;
provides a principled description for previous systematic counterexam-
ples; and introduces new phenomena which were unobserved or even denied
before this research. The integration between context-free phrase
structure and model-theoretical semantics in generative grammar is found
to be well-principled on the grounds of application to early child
language and disability.
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0.0 Introduction
There is some hope that a complete formal specification of the
hijman mind shall be available in the not too distant future. In the
meanwhile, this study is an attempt to advance toward such a goal.
The ordinary complexity of adult language presently escapes complete
grammatical description, but child language and disability may be
found to be sufficiently simpler in some aspects and so lead the way
in discovering the integration of mental components. It may certainly
be said that the use of syntax and semantics by a young child is sim-
pler and increases in complexity in a knowable manner. It may less
well be known that some handicapped people of any age also present
simpler minds in communication and probably in mental competence. The
purpose of this study is to demonstrate the relationship between a
form of data which can be collected directly from a person in a rela-
tively straightforward manner and a well-principled form of description.
The study of child language may play a role in formal psychology
because the study of the child requires descriptive methods which dem-
onstrate progress through a longitudinal series of data. If this sys-
tem of description can be successfully applied to language disabilities
it seems possible to develop formal treatments for such matters as
learnability controls on educational curricula, evaluation of thera-
putic claims in the mental domain, possibly some modest advancements
in artificial intelligences, and even the beginnings of an embryo field
1
2of mental prosthesis. Even if these matters prove to be naught but pipe
dreams and speculation, at least the results of this work should present
lii^S^istic descriptions of child abilities which are nearer the goal of
formal specification than current psychometric or behavioral practices.
0.1 The method of this study involves the qualitative comparison
of grammars to discrete and rather uncontroversial empirical data col-
lected from selected individuals in the manner of a clinical case study.
A simple orthographic transcription will suffice for the analysis of
most every syntactical and semantical phenomenon. One may quibble over
a particular analytic result or dismiss an empirical datum in the pro-
cess of this study, but the explicit degree of description and the pre-
cise nature of the theoretical claims should remain recognizeable. It
is no simple matter to present these procedures in mathematical formula-
tions which are independent of any particular sample or language.
A series of individual language samples shall be analyzed to illus-
trate the principles of grammar construction and comparative evaluation.
A chronological sequence of language samples is given to represent child
development at the emergence of productive syntactical construction and
how the grammatical description of data increases in synchronic complex-
ity. A few samples of disabled people illustrate comparable descrip-
tions for language disabilities.
The components of a generative grammar are taken to be the phono-
logical, the lexical, the syntactical, the semantical, and the pragma-
tical. All generative grammars are constructed of a minimal set of
recursive rules which interact in specified operations to derive the
sets of observable sentences. Each component has its own domain
of
3phenomena within the overall integrated performance system. Each compo-
nent may be characterized by its own data, its own form of rules, and
its own relationship to other components. Contemporary linguistic
theories differ according to these characteristics. The focus of this
study is the relationship between syntax and semantics in the descrip-
tion of language abilities and will hence assume a certain degree of
empirical dispensation towards other aspects of grammar. In the usual
manner of generative grammar, a language is defined as a set of sen-
tences, possibly infinite, which has a common source which is presumably
systematic
.
0.2 The phonological component of a generative grammar is a system
of rules which govern the patterns of speech sounds of a language. This
is usually the least controversial component of a grammar; although, the
role of prosody, morphology, and other sound-related concerns are some-
what more disputable. Since the last century there have been phonetic
alphabets for the almost universal description of human speech sounds
in a manner that tries to be independent of any particiilar language.
Phonological rules have been developed to operate upon subphonemic fea-
tures and to structure them into the sound patterns of English (Chomsky
and Halle I968 ). Phonological analysis is a well established corner-
stone of speech pathology and there are many reasonable considerations
of phonological disabilities in children (Ingram 19T6). With this, it
shall be assumed that phonology is a sufficiently independent component
of grammar which assigns a phonetic description to any sentence of a
natural language.
hThis method of considering grammatical components independently is
a matter of theoretical delineation and is not intended to raise overt
problems in psychological reality or clinical application. Independence
from phonological issues is accepted merely to simplify the form of data
and transcription in the syntactical-semantical analysis whose inter-
action is to be considered in some detail. Bresnan (1975) illustrates
some of the empirical problems in a syntax-independent phonology and
none of these problems seem resolvable by purely phonological means.
The simplification of the componential data to just the syntactical and
semantical information should not be taken as suggesting solutions to
general problems of the total grammar.
0.3 The syntactical component of a generative grammar is a system
of rules which govern the linear sequence of words and affixes in the
sentences of the language. Structural relationships between these words
and affixes are related to the composition of propositional interpreta-
tions governed by the semantical component. The syntax of a grammar
contains rules which assign at least completely unambiguous structural
description to any grammatical sentence. For this, two syntactical sub-
components are constructed in the manner of Chomsky standard theory
(Chomsky 1965; Katz and Postal I96U): the phrase structure rules and
the transformational rules. The phrase structure rules operate upon the
lexical items, building them up into more complex structural units. For
each sentence, the phrase structiure rules derive at least one initial
phrase marker which can be interpreted unambiguously. The transforma-
tional apparatus operates upon initial phrase markers— or deep struc-
tures— to derive final phrase markers— or surface structure s
—
in a
5manner which preserves the initial meanings. These standard transfor-
mations have not proven very useful in early child language, but they
are given herein for historical perspective to earlier studies.
O.U The semantical component of a generative grammar is a system
of rules which govern the propositional interpretations which may be
assigned to the sentences of the language. A proposition is taken to be
that which remains constant in exact paraphrase or in exact translation.
Propositions are formalized in a truth-conditional predicate calculus in
the manner of Montague (19T^)» For each phrase structure rule in syntax
there is a corresponding semantical rule which states how the meanings
of the more complex structure is composed from the meanings of the
constituents. This rule-by-rule correspondence between the syntactical
phrase structure and the composition of semantical propositions does
produce some dependence between these two components of grammar. The
kinds of phrase constructions which analysis will propose for some datum
can be evaluated with respect to the semantical propositions also found
in that datum.
Besides the propositional meanings of the predicate calculus, the
semantical component assigns a model-theoretical interpretation to each
expression. The model interpretation is usually constructed as ordered
sets whose domain of primitives is arranged in possible ordered pairs.
0.5 The lexical component of a generative grammar is a categorized
system of words and affixes of the language. These words and affixes
serve as both the terminal elements of syntax and the basic expressions
Consequently, the categories of the lexicon are setsof the semantics.
6organized by their syntactical form and semantical function. In the
grammars to be used in this study, the lexical categories are identified
by the combinatorial properties of its contents and by the relationship
of its contents to certain semantical primitives. The lexical items
enter the syntactical and semantical operations as unanalyzed constants.
The sentential operations are so constructed that sublexical definitions
with additional information are not available to the formulation of its
derivational form or compositional function.
It may seem strange that the semantical component does not have
access to complete definitions of contentive words. It is the purpose
of the semantical rules to characterize propositional formulae with the
kinds of logical inference which people are known to make upon sentence
structure. There are certainly other kinds of inference than those
based upon the formal analyticity of sentence form: implication in con-
versational discourse (Grice 1975)? deictic elements of nonlinguistic
contexts (Brunner 1975), sublexical information (Katz and Fodor I963).
The explication of all these inferential systems will lie beyond the
capacities of a sentence grammar. The sentence is taken to be a natural
unit of language, and the lexical items are given as its basic elements.
0.6 The pragmatical component of a generative grammar is consider-
ably less well characterized, and no formal treatment shall be advanced
here. There is some confusion in child language literature about the
role of pragmatics and its relationship to the semantical component, but
it will probably be some time before complete agreement is reached in the
complete specification of the pragmatical rules. The transcript data
vill be presented with enough situational information to be of some
Tanalytic value when formal treatments become available, but lacking
these now, it is difficult to speculate on what features of discourse
and situation should be systematically preserved. Some rough suggestion
on the pragmatical interaction with intensional logic and model theory
may be found in the discussion of the semantical analyses.
1.0 Transcription
The conventions of orthographic transcription are of two sorts: the
clinical conventions and the intuitional conventions. The former are
necessary for clinical purposes to connect the data to a particular
client while the latter are necessary to assure the accuracy of the
transcription to the particular performances of the client. The clinic
conventions will not be of much concern here as they involve ethical and
working problems of professional treatment centers and their clientele.
Among such specifications should be guidelines for the construction of a
language corpus, the organization of its possible contents, standards of
client confidentiality, clinically approved procedures, and so forth.
These clinical conventions do not require much specifications in this
study since most of the language samples are of a single variety. Un-
less otherwise stated, all data will be an actual spontaneous performance
of an individual— usually a client involved in some form of clinical
program. It is required that the conversation be typical and familiar
for that individual and can be transcribed with reasonable confidence of
word order and inflectional form. Reasonable confidence shall mean that
other speakers of English have read the transcript and listened to the
conversation with equal satisifaction as to the accuracy. Tape recording
8is the usual method of choice by which reasonable confidence is estab-
lished.
The intuitional conventions are a set of notational devices used in
transcription and are subject to satisfaction by speakers of English.
Since phonological analyses are not considered, phonetic transcription
will largely be unnecessary and a simple orthographic approach shall be
assumed. In the transcription process, the clinician is certifying that
a series of markers on paper do indeed represent a series of psycholo-
gical units which the client uses in communication. In some cases,
the claim may be made that these markers are identical with the set of
English words and in these cases the intuitional satisfaction of an
English competent reader would be high. In what follows, these intui-
tions are refined into mathematical definitions which can be compared
more precisely to definitions of English or other particiilar languages.
In other cases, the markers do not much resemble English words and uni-
que transcriptional information will have to be provided to establish
their relationships to client performances. It is expected that the
intuitive satisfaction of the English competent person will become lower
accordingly. As this study progresses, an attempt is made to increase
this effect. The description of a language disability requires a very
general system of data transcription which is increasingly less depen-
dent upon a particular language.
1.1 The orthographic conventions of the study assume that a trans-
cript represents language that has been understood well enough to carry
on a connected conversation. At first this may seem tedious, but with
9some disabled individuals this may require some phonological familiarity
in order to understand what is being said. It is also sometimes rather
difficiilt to say what a connected conversation is to a very young child
or to extremely autistic ones. Similarly, the understanding of what an
utterance is may be extended to include more than spoken performances:
sign languages, communication boards, prosthetic spelling devices, rebus
symbols, and the like. For the beginning, however, it shall be assumed
that transcription requires familiarity with spoken English and a dic-
tionary spelling for its words. The following pretheoretical symbols
may be conventionalized:
1.11 ABCDEFGHIJKLM
NOPQRSTUVWXYZ
The twenty-six characters of English
alphabet
,
1.12 # the word boundary blank, and
1.13 - a specialized blank for performance
breaks
.
The characters of the English alphabet are used merely for conveni
ence as any system for marking the order and inflectional form of words
may be substituted. Capital case lettering is used exclusively in order
to avoid \innecessary capitalization conventions which are not distingu-
ished in spoken performances. A word as a basic theoretical unit is
separated from other words by word boundary blanks. Word boundary
blanks
are usually suppressed in actual transcriptions for ease of
reading, but
their use as an intuitional convention is assured. No
abbreviations may
m
be tolerated as the data concerns the sequence of
words as spoken, and a
transcript will contain nonstandard orthography only
if there is a sen-
structural difference in that element fromous claim being made for a
10
the usual English equivalent. For example, the common phonological re-
duction DIDJA vould he employed in place of DID YOU only if the former
were considered to differ syntactically or semantically from the latter,
and the DIDJA should he structured and interpreted as a single lexical
item. The assignment of word boundaries in heavily contracted speech
or poor articulation is very often difficult, hut this should not pre-
vent the task. Secure grammatical description may he based on conversa-
tion which was well understood by the transcriber.
l.l4 #...# A word is any series of one or more
characters between consequetive word
boundary blanks.
1.15 ##...## A sentence is any series of words and
blanks which are understood to have a
grammatically structured meaning.
l.l6 ##...— A sentence broken off in performance.
1.17 #...- A word broken off in performance.
1.18 A complex word has a series of words
or syllables without the usual bo\indar-
ies, forming a single lexical item.
With these basic conventions it is possible to construct a trans-
cript of a conversation and thus represent what has been said. The ar-
rangement of the pretheoretical symbols represent the exact order of the
linguistic units that a client used in communication. This then is the
nature of the transcribed data which records what has been said, and
these intuitions of communication are the subject of theoretical refine-
ment in the syntactical and semantical analyses.
It is now possible to introduce a sample transcript of basic data.
As follows, 1.19 contains two chronologically ordered fragments of tape
11
recorded conversation, 3 May 19T^« This young man, Doug, aged 11 yr 8 mo
15 da, is very carefully articulate so that there is no difficulty in
establishing word order, inflectional form, and other word qualities.
Doug's conversational abilities give a variety of transcriptional pro-
blems by which to introduce additional punctuational conventions. His
syntactical and semantical abilities seem comparable to contemporaneous
adults— one of which is represented in this conversation. He seems to
have complete sentence level abilities, but his conversations are not,
however, usual for an 11-year old. In the discourse Doug seems to dis-
play some vague properties of disturbance which seem intuitively present
to a reader familiar with the conversation of yo\ing adolescents. Since
Doug’s sentence level grammar seems adequate, the disturbance must con-
cern conversation level qualities or other higher cognitive abilities.
This method of simple transcription then seems capable of representing
more information than that strictly needed for the study of syntax and
semantics of children.
The shifting of letter case below is introduced merely to distin-
guish the contributions of both participants in the conversation, Doug
retaining the capital case. Single word boundaries have been suppressed
to aid the readability of the text.
1.19 a ##THE REASON WHY HE GOT—THE REASON WHY HE HAD A PLANE
WRECK—BECAUSE—IT FELL APART##BECAUSE—THE REASON WHY
HE HAD—THE REASON WHY HE HAD A PLANE WRECK##BECAUSE
—
well what happened^#THE REASON WHY HE HAD A PLANE WRECK
AND HE FELL THROUGH THE FIRE AND GOT BURNED UP BECAUSE
HE—UH—AND DIED—BECAUSE THE PLANE WASNT—BECAUSE THE
PLAN MUST HAVE BEEN AN OLD 0NE##that would explain it
wouldnt it##YEAH##
12
b ##what happens when you die##YOU GO TO HEAVEN##what do
people do with you when youre dead##THEY SEND YOU TO
JESUS##how do they do that##JESUS IS A PICTURE OF YOU
AT HEAVEN##yes i know that hut how do people send you
there##THEY BURY YOU AT A CEMETARY##you ever seen all
that##YEAH##
It should be clear that 1.19a is a cyclic monologue in which Doug
is more or less rephrasing statements until he arrives at one which may
be causal (ie— having been an old one) rather than redefinitional of
plane wreck (ie— falling apart
,
falling through fire, getting burned up,
and dying). The lexical substitution of PLAN for PLANE in the final
causal statement is a recurring aspect of Doug's use of language, like
the cyclic rephrasing. These may be more clearly observed with the
introduction of punctuational conventions to further constrain intuitions
concerning transcription.
1.2 Punctuational conventions may be added to note other intuition
about the meaning or structure of the sequence of sentences which the
transcriber might wish to enter without advancing any semantical or syn-
tactical claims. The punctuation devices are usually accepted in order
to aid in the readability of the text or the analytic processing without
essentially altering the nature of the data.
1.21 Initial sentence boundaries are numbered consequetively
and the contributions of each conversationalist may be
columnized with column breaks being assigned preferen-
tially to phrase boundaries, if present, or then to single
word boundaries.
1.22
,
Intonational phrase boundary
1.23 ? Questioning contour
1^2h ' Compositional word structure
13
1.25 ft tt Direct quotation
1.26 (...) Contextual information
1.2T /.../ Uninterpretable portion of data
1.28 —
#
A performance stammer within sentence
1.29 XXX Confidentiality shield
Punctuation is added to aid in the readability of transcripts,
especially the large ones collected for clinical language studies. The
organizational convention 1.21 is adopted for reference purposes in lo-
cating specific portions of data. Commas and question marks are intona-
tional phenomena which affect conversational progress independently of
the sentence structure or meaning. There are certainly some syntactical
or semantical operations which are associated with phrase structure and
questioning, but these operations are identified within the lexical array
of data by the analytical method. These punctuational devices for into-
national marking are for convenience and for strong speech features which
aid in understanding the conversational structure in progress.
Contraction is frequently thought to be a syntactical operation
which alters word boundaries between certain structural categories. The
apostrophy indicates where more than one lexical item is thought to be
present even though there may be no obvious or subtle speech features to
distinguish the understood structure. There is afterall nothing which
distinguishes the occurrences of THEY’RE, THERE, or THEIR other than the
transcriber's understanding of what was said. Heavily contracted or
pathologically stereotyped or extremely imitative speech will challenge
a transcriber's ability to assign word boundaries with certainty. In a
lU
similar manner, direct quotation frequently is unaccompanied by any vocal
qualities so that the understood shifts in interpretation are attributed
to conversational features of discourse. A grammar of the sentences does
not account for these devices although they aid in the processing of
the data.
The slash notation 1.27 is used to indicate portions of the trans-
cript where the transcriber is sufficiently unclear such that analytic
claims should not be based upon any material contained within. Slashed
segments may contain a series of hyphens to indicate complete failure of
interpretation for that portion of the message. Slashes may also con-
tain some phonetic representations of audible sounds which are presum-
ably part of the linguistically coded sequence, but are of uncertain
word value. Sometimes the slashes may contain portions of the usual
English orthography when the transcriber is almost certain of the word
sequence but entertains sufficient doubt or awareness of alternative
wording so to excuse that portion of the data from serious analytical
concern. The slash notation helps maintain transcript integrity during
replay of tape recorded material, identifying which portions are rele-
vant for analysis and which portions are excused on grounds of auditory
inaccuracy.
The role of contextual information in sentence analysis has been a
subject of interest in many studies of precompetent children (Bloom 1970;
Greenfield and Smith 1976). This kind of study does not possess explicit
semantical principles and so they attribute much to contextual situation
which is properly semantical interpretation. Not much is to be made of
The syntax of Bloom (1970) vill be considered in detail in laterthis
.
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sections, and the semantical analysis offered below is based on what is
understood in the word relationships rather than any systematic reliance
upon pragmatical fields. Contextual reliance seemed necessary for these
earlier studies since they lacked formal semantics and they set about to
taxonomically classify meanings in a nongenerative manner. The results
of these studies are rather loose collections of semantical categories
which may be descriptive yet lack explanation.
For all that, contextual information is often necessary to under-
stand some of the marginal conversation produced when one of the conver-
sants lack syntactical or semantical abilities employed by the person
doing the transcritpion. As a punctuational device, context is helpful
in assuring that the relationships between the words have been properly
understood, but the context should establish the interpretation only
of certain explicit deictic variables, like pronouns or the definite
article. From the very beginning of syntactical development a child may
express many relationships in words which do not exist in any tangible
sense. Reference to contextual information cannot crucially determine
the semantical interpretation of the child's utterances. Conversely,
small children and some disabled persons certainly do rely heavily upon
a skilled conversant to interpret environmental situations for informa-
tion about the sentences in the discourse. Necessary contextualization
such as that needed for the reference of personal pronouns is not very
different in principle from the pragmatical strategies to interpret the
fragmentary language of small children.
Ideally, a complete grammar of communicative competence should
contain a pragmatical component whose theoretical language would then
l6
systematically account for necessary contextualization
. There are many
sources for pragmatical inference: perceptual searches, intonational
contours, gestures, eye glances, and intuitions of conversational con-
tinuity which alter the implications of the discourse. Explicit sets
of rules and principles underlying all such contextual phenomena cannot
be precisely formulated in a manner comparable to syntax and semantics
of current generative studies. Although the pragmatical information is
frequently helpful, its status as a punctuational device is distinct
from the formal consistency of syntax and semantics.
For the sake of brevity, other punctuational devices will be intro-
duced within language samples as their use may be best illustrated where
they occur. Further technical discussion may be deferred until then.
1.3 A language sample is introduced here from the same conversa-
tion as 1 . 19 - These segments are selected to illustrate Doug's cyclic
rephrasing and the use of punctuation in the transcription of such com-
plex performances.
1.31 (1) ONCE— ONCE BEFORE—
(2) DEAD PEOPLE DIE
(3) THEY GO TO A CEMETAEY AND
—
AND GO TO HEAVEN WITH JESUS
(U) IT'S /HAUS/ CHURCH
(5) PEOPLE THAT DIE—
(6) THEY— UH—
(7) PEOPLE DIE
(8) PEOPLE ARE DEAD
(9) THEY GET BURIED IN A CEMETARY
(10) AND JESUS TAKES THEM TO HEAVEN
(l) i understand
(11) YEAH
The numberings and columnizations are for the convenience
of pro-
cessing large transcripts ty scanning. Each conversant may
be numbered
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independently as above or sequentially, depending on the purpose of the
transcript. Since numbering is conventionally assigned to sentence
boundaries
,
the ## blanks may be suppressed to enhance readability with-
out loss of information. The numberings between 1.31 (9-10) introduce
an additional numbering convention for simple conjxinction of otherwise
grammatically complete sentences. 1.31 (3) is not numerically separated
because the latter conjunct is understood in the meaning of a conjoined
verb phrase rather than with a conjoined imperative which would have
been numbered separately. This numbering of sentential conjunct s is
needed because some conversational performances contain long series of
conjoined sentences which are otherwise unrelated syntactically. The
conversational numberings are sometimes marked with primes, as in 1.3^
(lO') and (2") forthcoming, to indicate that these utterances overlapped
in the time of performance so that the later double-primed sentence may
not be based upon knowledge of the earlier utterance. These features
of discourse performance do not effect syntactical or semantical analy-
ses, but make for nicer transcripts.
1.32 (1) SOME PEOPLE JUST GET UP—
(2) SOME PEOPLE JUST WRECK
(3) SOME PEOPLE JUST HAVE A—
Ik) SOME PEOPLE—
(5) SOME PEOPLE JUST WRECK
(6) SOME PEOPLE JUST HAVE A PLANE WRECK
(T) AND THEY GET BURNED UP IN THE FIRE
(8) THEY—
(9) AND THEY GET BURNED UP IN THE FIRE
(10) AND THEY DIE
(11) THEY GO TO THE HOSPITAL
(1) then what happens?
(12) THEY GO TO HEAVEN
(2) in the hospital?
(13) THEY GET BURIED IN A CEMETARY
(lU) AND JESUS TAKES THEM TO HEAVEN
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1.33
1.3k
1.35
( 3 ) oh , okay
( 15 ) AUD JESUS TAKES CARE OF THEM AT HEAVEN
(l6) THAT'S WHERE DEAD PEOPLE GO
(IT) PEOPLE COULD DIE
IF THEY GOT HIT BY A CAR
(1) AND A PERS—
(2) AND A PERSON—
(3) AND A PERSON WHO GETS BURNT UP
BY A FURNACE—
{k) THEY COULD DIE TOO
(l) they could,
couldn't they?
(5) AND— UH—
(6) PEOPLE'S HOUSES THAT BURNED DOWN—
(7) PEOPLE COULD DIE
IF THEIR HOUSES BURNT—
IF THEIR HOUSES BURNT DOWN
( 1 )
(2)
(3)
ik)
(5)
( 6 )
(T)
( 8 )
(9)
(l) they do?
( 10 ')
(2") what if
i was in a house
that was hiirning?
( 11 )
( 12 )
(3) i coTild choke
(U) and then what
would happen?
(13)
( 5 ) and then what
would happen?
(IM
IF PEOPLE GET BURNT UP IN A—
IF PEOPLE GET BURNT UP—
IF PEOPLE—
IF PEOPLE GET BURNT UP IN A HOUSE—
IF PEOPLE—
YOU KNOW WHAT HAPPENS?
YOU KNOW HOW—
YOU KNOW WHAT HOUSES DO?
THEY BURNT DOWN
THE ONES THAT—
I DON'T KNOW
YOU COULD CHOKE OR SOMETHING
YOU'D GO TO THE HOSPITAL
AND YOU MIGHT DIE
OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT
(1) what would happen
if you were in a house
(2) and it was burning
on fire?
(l) I DON'T KNOW
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(3)
(2) FOR ONE THING,
YOU MAKE SURE
YOU'RE NOT IN YOUR HOUSE
(3) BECAUSE IF IT BURNTS DOWN
(U) AND ALL THE FURNITURE FALLS OUT
(5) AND IT CA—
(6) AND THEY—
(7) YOU MAKE SURE
YOU'RE NOT IN YOUR HOUSE
WHEN IT CATCHES ON FIRE
AND BURNTS DOWN
(8) AND ALL THE FURNITURE WILL FALL OUT
(9) CAUSE IF YOU STAY IN IT
(10) AND IT CATCHES ON FIRE REAL QUICK
AND BURNTS DOWN
(11) YOU'LL DIE
"boy* you would,
wouldn't you?
(12) YEAH
This then is the nature of the performance data which is stock and
trade for a clinical language study. One of the first steps in analysis
is to begin the refinement of this data once it is recognized that men-
tal phenomenon is recorded in the transcript. Actual performance data
such as this has become rare in psychological studies and yet in case
studies this is necessary for explicit certainty to a particular client.
As difficult as the task of characterizing individual performance data
is known to be, it is important for clinical studies not to lose sight
of the performances in the refinements of grammatical analysis. The
claims for a psychological reality of various forms of grammar may rest
not only upon learnability or universality, but also upon how the form
of grammar breaks down in disability. The analysis of grammatical mal-
functioning is a central concern in clinical studies and the motivating
elegence in the use of generative methods is the variety of performance
breakdowns due to incompetence of the client.
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2.0 Grammatical Analysis
Since the purpose of this study is the description of language
disability, it is an important methodological issue to define the ana-
lysis in a manner which does not assume the specific structure of a
particular language at the core of the procedure. Most analyses of
language disability have explicitly assumed the task of comparing a
client's performance ability against a specific grammar of English.
While there may be some sense in doing this with cases of traiomatic
aphasia in which language is lost, there seems little point in such com-
parison for deviantly communicating persons who have never spoken by the
same rules as the linguistic community. To depart from the method of
surface structure comparison, this work requires an analysis which is
general enough to describe any simple language— artifical ones; certain
fragments of natural languages, like English, Spanish, or Hittite; and
especially the simple expressions of very young children and some com-
munication handicapped persons. The artificial languages are of extra
use since they may be explicitly constructed of known quality and there-
by be of use in the definition and calibration of the analytic tools.
A language is defined for a generative grammar as a set of all of
the sentences of that language. The size of a language may then be sub-
ject to variation. Some languages may consist of only a small set of
specifically listed sentences. The languages of some computer programs,
some very small children, and some aphasic persons may have finite limits
on the length or number of sentences in their language. Other languages
can cycle some phrase structures endlessly and thereby permit sentences
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of endless diversity or length. With these variations possible, the pro-
blem of characterizng a language cannot rely upon the exhaustive list-
ing of sentences since there may be infinitely many of them. For the
purpose of clinical case studies, the language of a client is described
from a set of sentences taken from actual perfromances and are selected
to represent that client's abilities in a systematic way.
A grammar is a set of rules which describe the structure and mean-
ing obtained by combining the words into sentences. Given the set of
words as basic expressions, a syntactical and semantical grammar relates
these basic expressions to each other in a way that eventually refers to
a model interpretation of the situation or state of affairs. The syntax
is said to provide the structure of the sentences and the semantics is
said to provide a corresponding truth-functional proposition.
A syntactical rule is a discrete part of the generative grammar
and these rules consist of structural operations upon syntactic cate-
gories. Categorial rules of phrase structure have been developed for
some time (Ajdukiewicz 1935 » Bar-Hillel 1965 )* Categorial rules of syn-
tax have a small number of beginning categories and any number of de-
rived categories constructed from them. All categories are listed in the
lexicon with their contents of basic expressions. Basic expressions are
usually single words or affixes , and these serve as terminal elements
for the phrase structure. Each categorial rule specifies which cate-
gories produce syntactic structures of the language and stipulates the
linear order of its constituents. A well formed categorial rule com-
bines its categories in accordance with type-relational
definitions of
the categories in that operation. The lexicon is organized by
these
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type-relational definitions, although all possible combinations of types
may or may not occur in a language. Furthermore, the syntax may contain
noncategorial rules in which definitionally unrelated categories are
combined.
The simplest form of syntactic structure is known as a phrase. A
sentence is a special kind of phrase which has a truth value in the model
interpretation. A clause is another type of phrase which has a complete
definable truth value but it is embedded in a matrix sentence so that its
truth conditions usually contribute to the overall interpretation of the
matrix. This manner of building phrase structure in an isomorphic cor-
respondence with semantical translations on a rule-by-rule basis is the
legacy of Montague (197U).
For the semantical component of a generative grammar, the meaning
of a sentence is found in the conditions for evaluating its truth in a
particular or possible situation. Each rule of semantics corresponds to
a phrase structure rule so that the meaning of the phrase is composed of
the meanings of its constituents. To specify the meaning the a sentence
is to specify the conditions under which that sentence may be true or
false. The interpretation of a sentence involves a connection to model
theoretical semantics in which all possible situations of a given domain
are represented in sets of ontological primitives (Tarski 19^^; Carnap
19 ^7 ) • Each riile of semantics has a defined relationship to such models
which are composed of possible individual, situations, times, and other
functions over logical constants. The manner of building models from
simple set theory is a contribution of Friedman, Moran, and Warren
(1977)- An important intermediate step between the model interpretation
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and the phrase structure is the translation into intensional logic. This
IS a predicate calculus whose semantics are familiar to semanticists
,
and
It IS within this 'deep' level of structure that the familiar logical op-
erators and connectives play. These connectives include negation, con-
junction, implication, equivalence, identity, inclusive disjunction, and
so forth. The foundations for this modern form of propositional logic
were developed by Frege (i8T9).
Beyond the direct interplay of syntax and semantics
,
the syntax in
this study makes ocassional access to an additional kind of rule the
transformations. These structural operations are included as postseman-
tic derivational processes. This is intended to be similar to the early
Chomsky (1965) standard linguistic theory. Transformations are formally
given as meaning-preserving operations upon complete initial phrase
structures and do not affect propositional composition. This is to limit
the transformations in the manner of the Katz-Postal (196^1) hypothesis,
which became a piece of standard methodology for a while. The use of
this form of linguistic theory does make some modest difference in the
results of a particular analysis; however, much of this difference is
thought to be notational variance which are easily intertranslated with
other linguistic models.^ In the manner of Peters and Ritchie (19T3),
Making transformations available in this manner is only for con-
ceptual clarity and the somewhat wider acceptance of this linguistic
theory over other possible theories. Chomsky's more recent extended
standard theory allows transformations with trace markers to affect the
semantical interpretation which is projected from the surface of the
sentence. Cooper'* s (19T9) discussions of Montague's semantical theory
consider transformational grammar with more completeness than here.
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the formalizations of transformations in this study will use the factor-
izations of labeled bracketing. These transformations do not figure
heavily in the forthcoming analyses because of the formal simplicity of
the particular client data; although, Bloom (1970) does introduce some
transformations for early child language which have not been widely
accepted. On this account the formal definitions of transformations may
seem naive without consideration of the constraints upon their deriva-
tional application or the mechanism of cyclic ordering. These defini-
tions of copy and delete operations should make explicit the relation
between this analysis and other previous methods which may be more fami-
liar.
To introduce the details of grammatical analysis, some effort is
taken to formally define the analytic mechanisms in a manner which is
free of any particular language. A specific grammar of English or French
might be the resiilt of applying some analytic method constructed as this
one to some data from competent speakers of English or French. For this
study, a small artificial language is used to define the syntactical and
semantical devices which later will be used to describe client perform-
ance data. This method of definition is a contribution of logicians to
linguistic inquiry.
2.1 Rules of phrase structure are operations which specify the
structural relations which hold for one or more constituents. These con-
stituents are either: (i) phrases which are the output of other syntac-
tical operations , or (ii) basic expressions from the lexicon. The simple
ordered language, 2.10, is constructed from the 2.11 lexicon by a strict
categorial syntax, 2.12.
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2.10 An arbitrary language
A P AAR A PN
BP A B S A PNN
AQ BAS BBSN
BQ BBS BARN
B Q D B PN
A P C B P
B A RN C B Q
A A P D A A PN
T X Q
T Y Q
U X B SN
U Y T X R
As a matter of convenience, the capital case lettering is strictly
reserved for actual tokens of the object language being described. This
coincides with the conventions for transcription of client performances
in the last section, but this will not be an important distinction for
this artificial language whose actual tokens directly correspond with
the output of the grammar. In most client data there are actual tokens
which are ungrammatical by the analysis— counterexamples and perform-
ance fragments. In theoretical discussion there are grammatical tokens
which are predicted by the grammar but not actually in the particular set
of data. The arrangment of 2.10 into five columns is purely an arbitrary
feature for esthetic purposes. These are arranged to show grammatical
progression, but the arrangement of the actual tokens of an object lan-
guage could be presented in any order.
2.11 Lexicon of basic expressions
•
e : A , B
t/e : P , Q
(t/e)/e : R , S
t/t • : +N
t/tt : C
,
D
(t//t)/e : T , U
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The lexicon of a simple language contains the set of categories in
•which are found the basic expressions. Italic lettering is reserved for
the description of syntactical categories while the boldface lettering
is reserved for the basic expressions. Categories are defined by their
categorial type-relations to one or more primitive categories. The
primitive category, ;b
,
is the category of sentences. Any expression of
type has a truth value by the semantical component. In the 2.11 lexi-
con there are no basic expressions listed in this category; therefore,
all sentence expressions of the language must derived by syntactical
operations. It is possible to enter some expressions as basic sentences
which unitary syntactical structure and a noncompositional interpreta-
tion. Some idiom chunks could be treated as such. The other primitive
category, ^ , is the category of entities— the basic terms of the 2.10
language
.
The compos it ionally related categories are defined by their com-
binatorial abilities with the primitives. The slash notation is of the
form: to make an a
, / , it takes a 3 where a , 3 are metavariables over
syntactical categories. Greek lettering is reserved for these variables
in the metalanguage. It is required that Ol/3 and CX//3 receive identical
interpretations in the semantics even though they are distinct syntactic
categories, the form Ol/33 is a category of expressions which make an a
by taking two expressions of type 3 • Parentheses in the slash notation
are used for disambiguation.
In the 2.11 lexicon there are two categories of predicates, t/e
and (t/e)/e . There are also three categories of sentence operators:
t/t is the simple modifier for negation and other single sentence
oper
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ators, t/tt is a category of connectives, and ( t //t ) /
e
is a category of
phrase-building sentence modifiers. The single basic expression in t/t
is a suffix— the + indicating the direction of affixing to the next
lexical item in the terminal string of basic expressions.
Categorial grammars are often constructed with the two primitives
and ^ ; although, more primitives could be identified if needed. The
metalinguistic principle of simplicity constrains the n\amber of primi-
tives to the fewest necessary for adequate description of the object
language
.
2.12 Syntax of phrase structure
SI -> e t/e
S2 t/e e (t/e)/e
S3 t t t/t
su t t/tt t
S5 t t//t t
s6 t//t (t//t )/e
ST -> A , B , X
S8 t/e -> p , Q
S9 (t/e)/e R , S
SIO t/t -y +N
Sll t/tt -> C , D
S12 (t//t )/e T , U
The rules of phrase structure stipulate which
combinations of the
categories occur in the syntactical operations of the
language. Even
though the lexicon is constructed upon combinatorial
principles among
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the categories, not all possible combinations need occur in a specific
language. The syntax precisely regulates the phrase structure of the
language, and occasionally rules may not coincide directly with the
type-relational definitions in the lexicon. Such r\iles which do not
operate in the manner of the categorial definitions are called noncate-
gorial rules. The analysis of natural languages is often faced with
admitting noncategorial rules of phrase structure; however, a metalin-
guistic principle of categoriality generally favors a grammar in which
the phrase structure does coincide with the type relations of the lexi-
con. Some effort is taken with the 2.12 syntax so that it is uniformly
categorial while noncategorial rules will be seen in natural data later.
All phrase structure riiles are of the form: if a then 3... where
a is any single category and 3. .
.
is any strictly ordered string of cate-
gories. The rules Sl-S6 are of this form called rewriting rules. The
phrase structure rules S7-S12 are known as lexical entry rules and have
the form: if a then 3 where a is any single category and 3 is any sin-
gle basic expression of that category. The commas in phrase structure
notation are a short-hand manner of representing a closely related sub-
set of rules having the same nonterminal category, but alternatively
different lexical items which are separated by the commas. It should be
understood that there is one unique lexical entry rule for each distinct
lexical item.
Syntactical operations generally consist of ordering constituents
or the affixing of them. In languages such as English, ordering is a
major property of the syntax while in other languages like Russian the
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affixing of words with grammatical role markers is the major device of
syntax while word order is relatively free. The strict ordering conven-
tion for the phrase structure of this study is provided here as a matter
of convenience in dealing with the small English influenced samples.
This shotild not be taken as a fundamental ordering principle of all
grammars. As many languages have free word orders, it should be possi-
ble for the language of some disabled people to make use of less strict
ordering than expected by the linguistic community— especially where
a self-made or idiosyncratic language may exist. The metalinguistic
decision to use a strictly ordered phrase structure provides conceptual
simplicity for the grammars of this study in relation to their data, and
this decision should not be taken as a general solution to the problems
of a uniform grammar for all languages, even though this goal is rather
attractive and eventually necessary to learning theory.
With these conventions above, an analysis tree and a derivation
can be defined in order to connect the grammar to actual examples of
sentences in the object language. An analysis tree is a familiar visual-
ization of syntactical structure by which derivational history is illus-
trated. Each Junction of an analysis tree is called a node, and each of
these is double labeled with the name of its category and the number of
rule which operates to result in the immediate constituents. Special
abbreviated node labels will later be assigned to each category as the
categorial definitions of this section rapidly become too cumbersome
for
diagraming and mnemonic purposes. A derivation specifies the serial
order
of syntactical operations. Each derivation begins with an
exponential
entry— a beginning point much like the hypothetical entry in
the deriva-
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tion of deductive inferences in propositional logics. The exponent of a
syntactically connected expression is the category to which the whole
composite expression belongs. Each successive line of a derivation is
the result of a single syntactical operation from the grammar upon the
preceeding line. Notice the relations between an analysis tree and its
derivation in each of the following. The derivation contains more infor-
mation than the analysis tree. The tree diagrams have a familiar form
which is quickly appreciated, but they lack the information about the
order of rule application contained in the derivational history.
2.13 Analysis trees and derivations
t
A P
i
.
[t] exponent
ii. [[e][t/e]] by SI
iii
.
[[[A]][t/e]] by ST
iv. [[[A]][[P]]] by S8
t
i . [t] exponent
ii
.
[[t][t/t]] by S3
iii rrreirt/eU[t/t]] by SI
iv. rrreirreir(t/e)/e]]][t/t]] by S2
V. rrrrBnrreir(t/e)/e]]][t/t]] by ST
vi
.
[[[[B]][[[A]][(t/e)/e]]][t/t]] by ST
vii [[[[B]][[[A]][[R]]]][t/t]] by S9
•
viii
.
[[[[B]][[[A]][[E]]]][[+N]]] by SIO
31
lin© of a derivation is called a symbolization of the
syntactic structure thus derived, and it is an ordered string of basic
expressions, explicitly generated by operation of the syntactic rules.
A symbolization is somewhat different than the actual sentence of the
object language. For instance, . . .R +N. .
.
appears in the symbolization
and should be compared to ...RN... in the object language. The opera-
tion of some unspecified but intuitive device of morphology is not a
feature and so the inflection of lexical items is unspecified. In
addition to such trivial differences between a derived symbolization and
an actual token of the object language, a symbolization is the result of
a particular derivation and the relationship between each line item is
indicated by square bracketing. In an ambiguous language, such as 2.10,
some of the sentences may be assigned more than one symbolization: each
differing in the bracketed relationships between expressions and each
having a different corresponding analysis tree.
2.1k Analysis trees and symbolizations of an ambiguous sentence
[[[b[Q]]d[[b[p]]+n]]
t
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[[3[Q]]d[3[?]]+n]
t
Bracketing in a symbolization is often suppressed for parsimony
since it provides the same information as an analysis tree. Selected
bracketing may be used gratuitously to illustrate particular line item
relations— known as scope relations— where there may be doubt or deser-
ve extra emphasis. It is also possible to label each bracket with the
category to which the constituents within belong.
Both the analysis tree and the derivation are operational devices
which ccnnecn the rules of the grammar to empirical examples of sentences
of the language. Thus, the sentence, AAR
,
in the 2.10 language is
grammatical by the 2.12 syntax because there exist a well-formed analysis
tree and derivation for that sentence. These devices may also define
some nonempirical or even nontheoretical examples of sentences. It may
be noticed that the sentence, 0 3 3 R , is not found in 2.10 although
it is grammatical by the syntax; and furthermore, the sentence, * A 3 ? ,
is neither found in the language nor grammatical by the 2.12 syntax.
2.15 jl-sentence Analytic punctuation for a sentence
which is grammatical but not actually
listed in the finite set of sentences
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presently being analyzed. Such a sen-
tence is said to be predicted by the
grammar since there exists at least one
^®ll“f'ormed analysis tree and derivation
for such, although no example of it may
have been observed.
2.16 ^-sentence Analytic punctuation for a sentence
which is ungrammatical since no well-
fonned analysis tree and derivation
can exist for such a sentence in accor-
dance with the grammar. An example of
such a sentence in the actual language
being analyzed is said to be a counter-
example since it is not predicted by
the grammar.
Both of these analytic punctuation symbols for hypothetical sen-
tences are useful devices in discussing an analysis and should not be
confused with transcript punctuation which is part of the data. Analytic
punctuation does advance theoretical claims for consideration while the
transcript punctuation does not.
2.2 Rules of predicate logic are used recursively to define the
set of meaningful expressions of an interpreted language. To understand
the meaning of a sentence, the various conditions under which that sen-
tence is true or false must be known i and furthermore, the meaning of a
sentence must depend upon the systematic composition of its parts. For
a sentence to be interpreted, the meaning of that sentence is related
to a set-theoretical model of the situation or state of affairs within
the domain of discourse.
Traditional logics have two truth values: true and false. Logics
with other numbers of values are possible, but these shall not be con-
sidered here. As an abstract ideal of definitional purpose, an arbi-
trary language could be constructed from a single of each grammatical
device that is, a single truth value, a single reference point, a sin-
gle individual, a single term, a single predicate, a single connective,
and so on. Since it is doubtful that such a language could be plausible
for human communication, a grammatical analysis based upon such a de-
scriptive framework might escape the definitional circularity of many
psychological or mental theories. The metalinguistic decision to base
this method upon a double of each device (except tense) is made with the
intention to select the smallest psychologically plausible language for
the definitions. A single time in the interpretative model is an arbi-
trary restriction for simplicity since none of the child or disability
data contain tensing.
The semantical component of the grammar contains several subcompo-
nents: an intensional logic which is a 'reasonable first hypothesis for
a universal language of logical form' (Partee 1977); an interpretational
model which specifies the relations between the things referred to in
domain of discourse; and the semantical rules defining the relationship
between the logic and the model. The rules which translate from phrase
structures to logical expressions correspond on a one-to-one level, so
that a derivation of a propositional symbolization will directly corres-
pond to a syntactical analysis tree of the initial phrase structure.
This form of semantical rule which translates from the syntax into
an expression of intensional logic is an indirect double-syntax method
but this is not intended to obscure the semantics. Truth functional
operations define the semantical conditions for sentences to be true
35
assertions in reference to the modeled situation. Rather than presenting
the semantics of a language directly with its syntax, Montague (19TU: PTQ
and UG) uses this method of translation from syntax to logic whose inten-
sional semantics are explicit and familiar to semanticists
. The easy
convenience of this translation method has made it popiilar in the most
subsequent research, although the double syntax contains some power in
assymetrical relations between the phrase structure and logic. A more
direct method of representing semantics (Montague 197^: EFL) may even-
tually become preferred once the issues become familiar. As a psycho-
logical theory there may be some nontrivial differences bewteen the
direct and indirect semantics (Partee 1977); however, the logical trans-
lation rules shall be used here.
The structure for meaningful expressions of intensional logic are
defined in 2.21. The denotative categories of the logic are called
semantical types, and the greek lettering are distinct metavariables
over these types: a, t 3 a-re distinguished for any type in the logic;
cp
,
are distinguished for sentence-corresponding types. Many basic
expressions translate directly into logical constants , so there are as
many constants as needed for the lexicon, usually noted by marking the
boldface expression, as in A' . The intensional logic makes use of as
many variables as needed for the semantical types. Logical variables
are written with italic lettering and are sometimes numbered by
subscript
to avoid confusing two variables of the same type. The use
of v^ is
distinguished for any logical type; for the type of
individuals,
X for the type of individual concepts, and so on.
There is a special
—
n
semantical function, G , for assigning elements of the
model interpreta-
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tion of logical variables when specifying the meaning of sentences. The
definitions of semantical types are noted in angle bracket notation which
directly corresponds to the slash notation of the syntactical categories,
but using an additional primitive, £ , for the senses of a referent in
an intensional model.
2.21 Meaningful expressions of intensional logic
a. K'
b. V
—
n
c
.
A. V 3
d. a(3)
Every constant, K'
,
of any type is
a meaningful expression.
Every variable,
,
of any type is
a meaningful expression.
The lambda-abstraction of a variable,
,
of any type <a> is a function from
from expression, a
,
of type <a> to an
expression, 3 > of type <^> , whenever
a is assigned in place of v . The
~n
lambda-abstract is a meaningful expres-
2
Sion of type <a,b> .
The value of the function, a
,
of type
<b ,a> for the argioment
, 3 » of type <^>
is a meaningful expression of type <^> .
Unfortunately, the study of semantics does not uniformly use the
greek lettering as metavariables over categories. The lambda, X , is
the only greek letter which appears as a symbol in the logical expres-
sions containing an open variable. This usage was introduced by Church
( 19^1 ) and has been retained since in the semantical literature. In a
similar fashion, greek letter epsilon, e , is usually reserved as a
metasymbol for set membership, but this usage can be avoided here for
simplicity.
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e. a = 3 The identity formiila where a
, 3 are any
expressions of the same type is a mean-
ingful expression of type <t>.
f. -1 cp The negative formula is a meaningful
expression of type <t>.
g. cp A kij The conjunction formiila is a meaningful
expression of type <t>
.
h. cp V The disjunction formula is a meaningful
expression of type <t>.
i. cp ^ li) The conditional formula is a meaningfcil
expression of type <t>
.
j . cp^ip The equivalence formula is a meaningful
expression of type <t>
k. Vv cp
-n
The existential quantification of a
variable,
,
of any type is a meaning-
ful expression of type <t>.
1. Av cp
—
n
The universal quantification of a vari-
able,
^ ,
of any type is a meaningful
expression of type <t>.
m. ? cp The questioned formula radical is a
meaningful expression of type <;t>.
n. "a The intension of an expression, a , of
any type <a> is a meaningful expression
of type <s,a>.
o. "a
•
The extension of an expression, a , of
type <s,a> is a meaningful expression
of type <^> .
The semantics of this intensional logic has two major parts: the
rules of composition for meaningful expressions; and the reference to a
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set-theory model containing the state descriptions. A metalinguistic
principle of compositionality requires that the meaning of a complex
expression must he built up from the smaller expressions in a systematic
way. Thus in the semantical rules, 2.22 which follow, any expression of
type <t> from the logic is given a formal correspondence to syntactical
sentences and can be assigned a truth value, {1,0}
,
from the model.
The value, 1
,
is given as true in reference to a portion of the model
and the value, 0
,
is reserved for falsehood. The set theory notation,
^ ’
refers to a function from logical constants to sets of reference
points, I
,
in the model, M . A special semantical function, G(v ) , is
—
n
a model interpretation function which has domain over variables of any
type and ranges over the set of possible denotations of the correspon-
ding type. This G-assignment provides possible values for the variables
in the logical expressions. Quantification also concerns some special
functions related to variable assignments. The existential function,
„/r-|M,I,G*v
L V J j , IS a majcimal assignment function whose value is true
when there exist at least one value of G-assignment for the quantified
variable such that cp is true. The G' function is like the G-assignment
with the possible difference that G’(v^) is the value assigned for the
variable such that the truth conditions for (p can be satisfied. The uni-
versal function, L([cp] ’ ’ ) , is a minimal assignment function so that
cp must be true for all values of G-assignment to the variable.
The semantical rules, 2.22, are only stated once in this study be-
cause most of the analytic work on the language samples is translation
from the phrase structure into the intensional logic. Since Montague
(l9T^) first introduced this indirect technique of translation, it has
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become the popular basis of subsequent work. Actual semantical rules
are only given once in this study as they give the interpretation for
expressions of intensional logic and the subsequent grammars will give
translation rules matching the syntax to this logic. This kind of anal-
ysis with logical translation does claim some psychological reality to
the level of intensional logic, and this could become a matter of empir-
ical verification once the method becomes familiar enough to tease out
the relevant data. In the meantime, the intensional logic is a plausible
hypothesis to approximate some internal level of language processing
which is universal for all specific natural languages.
2.22 Semantical rules of intensional logic
a. = F(K')(<i>)
b. [v^f
=
G(v^)
c. [;.v^ =
d. [ a(3) f = [af G([g]M,I,G)
e. [ a = 3 = 1 ^
[e^M.I.G
f. [ -icp ^ ^ ^ [<pf
’I-®
= 0
g. [ cp A = 1
-M- [«,f
=
1 A [4,]“
’I'®
= 1
h. [ (p V ilJ
=!-(-> 1 A [4l]“’^’® = 1
V = 1 A
[4,]“'^’° = 0
V = 0 A = 1
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i. [ cp = 1 ^ 1 A
V [<pf = 0 A
V = 0 A
j. [cp = 1 -H- = 1 A [4j]M,i,g
V [cpf ’^>0 = 0 A
k. 9->11
]M,I
’°= 1 >°')= 1
1. [ A V cp
-ti
]M,I
1 L([cp]“-I ’°')= 1
m. 1
1
6 jM,I 1 = 1
n. =
o. i>)
1
1
0
1
0
It is now a rather straightforward task to return to the descrip-
tion of the arbitrary object language, 2.10. A set of direct correspon-
dences need to be established for the syntactical categories to be mapped
onto the sets of semantical types: these being denotative categories of
the logic. These semantical types can be determined from the syntactic
categories by a mapping fimction to semantical types: f(Y) is assigned
to <Y> where Y is a distinguished metavariable over primitive categories;
f(a/|3) and f(a//3) are assigned to <<£, f(3)>) f(ci)> where a,3 are the
usual metavariables over any category and ^ is an additional categorial
primitive for the senses of expressions from different reference points
of an intensional interpretation; and, f(a/33) is assigned to <<<£, f(3)>5
<s, f(3)», f‘(a)>.
es in 2.23 are provided
The syntactical-semantical correspondenc
for the 2.10 object language in accordance with this mapping function,
and it may be helpful to refer to this later in discussion when it is
preferable to use the semantical designations for various types.
2 .23 Correspondences of syntactical categories to semantical types
SYNTACTIC
CATEGORY
SYNTACTIC
DESIGNATION
SEMANTIC
EXTENSIONAL TYPE
SEMANTIC
DESIGNATION
SEMANTIC
INTENSIONAL TYPE
SEMANTIC
DESIGNATION
sentences <t> truth values <3 ,t> propositions
terms <e> individuals <s,e> individual concepts
t/e intransitive
predicates
sets of
individuea concepts <s,<ss.e>,t>>
properties of
individual concepts
(t/e)/e transitive
predicates 'SS ,e> ,<<s,e> ,t>'
•xtensional relations
h"t.vecn 's,<<s.e-' ,<<s,e> .t>>>
intensional relations
individual concepts individual concepts
t/t sentence
modifiers <«s.t> t>
sets of
pronos it ions «s ,<<s ,t> ,t>>
properties of
propositions
t//t sentence
modifiers <<s .t> ,t>
sets of
propositions <3,<<S,t>,t>>
properties of
propositions
(.//tl/e modifier
heads <<5.e> ,<<s.t> .t>>
extensional relations
between propositions <s ,<<s ,e> ,<<s .t> ,t>>>
intensional relations
between propositions
and individual concepts and individual concepts
t.'tt
sentence
connectives <<<s.t> ,<s,t>> .t>
sets of
ordered propositions 'S,<<<S.t> ,<5.t>,t”
properties of
ordered pronositions
In the following translation rules, 2.2h, each rule of the 2.12
phrase structure is given a corresponding expression of intensional logic
.
The categorial treatment of the grammar results in the logical connec-
tives of propositional logic—
-i
,
v
,
a
,
V
,
and A— being entered as
lambda-abstract with P-variables over propositions. While this adds
slightly to the derivational complexity of the grammar, the strict cate-
gorial grammar gives a uniform functional application for the phrasal
rules: Tl, T3-T6. Much of this unsightly lambda-abstraction is usually
avoided by relaxing strict categoriality to an approach known as the
syncategorial treatment which enters the logical connectives directly
in logical expressions rather than as lexical entries.
2.2k Semantics of logical translation^
T1 t/e (^e )
T2 ^ [-(-t/e-^/e ( x."e)l
T3 t/t (^t)
tH t/tt ( ''t ,"t
)
T5 t//t ("t)
T6 4t//t4/e (-e)
TT A'
,
B'
,
u^
,
u^
T8 P'
,
Q’
T9 R'
,
S'
TIO j (1
Til
^1^2 ['P.! ''
T12 AxAP V[''x][''P ] ,
n — —
n
AxAP a[''x][''P
n
“
~n
To complete the specification of the semantical component, it is
necessary^ to define a set theoretical model for the state descriptions
to which the object language, 2.10, is said to refer. A specified model
M, contains a set of possible individuals which are the collection of
It should be noted that parentheses symbols in the intensional
logic are used in the set theoretical manner for containing a function's
arguments. The disambiguating parentheses in the slash notation of the
categorial syntax are of different purpose, and hence have been marked,
to avoid confusion. This will not be necessary later when node
labels can be used in place of the categorial definitions. The variable
P
,
is of type < s ,t> .
1*3
things refered to within the domain of discourse and these provide the
ontological basis for the model. A pair of curly brackets, { } , contain
unordered sets of model elements, usually in pairs; and, parentheses,
( ) , contain ordered pairs in the model. Besides the set of possible
individuals, the model contains sets of possible truth values, {1,0} ;
and sets of reference points, {10, II, ...
,
IN}
; and the sets of
function values from basic expressions to the intensional reference
points. It is the set of reference points which distinguish the inten-
sional model from the extensional models which contain only a single
state description. Specifying the set structure for a model begins with
rather simple recursive principles which combine the model elements in
all possible combinations— a cartesian product of the individuals , truth
values, and reference points. The model contains a reference for every
possible relationship between the elements, and the task of the semantical
component of the grammar is to compose meanings in expressions which indi-
cate subsets within the model that is being refered to. The pragmatical
compnent of the grammar should also aid in limiting the refered to part
of the model through discoxirse conventions, conversational integrity, and
so forth. Unfortunately, the formalization of pragmatics is sometime in
futiire, hopefully not too remote. In the meanwhile, psychologically
oriented theories of semantics are faced with the problem of specifying
models which exponentially explode in size relative to the n\imber of
lexical items in the language. The cartesian products of even quite small
languages produce enormous models which are rarely specified completely
because of the size. Mathematicians in the development of model theory
have produced techniques of increasing generality so that the specifi-
cation of the set structure of the model is assuuned without need of
direct representation. Model theoretics allows semantics to accoiant
for potentially infinite sets of possible individuals, worlds, and
times only some of which are ever actually refered to. For psychologic
studies, however, this aspect of generality does not resolve the main
problem of representing a finite model which is refered to in actual
sets of sentences used in conversation. There are a number of ways to
limit the size of finitely specified models, such as meaning postulates
or altering the cartesian principle and generate only partial models
rather than total. These are more or less systematic techniques; but
lacking a formal pragmatics, they appear unpleasingly arbitrary for
psychological purposes at present. The specified model, 2.25
,
for the
2.10 object language is arbitrarily restricted to only two reference
points, {11,12}
,
for the purposes of analytic definition. Other
methods for representing finite models shall be mentioned later when
used in the study of actual performance data, but the techniques for
limiting the exponential size of total models shall be no less arbitrary
but perhaps satisfactory for use.
2.25 Denotative Descriptions and Model Specifications
Set of Possible Individuals {{A1,A2},
Set of Reference Points {11,12},
Set of Truth Values {1
,
0 }
,
Values of Intensional Functions
D
< s ,e>
D
< s ,<<s ,e> ,t> >
D
<s,<<s,e>,<<s,e>,t> >>
{F(A') = {(I1,A1),(I2,A1)},
F(B') = {(I1,A2),(I2,A2)},
F(P*) = {(I1,{({(I1,A1),(I2,A1)},1),
({(I1,A2),(I2,A2)},0)}),
(I2,{({(I1,A1),(I2,A1)},0),
({(I1,A2),(I2,A2)},1)})},
F(Q') = {(I1,{({(I1,A1),(I2,A1)},0),
({(I1,A2),(I2,A2)},1)}),
(I2,{({(I1,A1),(I2,A1)},0),
({(I1,A2),(I2,A2)},1)})},
F(R’) = {(I1,{({(I1,A1),(I2,A1)},
({(I1,A1),(I2,A1)},1),
({(I1,A2),(I2,A2)},1)}),
({(I1,A2),(I2,A2)},
({(I1,A1),(I2,A1)},1),
({(I1,A2) ,(I2 ,A2)},0)})})
,
(I2,{({(I1,A1),(I2,A1)},
({(I1,A1),(I2,A1)},0),
({(I1,A2),(I2,A2)},1)}),
({(I1,A2),(I2,A2)},
({(I1,A1),(I2,A1)},1),
({(I1,A2),(I2,A2)},0)})})},
kS
F(S’) = {(I1,{({(I1,A1),(I2,A1)},
({(I1,A1),(I2,A1)},0),
({(I1,A2),(I2,A2)},1)}),
({(I1,A2),(I2,A2)},
({(I1,A1),(I2,A1)},0),
({(I2,A2),(I2,A2)},0)})}),
(I2,{({(I1,A1),(I2 ,A1)},
({(I1,A1),(I2,A1)},0),
({(I1,A2),(I2,A2)},1)}),
({(I1,A2),(I2,A2)},
({(I1,A1),(I2,A1)},1),
({(I1,A2),(I2,A2)},0)})})}}}
The 2.25 model interpretation explicitly gives the values of the
intensional functions for the logical constants of the 2.10 object lan-
guage. The set of possible denotations of the intensional type, < s ,e>
,
is called the set of individual concepts because the semantical function
selects an individual at each reference point. The constants. A' and B',
are given as rigid designators in this model— these functions pick out
the same individual at all reference points. In some semantical studies
the constants which correspond to term expressions are given as nonrigid
designators which pick out different individuals from different reference
points. The same name can refer to different people, but for this study
the function of rigid designation is presented because it is simpler in
model specifications and it is not too incompatible with the data later.
The person names for very young children; MAMA, DADA, and the like; seem
properly analyzed with the simpler functions although there are some
empirical complexities to be found in the earliest term expressions for
individual identities.
The model denotations for the intransitive predicates, P' and Q'
are called properties of individual concepts. For the constant, P'
,
there is a function which contains a truth value for each individual at
each reference point. It has been specified that A1 has that property
from the first reference point, II
,
but not from the second, 12
. The
reverse is true of the other individual, A2
. Concerning the property,
Q’
,
the first individual nevers has this property while it is always
true of the other.
The transitive expressions, R' and S’
,
are intensional relations
between individual concepts. The relation, R'
,
is not only transitive,
but it is also reciprocal since the same individuals always stand in the
same relation to each other. The R' relation is also reflexive since
there is at least one reference point, eg. II
,
where it is true that
one individual stands in the R’ relation to itself. The S' relation is
given as transitive but neither reciprocal nor reflexive.
Concluding this section on the semantical component, it can be
shown that each sentence of the object language has at least one deriva-
tion for an expression of intensional logic. A truth value for every
sentence can be found in the model interpretation. For the intermediate
step of translation into the intensional logic, the syntactical deriva-
tion introduced in 2.13 again appears for the semantical purpose of de-
riving the logical expressions by translation rules. The form of a
U8
semantical derivation is not perfectly isomorphic with the syntactical
derivation since the logical conversions of lambda-abstractions and the
'"'-cancelations do not have direct syntactical correlates. These con-
versions are entered as unn-umbered derivational reflexes, allowing the
sequence numbering to emphasize the r\ile-by-rule translation process
between syntax and the logic. The examples of semantical derivations
in 2.26 are the same examples found in 2.13.
2.26 Semantical derivations
i . t exponent
ii . t / e ( " e ) by T1
iii. t/e("A’) by TT
iv. P’ (''A' ) by T8
i . t exponent
ii. t/t (''t ) by T3
iii . t/t ( "[t/e ( "e )] ) by T1
iv. t/t ("[Ax [{t/e^/e ( X , "e )] ("£) ] ) by T2
t/t ("rit/e^/e ( "e , "e )]) convert
V. t/t (-rU/e^/e { -B', -e )]) by TT
vi . t/t (“flt/e^/e ( -B', 'A')]) by TT
vii. t/t ("[ ,"A' )]) by T9
viii . AP -1 ["P ]("[R’("B’,"A’)])
—n —n ~ ~ ~
by TIO
-1 [''"R' ("B’ ,"A' )] A-
convert
''
''-cancel
Since the intensional logic has explicit semantical rules, it is
possible to apply the 2.22 semantical rules to the symbolizations of
the logic and discover that [p.
=
1 since the P' property
of the A1 individual from the II reference point. Alternatively,
[P*("A')] ’ ’ =0 from the other reference point. The interpreta-
tion of the negative expression above is false from both reference
points since the R' relation is true of A1 and A2 from II and 12 in the
model
.
2.3 Rules of syntactical transformations are here defined as post-
semantical operations which change the structure of initial phrase mar-
kers without changing the semantical interpretation. These rules can be
formalized upon the 2.13 syntactical derivations in a simple manner. A
transformation is defined upon a derived symbolization of syntactical
phrase structure— a string of basic expressions within sets of brackets
that have been labeled for the category which they derived from. The
first step of a transformation is to factor the labeled string into a
structural description, then two kinds of syntactic operation follow:
factor copy or factor deletion. Since transformation can be specified
as obligatory so that they must operate whenever an initial phrase mar-
ker meets the structural description, a movement transformation is here
defined as an obligatory factor deletion upon the output of a factor
copy. These are the three basic forms of transformations: copy, delete,
and move.
Factorization is the central process in transformations which well-
formed strings of labeled brackets are divided into smaller parts known
as factors. A factor is any portion of the well-formed string which
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contains at least one expression and does not have a rightmost left
bracket nor a leftmost right bracket. More simply, a factor does not
begin with ] nor end with [ and must have structural content. Strings
of expressions may frequently be factored in more than one manner, so
transformations are given a structural description of factors which
are acceptable input for the structure transforming operations. The
structiiral description of a transformation specifies the contents of
some factors which must be present for the rule to operate. The
structural descriptions usually require the use of metavariables
—
factors with specific content are sometimes separated by any number of
unspecified factors. Greek lettering is again used for these meta-
variables over any syntactic structure in relation to the transforming
factors
.
Once a symbolization has been factored in manner which satisfies
the structural description, the transformation either copies the con-
tents of a factor at another place in the symbolization, or deletes the
deletes the content of a factor. The conditions under which a trans-
formation can perform its operations and constraints upon the possible
structural descriptions for transformations are complex matters and are
not considered in any detail here. Although the proper treatment of
transformations is an important concern, these rules do not play a very
central role in the studies of early syntax which follow. Consequently,
many formal properties of transformations, like cyclic ordering, are
only suggested here.
More illustrative purposes than formal definition, a single move-
ment transformation is introduced in 2.30 which completes the grammar
51
for the 2.10 object language. The vertical columns of dots separate
the factors in the transformation.
2.30 An obligatory tranformational rule
Quantifier Movement:
a. Structural description:
QQ//tiMtiZe ia
b. Factor copy:
a
c. Factor delete:
a r ^(t//t)/e B C^]
The complete derivational process for a transformed sentence of the
object language is presented in 2.31 below. To emphasize the isomorphism
between the syntax and semantics, the corresponding expressions are num-
bered sequentially line-by-line while the unique processes like logical
conversions or transformational suboperations are unnumbered as deriva-
tional reflexes.
yntacticnJ
and
semantical
derivations
atid
analysis
trees
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3.0 Grajnmatical Description of Early Child Language
The distinction between an infant and a child is the ability to
speak. The development of this ability usually begins around the first
year of life with an ever enlarging vocabulary of single word utterances
until the end of the second year when words become joined together into
syntactical structures of increasing complexity. Rather complete sen-
tences are regularly spoken and understood by a child by the third year.
The first period of single words when the first vocabulary develops is
known as the holophrastic stage since it was early accepted that the
first words did not represent isolated parts of speech but interpreted
pragmatically with the value of complete sentences (Stern and Stern
I9OT ; Bloch 1921 ; de Laguna 1927). The stage of early syntax has a
somewhat clear beginning point in speech production when two words are
produced in a single unit of intonation and are understood with a con-
stant compositional interpretation.
The formal treatment for grammatical description of this early
period of language development has been problemed at several levels:
(i) the continuation of the holophrastic interpretation into the stage
of syntactical growth; and, (ii) the lack of an explicit semantics. A
general problem in defining stages of linguistic acquisition is the pro-
longed maintenance of holophrastic interpretation at sentence level when
syntactical rules of phrase structure are known by the child. If the
syntactical rules are discrete mental processes, the child may be defaul-
ting in a conversation if the holophrase interpretation is thought to be
different from the rules of syntactical interpretation. It isvery
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commonplace to exclude the holophrase from consideration in syntactical
analyses as a matter of methodology, and reliance is placed upon average
sentence length (mean length of utterances: Brovn, Cazden, and Bellugi
1968) to pool the syntactical combinations into analyzable samples. The
MLU practice usually defines the onset of syntactical combination to be
1.5 morphemes per utterance and thereafter dumps the holophrases from
formal consideration. MLU has been one of the more resilient rubber
in child language: no form of adult grammar is organized by mor-
pheme counting. The MLU methodology is based upon performance features
of discourse, and thereby defaults in the formal treatment of mental
competence since the child's ability to interpret holophrases is both
unspecified and considered to be something very different from syntac-
tical ability. This problem of holophrastic treatment is related to the
lack of formal semantics in linguistic inquiry. There have been two
general approaches to the inavailability of semantical analysis: the
development of an autonomous syntax for which there need be no semantics;
or the use of structural semantics which cannot be explicitly related to
a generative syntax. To illustrate these practices, the benchmark works
of Braine (1963) on pivot grammar and Bloom (l9T0 ) on melding phrase
structure grammar with structural semantics are presented below.
The pivot grammar was introduced by Martin D. S. Braine (1963) as
an attractive formal treatment for early child syntax because the simple
binary structure it imparts to the first word structures seems the likely
building block with which to begin syntax. At first blush it seems very
reasonable to expect a child to combine single words into a structure of
this sort. Braine ' s data sample consisted of cummulative inventories of
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sentence types heard by parents during the first few months of syntac-
tical development after the emergence of two-word constructs in the
spontaneous speech of the child. This sampling appears to be catch-as-
catch-can, being neither systematic nor thorough, but it was enough to
advance the first hypothesis concerning the form of emerging syntax.
3.01 Language sample: Andrew; 19-2h months (Braine I963 )
Pivot Initial Constructions
NO BED MORE CAR ALL BROKE I SEE OTHER BIB
NO DOWN MORE CEREAL ALL BUTTONED I SHUT OTHER BREAD
NO FIX MORE COOKIE ALL CLEAN I SIT OTHER MILK
NO HOME MORE FISH ALL DONE OTHER PANTS
NO MAMA MORE HIGH ALL DRESSED
SEE BABY
SEE PRETTY
SEE TRAIN
OTHER PART
NO PEE MORE HOT ALL DRY OTHER PIECE
NO PLUG MORE JUICE ALL FIX OTHER POCKET
NO WATER MORE READ ALL GONE OTHER SHIRT
NO WET MORE SING ALL MESSY OTHER SHOE
NO MORE MORE
MORE
TOAST
WALK
ALL SHUT
ALL THROUGH
ALL WET
HI CALICO
HI MAMA
HI PAPA
OTHER SIDE
Pivot Final Constructions
CLOCK ON THERE
UP ON THERE
HOT IN THERE
LIGHT UP THERE
MILK IN THERE
FALL DOWN THERE
KITTY DOWN THERE
SIT DOWN THERE
COVER DOWN THERE
MORE DOWN THERE
BOOT OFF
LIGHT OFF
PANTS OFF
SHIRT OFF
SHOE OFF
WATER OFF
AIRPLANE BY
SIREN BY
MAIL COME
MAMA COME
Combinatorial Counterexamples
AIRPLANE ALL GONE
CALICO ALL GONE
CALICO ALL DONE
SALT ALL SHUT
BYEBYE BACK
BYEBYE CALICO
BYEBYE CAR
BYEBYE PAPA
ALL DONE MILK
ALL DONE NOW
ALL GONE JUICE
ALL GONE OUTSIDE
ALL GONE PACIFIER
CALICO BYEBYE
PAPA BYEBYE
OUTSIDE MORE
OFF BIB MAIL MAN
OUR CAR MAIL CAR
OUR DOOR PANTS CHANGE
LOOK AT THIS DRY PANTS
WHAT'S THIS
WHAT'S THAT
PAPA AWAY
DOWN THERE
OTHER COVER DOWN THERE
UP ON THERE SOME MORE
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grammar is the most complete use of an autonomous syntax.
No semantic distinctions are made in the analysis of data, so that only
the distributional evidence is considered.
3.02 A pivot grammar
Lexicon
: ALL
,
MORE
,
OTHER
,
NO
,
I
,
SEE
,
HI
: ON THERE
,
IN THERE
,
UP THERE
,
DOWN THERE
,
OFF
,
BY
,
COME
X : BROKE
,
BUTTONED
,
CLEAN
,
DONE
,
DRESSED
,
DRY
,
FIX
,
GONE
,
MESSY
,
SHUT
,
THROUGH
,
WET
,
CAR
,
CEREAL
,
COOKIE
,
FISH
,
HIGH
,
HOT
,
...
,
BOOT
,
LIGHT
,
PANTS
,
SHIRT
,
SHOE
,
WATER
,
AIRPLANE
,
SIREN
,
MAIL
,
MAMA
,
MORE
Syntax
SI s -» PI X
S2 S -> X P2
The pivotal form of grammar seems direct and not unreasonable as
children might make such structural distinctions in the early stages of
language learning. Braine's unsystematic manner of collecting and pre-
senting the data makes it difficult to offer other , more complete analy-
ses or to explicitly state the criteria for postulating the rules of
syntax. Apparently from the distribution of the BYEBYE sentences, some
quantitative measure is necessary to determine if a pivot should be
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classified as initial or final. Similarly, there is no evident rationale
pivots on the basis of two examples and yet OUR is
not acceptable as an initial pivot. Although the single word holophra—
ses are obviously excluded from the data, they are cited as the reason
that more is entered as both a pivot and an X-class member; while other
words like ALL do not occur as single-word utterances.
More to his credit
,
Braine does mention one important criterion
for deciding whether utterances with infrequent words should be classed
as pivotal— subsequent development. It may be noted that the sentences
in 3.01 were collected over a five month period and analyzed as a single
sample. This is known as the method of synchronic analysis by which
sentences occuring at different times are grouped together with the
assumption that a single grammar is to account for them all. Admittedly,
a five month period is not a very sensitive time sampling as considerable
acquisition may have occurred during this period, changing the grammar
needed to account for all these sentences. The notion that subsequent
development is a criterion by which an earlier synchronic analysis may
be evaluated with respect to a later synchronic sample is an important
piece of methodology in the absence of a diachronic learning theory.
This has been the basic manner in which most formal treatments of child
language seek to represent the progress of language acquisition. There
is one time period of an early grammar followed by a later time period
when a different grammar is in effect. It seems unfortunate that Braine
never presented his subsequent data by which it known that is a
pivot and MAIL is a member of the open X-class. It is possible, however,
to follow Andrew's development into a subsequent synchronic sample
where
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Braine (1965) offers a context-free phrase structure as the developmen-
tal derivative of the pivotal syntaoc.
The studies of Lois Bloom (1970) provided the formal introduction
of phrase structure grammar for the emergent syntax in the two-word
period immediately following the holophrase stage of development. She
claimed that simple binary structure of the pivot grammar was inadequate
for the first two—word syntax because of major differences in the mean-
ing of these utterances. A taxonomic classification of a child's two-
word meanings was given in the manner of structural semantics, and a
larger generative syntax was then required.
Bloom's data samples were collected by tape recording some play
sessions with a child and closely transcribing every utterance with as
much pragmatical context as needed to be certain of the intended mean-
ing of each utterance. Rather than presenting all of her transcript
data, however, she selected utterances to illustrate the discussion of
her analytic methods. The language sample which follows are all of the
sentence types from her child, Kathryn, which Bloom selected from 1225
child utterances in 7l hours of recorded conversation.
3.03 Language sample: Kathryn; 21 months 0 weeks (Bloom 1970)
Demonstrative PivotsAttentive Pivots
HI SPOON
HI SHADOW
HI HONKY DORY
HI CHILDREN
HELLO CHILDREN
OH BABY
THANK YOU BEAR
OK LAMB
OK RAISIN
THIS NECKLACE
THIS RIDES
THIS BABY BOOK
THIS TURN
THAT'S TURN
THIS SLIPPER
THIS BOOK
THIS HAND NOW
THIS BUTTON
THIS SOCK
THIS DIRTY
THIS FUZZY
THIS WINDOW
THIS CLEANING
THAT'S COLD
Nonexistence Pivots
NO POCKET
NO POCKET IN THERE
NO SOCK
NO FIT
NO ZIP
NO TURN
NO CLOSE
NO WINDOW
a NO
6o
Recurrence Pivots Rejective Pivots
MORE CEREAL
MORE RUBBER BAND
MORE TOY
MORE SO— CEREAL
MORE HAIR CURL
MORE MEAT
MORE COTTAGE CHEESE
a MORE MILK
MORE MILK
MORE NUTS
a MORE NUTS
Genitive
MOMMY SOCK
MOMMY SLIPPER
MOMMY HAIR CURL
KATHRYN SOCK
KATHRYN SHOES
MOMMY’S MILK
SHEEP EAR
a TIGER TAIL
TIGER TAIL
MORE RAISIN
MORE RAISIN MORE
a MORE RAISIN
a wa MORE RAISIN
MORE HAND
MORE SOAP
NOTHER BLOCK
NOTHER TOY
NOTHER HAIR CURL
NOTHER PIN
MOMMY SOCK
MOMMY PIGTAIL
MOMMY a MORE HAND
MOMMY SHOE
MOMMY a MUFFIN MAN
MOMMY VEGETABLE
MOMMY SB MORE MEAT
BABY MILK
NO DIRTY SOAP
a NO CHAIR
NO SOCK
Denial Pivot
NO DIRTY
KATHRYN a BEAR
JOCELYN CHEEK
/a/ BABY CHEEK
BABY COTTAGE CHEESE
WENDY COTTAGE CHEESE
CAT COTTAGE CHEESE
CAT MEAT
CAT MORE MILK
Sub j ect-Ob j ect ive
Agent-Active Predicate Attributive Noun Phrase
MOMMY BUSY
MOMMY PUSH
MOMMY PULL
MOMMY BOUNCE
LOIS COMING
BABY BUSY
BABY STRETCH
LOIS a COMING
TOUCH MILK
HELPING MOMMY
ATE NUTS
THROW MEAT
LIE DOWN TABLE
a TAKE a NAP
a PULL HAT
a SEE BALL
a TRY
a PULL
JEWELRY PIN
PARTY HAT
BREAD BOOK
COFFEE CAKE
COFFEE NOODLES
Sub j ect-Locative
SWEATER CHAIR
WENDY ELEVATOR
BEANBAG HORSE
TWO WINDOW
TWO SHEEP
BLACK HAIR
a BOOK
a SOFA
a^ TIRE
da DIRTY
Equivocal Ambiguities Conjunctive
MOMMY APPLE
MOMMY COTTAGE CHEESE
MOMMY MILK
MOMMY HANGNAIL
MOMMY VEGETABLE
MOMMY SHADOW
MOMMY IRON
MOMMY KISS
LOIS KISS
WENDY HAIR
KATHRYN APPETITE
WENDY BOOK
BEAR RAISIN
BABY RAISIN
KATHRYN RAISIN
KATHRYN a RAISIN
OH KATHRYN RAISIN
UMBRELLA BOOT
FOOTS FLOWER
'CHINE FOOT
GIRL DRESS
GRANDMA FLOWER
LOIS TOY
6i
Count er exajE'D1 e s
I COMB PIGTAIL
'CHIHE MAKE NOISE
ME SHOW MOMI^
KATHRYN WANT RAISIN
KATHRYN WANT PUDDING
SHEEP 9 FUZZY
MOMMY DO IT
BABY DO IT
I'M BUSY NOW
TWO SIT DOWN
WHERE THE SPIDER
HELPING SQUISH
MOMMY SHIRTS HOT
a WANTA SEE
TWO SHEEP SIT DOWN
KATHRYN HAS THAT BOOK
MAN RIDE 9 BUS
MOMMY THROW IT AWAY
MAKE HIM SIT DOWN
'/fflO HAS THAT BOOK
DOLLY EYE PRETTY EYE
3 WANTA SIT DOWN CHAIR
Bloom's grammar, 3-03 presented below with simplified lexical entry
rules, generates very large phrase structures to correspond to meaning
categories: genitive; subject-objective; attributive; and so forth. An
obligatory reduction transformation is defined upon any structxire larger
than binary so that any operation of this reduction can recursively pirone
any size initial phrase structure in a derivation to a two-word surface
string. The factorization for this reduction uses the greek letter meta-
variables in its struct-ural description without specifying any necessary
structural content aLthough its operation is intended to be constrained in
some manner to strings with three or more constituents. The phonetic
symbol, o
,
schwa, is a meaningless constituent which holds phrase-initial
position on any kind of phrase structure.
3.03 A transformational phrase structure grammar
Lexicon
Noun : APPETITE , APPLE , BABY , BALL , BALLS , BEAN3AG ,
BEAR . BLOCK , BOOK , BOOT , BOY , BUTTON , CAR ,
RUBBER BAND , SHADOW , SHEEP , , SHOE ,
SHOVEL
,
SLIPPER
,
SOAP SPOON , SPIDER , SWEATEE
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TAIL
,
TAPE
,
TIGER
,
TOE
,
TOENAIL
,
TOY
,
UMBRELLA
,
VEGETABLE
,
WATCH
,
WALL
,
WENDY
,
WINDOW
Verb : ATE
,
AWAY
,
BOUNCE
,
BUSY
,
CATCH
,
CLEANING
,
CLOSE
,
COMB
,
COMING
,
COUGH
,
DANCE
,
DO
,
FIND
,
FIT
,
GET
,
GO
,
HAVE
,
HELP
,
HELPING
,
HERE
,
HURT
,
IN
,
IRON
,
. .
. ,
RIDE
,
RIDING
,
SEE
,
SIT DOWN
,
STRETCH
,
STUCK
,
SHOW
,
SQUISH
,
THROW
,
TOUCH
,
TURN
,
WANT
,
WASH
,
WATCH
,
ZIP
Ad.i active : ALL
,
BABY
,
BIG
,
BREAD
,
COFFEE
,
COLD
,
DIRTY
,
FUNNY
,
FUZZY
,
HEAVY
,
JEWELRY
,
LITTLE
,
MORE
,
NOTHER
,
PARTY
,
PINK
,
SHARP
,
STICKY
,
TIRE
,
TWO
Syntax of Phrase Structure
SI S NOM VP
S2 S NOM NP
S3 s -) NOM NG VP
SU s NOM m ro
S5 s PIVOT N
S6 NOM DEM
ST NOM N
S8 VP VB
S9 VP VB
SIO VP ->• VB PART
Sll N
S12 NP 9 N
I
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S13 a ADJ N
SlU -V ADJ N
S15 PIVOT -* HI
,
OH
,
OK
,
THANK YOU
Sl6 N -* PRON
SIT N PREP
Sl8 N -) APPETITE
,
APPLE
,
BABY
,
BOOK
S19 DEM -> THIS
,
THAT
,
THAT'S
S20 VB ATE
,
AWAY
,
BOUNCE
,
BUSY
,
.
S21 m NO
S22 PART - NOW
,
HERE
,
OUTSIDE
,
AWAY
,
RIGHT
S23 PRON I
,
IT
S2U PREP - ON
,
OFF
,
UP
S25 ADJ ALL , BABY , BIG , BREAD , . .
.
Syntax of Transformational Rules
TFl Optional Adjective Placement
Factor : a ADJ N
i
^
Copy : a ADJ N ADJ 1 3
Delete : a N ADJ 1 3
TF2 Optional Preposition Placement
Factor : a PREP N ! ^
Copy : a PREP N PREP 3
Delete : a N PREP 3
LATER
,
6h
TF3 Optional Schwa Placement
Factor : a • VP i 3
Add : a ! s VP
j 3
TFU Obligatory Prenegative Reduction
Factor :
Delete :
a m
m
3
3
TF5 Obligatory
Factor :
Delete :
Phrase Reduction
a
a
3 Y
Y
This obligatory reduction at the end of the grammar is such a
powerful device that its operation characterizes most the derivational
process of this grammar. Its formulation is doubtful, since it violates
the metalinguistic criterion of recoverability which is necessary for
meaning preserving transformations and hence it cannot be aquirable as
an inherent property of the language acquisition device. Furthermore,
such a rule could not be learnable like the other rules from the primary
evidence of mother’s language since this rule is not part of the adult's
grammar. If the obligatory application of this reduction were strictly
adhered to, all single word utterances would filtered and all utterances
of more than two words would be counterexamples to this formal treat-
ment. Bloom, however, is somewhat lenient in her classifications.
The taxonomic classifications of structural semantics do not have
explicit principles which relates the semantical categories of meanings
to the syntactical derivation process. Bloom claims to rely upon some
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unformulizable intuitions of pragmatical or extralinguistic contexts to
obtain the semantical interpretation of this syntax. Unintuitive sit-
uations result in the rather numerous examples of equivocal ambiguities
which are thought to be mostly genitive or subject-objective. In the
3.0U analysis trees, a configurational assignment is given for Bloom's
interpretive categories to initial phrase structures. The greek letter,
A
,
is known as the delta dummy— evidently being an unspecified lexical
entry. As an odd feature of incomplete interpretive analysis. Bloom
does not provide the rule for the double-noun noun phrase for her con-
junctive interpretation, but she does suggest something like it in her
discussion of the grammar.
3.0U Analysis trees and corresponding semantical categories
GENITIVE
s
318
MOt'C-r/ SOCK
SUBJECT-OBJECTIVE
a 3 i YrAOCor :
66
7a.c Lor : ci 3 Y
[
TF5
NP
314
ADJ
JEWELRY PIN
318
ATTRIBUTIVE
Factor : a 0 i Y
MOM '/P
37 y
TF5
NP
y
311 SUBJECT-LOCATIVE
M N
SWEATER CHAIR
TF5
HP
CONJUNCTIVE
M H
ysis j"'Sl3
UMBRELLA BOOT
Factor : a e Y
Bloom's thesis is a clear advance in formal treatment of early
child language over the pivot grammar of Braine. Most researchers since
have either applied some portion of her treatment— usually the context-
free phrase structure, or have muddled up the formalisms— most often
laboring over the confusion between semantics and pragmatics but sometime
even the distinction between performance and competence is lost. To be
certain, these are not simple matters especially when first encountered
with intellectual instruments which were sharp by earlier standards but
seem blunt when encountering new phenomena needing improved methods.
The search of syntax for semantics has not been simple nor at times
straightforward, but a complete semantics is presently available which
can parallel the accomplishments of syntax stride by stride. It is the
purpose of the remainder of this section to introduce a formal improve-
ment in descriptive method for early child language that is at least as
important as the one described above. In that these improvements mostly
concern the degree of explicit description in the semantical component,
and the grammars, lacking a formal pragmatics, are still incomplete; it
is reasonable to anticipate a time when these theories shall be laid to
rest by better ones closer to completeness.
3.1 Child language samples are almost always pleasant to collect.
Especially in the earliest stages of development, a child's language is
one of the simplest forms of psychological performance. Being much sim-
pler than the adult language, there is hope of more adequate description
by fewer grammatical devices and fewer theoretical uncertainties. It
may be possible to offer a formal analysis for all of a child's perfor-
mance capacities before it is possible to do so for the more complex
performances. of an adult. The child's first words are undeniable mental
events, and by their nature to communicate something, they are subject
to a high degree of observer certainty. A person who is familiar enough
with a child to converse with it should be able to specify what has been
communicated. One of the most natural forms of data is the verbatim
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transcript of the child's most usual social conversation. The obvious
limitations of spontaneous productive performances in underestimating
the first acquisition of learned abilities is not at empirical risk here.
The construction of controlled elicitation techniques follow descriptive
methods in relatively untampered environments where the counterexamples
can be observed.
This study concerns the language of a young girl, Shannon, when
she was twenty-three months old. An hour length transcript was prepared
with as little interruption of her normal comings and goings as possible.
The corpus of transcripts begins during her fourteenth month and contin-
ues weekly with measured hour samples taken at times convenient for
Shannon. For much of the first nine months of holophrastic speech, tape
recorded samples were infrequent and not substantially different from
direct observational transcripts written as the words were spoken. Her
earliest two-word utterances were rather isolated examples in otherwise
single word performances. The transcript fragments from the twenty-
third corpus entry on 21 August 1976 and from the twenty-fifth sample
on 23 September 1976 provide good illustration of these earliest combina-
tional tokens. Henceforth, observational transcripts can be recognized
by time markers which progress minute by minute identifying the temporal
period in which the ordered sequence of utterances occurred. Recorded
transcripts of 60-minute casettes usually contain more complete verbal
context and lack the time markers.
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Itan:
1
wno
afraid
this
was
to
lini'Pen
You
know
how
to
do
tin'se
liiigsT
TO
Two-vord constructs of this nature began to more frequently occur.
In the twenty-seventh transcript, about a third of Shannon's utterances
were two-worded. The twenty-eighth sample was taken on 2J October 1976
when she was 22 months 26 days old; and this transcript was the earliest
point in the corpus where half of her conversation was constructed in
syntactic phrases (MLU: 1.5). Coincidently
,
it is also the earliest
^here three—word constructs were sampled and also the first clear
performance breaking of phrase structure is evident. This 28th sample
is the data base for synchronic analysis of Shannon's earliest syntactic
structures and what is understood to be their meanings. It should be
mentioned that all of the two-word constructs sampled before this date
conform to the output of this grammar of this sample— merely being less
frequent during the previous six weeks.
This Shannon 22 mo 26 da transcript (Appendix A) is available at the
end of this study so that anyone may consider the raw data of the analy-
sis and ascertain for themselves the accuracy of the fit between grammar
and what was actually said. It is unfortunate that so few child language
studies in the past have reported complete sets of their fundmental data
rather than the usual practice of selecting whatever examples appear to
support the researcher's analysis. It is important to play the game with
all of the cards on the table, especially the ones which do not seem to
help the strategy. The counterexamples to a theory are often a persistent
source of subsequent theories and deserve the respect of attention.
The 3.11 language sample is a strict collection of every utterance
spoken by Shannon during a measured hour. Almost everything she said
could be clearly interpreted for its truthfulness because Shannon was
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carefully articulate and she enjoyed conversation with familiar adults.
The adults who spoke with her had long understood her holophrastic words
to have some propositional qualities which permitted sequential conver-
sation about a situation. By the time of this sample, the two- and
three-word sentences were understood with a compositional semantics.
The 3.11 sample is organized so that each sentence token in the trans-
cript is cummulatively categorized as a sentence type according to its
structure and meaning. All of the pragmatical features of the conver-
sation are left in the transcript except questioning and the holophras-
tic negative answering. Even at this stage of early acquisition, the
meaning of an utterance and how it was to be interpreted is not cruci-
ally reliant upon pragmatical information. There may continue to be
some confusion about this for some time until better grammars with
formal pragmatical components are available.
Every word in the sample has been transcribed to the recognizable
level of inflectional morphology; although, morphology is not part of
the analysis. Most of these inflections in Shannon’s vocabulary were
inconsistent— sometimes used with apparent meaningful application;
sometimes omitted when they were appropriate; and sometimes used when
inapplicable. Inflectional forms of what may seem to be a common root
or lexical stem are here treated as separate, sometimes alternative
vocabulary entries. It is curious that the genitive inflection upon a
holophrastic term always appeared to retain a distinct genitive meaning;
therefore, these are accepted as counterexamples to the nonmorphology
aspect of this analysis. The intonational contour of holophrastic ques-
tioning also maintained a constant conversational function. There are
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22 utterances that have been dropped from the 3.11 sample because of
some unintelligibility in their performance. The location of these
in the discourse and some level of phonic approximation of the unintel-
ligible portions may be found in the appendix. The accuracy of the
observational form of transcript was reliable and certain to the three
ad\ilts who spoke with her the most. This language sample was collected
under the most customary of sampling situations— in Shannon's home
with her mother doing some chores and sometimes playing with the toys;
researcher following around with pocket watch and clipboard.
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3.2 Grammatical analysis of child language sample
3.20 Grammar: Shannon; 22 mo 26 da
Lexicon of Basic Expressions
Sentence : t :
Terms : e : MAMA
,
MOMMY
,
SHANNON
,
DADA
Common Nouns : t//e BIKE
,
TEA
,
BREAST
,
BOTTOM
Term Properties : t/e : BYE-BYE
,
UP
,
WASH
,
HI
,
..
CN Properties : t/(t//e) : UH-OH
,
BIG
,
hot
,
SHARP
,
.
Neg Element : t/t : NO
Syntax of Phrase Structure Example
SI t e t//e DADDY'S SHOES
S2 t t/e BYE-BYE STM
S3 t -> t/(t//e) t//e UH-OH LID
si+ t -> t/t t//e NO BMMA
S5 t//e -> t/(t//e) C t//e52!t//e^
s6 t t ? BELINDA?
ST t e_ MAMA
S8 t t//e BIKE
S9 t t/e BYE-BYE
SIO t t/(t//e) UH-OH
Sll t -> t/t . NO
S12 MAMA , :MOMMY , SHMNON , DADA , DADDY ,
M
STM
,
BABY
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S13 tile BIKE
,
TEA
,
BREAST
,
BOTTOM
,
Slh tie BYE-BYE
,
UP
,
WASH
,
HI
,
. .
.
SI 5 tiitlle) UH-OH
,
BIG
,
HOT
,
SHARP
,
.
3l6 tit NO
Semantics of Logical Translation^ Sxample Symbolization
T1
T2
T3
TU
T5
t6
TT
T8
T9
TIO
Til
T12
V_zVu [3("u) A u = a] VzVu [shoes
'( "u) a u = DADA' ]
Vu 11 A u = a] Vu [BYE-BYE' ( 'u) A u = STAN
'
]
Vz Vu [3( A 6(^i)] Vz Vu [LID'( "u) a UH-0H’( £)]
Vz Vu C3( A C u VzVu [BANANA' ("u) A u = uj
Ax lz{ X ) A 6( Ax [ X ) A HOT ' ( "z ) ]
[cp] 9 [Vu [u = BELINDA'
]
Vu = a
.] Vu [u = MAMA'
]
Vu [3( ] Vu [bike '
(
"u)
Vu [y( ] Vu [BYE-BYE'
(
"u)
]
Vz Vu [z{ "u) A 6(^z)] V z Vu [ z( "u) A UH-OH '( hL)]
Vu
—
m
[cp" A C u =
“m
VU2 [SOUP"( "U2^ ^ ^0
where cp ' is part of the nresunnositional
common ground and <P'’ is the result of
replacing all occurrences of a single
ncnindexed variable in with u
-m
MAMA'
,
MAMA'
,
SHAMON'
,
DADA’
,
DADA'
,
SHAUWON'
,
STAN
' ,
3AEY '
,
• .
•
n
The greek letter metavariables are here used in place of the caze-
gorial definitions. . This avoids the problem of marking the parentheses
for disambiguating, the slash notation. Following the order in the lexi-
con, phi is reserved for the type of sentences, alpha for terms, beta
for common nouns
,
and so forth
.
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T13 BIKE’
,
TEA'
,
BREAST
’
,
BOTTOM’
T14 BYE-BYE
’ ,
UP
’
,
WASH'
,
HI’
,
.
TI5 UH-OH’
,
BIG’
,
HOT'
,
SHARP'
,
ti6 A.P [-1 P]
For discussion in the following text, names are given to each
syntactical-semantical rule pair: (Sl-Tl) genitive; (S2-T2) term speci-
fication; (S3-T3) common noun specification; (sU-TU) rejective negation;
(S5-T5) common noun property conversion; (s6-T6 ) question; (ST-TT) thru
(Sll-Tll) are holophrase rules; and (S12-T12) thru (SI6-TI6 ) are lexical
entry r\iles.
Comparing this grammar with the two presented in the previous sec-
tion, there are a nimiber of advantages with this form of analysis with
respect to early child language. The explicit compositional nature of
the semantical treatment is an improvement over the structural taxonomy
available to Bloom’s work. Formal consistency in meaningf\il interpreta-
tion is a good replacement for unspecifiable judgements based upon the
pragmatical or extralinguistic contexts and Shannon is remarkably consis-
tent in her earliest combinatorial abilities. An autonomous semantics
is an ideal companion for the autonomous syntax in generative grammars.
The simplicity of the binary syntax for the first word constructions is
regained since the compositional semantics can do its own work, albeit
with substantial aid from the translation into logic. Another advantage
of the 3.20 grammar is the uniformity of the rules which generate the
greater range of the child's early forms. That powerful and obligatory
reduction at the end of Bloom’s grammar is unnecessary and neither is
TT
the claim for mysterious performance limitations vhich sometime sustain
three-word utterances but at other times can only muster a holophrase.
All performance counting— like J4LU or the one-, two-, and three-word
division in the 3.11 sample— is extraneous to the analysis of mental
competence. Grammars are just not organized by the number of words or
the length of sentences they are used for in performance. The inten-
sionality of the logic in 3.20 is an attractive feature as it may supply
some unexpected motivation for the acquisition of binary syntax over the
conversationally powerful holophrase.
3.21 Genitive constructs: analysis trees and derivations
315
i
.
cp exponent
ii. VzVu [3(^u) A U = cl] by T1
iii
.
VzVu [3("u) A u = DADDY'S'] by 'TIE
iv. V_zVu [shoes ' ( ^u) a u = DADDY ’S'] by T13
i
.
cp exponent
ii. VzVu [3(’'u) A u = cl] by T1
iii
.
VzVu [A.X [^( X ) ^ ''^) ]( "u) A u = a] by T5
VzVu [z( ^u) A 6( A u = cl] A.-convert
iv. Vz'/u [z("u)a 5( ^_z ) A u = liAM-A'] by T12
Vz'/u [z(^u)a H0T'(^^) ^ ~ MAiiA'l oy
'The genitive relationship bev..’een an individual and an
oojecz is
one of the earliest grammatical distinctions that Shannon
made in j.e-rn
r 1 civ. -na-rT ?;
. She cad learned
ing how to construct larger meanings with smaller
p rxo
.
T8
to express an asymmetrical functional relation by joining words into
phrases: an individual could possess a common noun and not the reverse.
The adults who spoke with her understood this relationship to be some-
thing like possession, at least. There were a number of different
situations in which this relationship could be asserted: (i) sometime
an individual was in proximity of an object, as in BABY BREAST or in
ELEPHANT BIKE; (ii) sometime an object might have distinguishable pro-
perties which could identify its possessor even in the absense of that
person, as in DADDY'S SHOES which were usually larger or elsewhere
MOMMY’S CAR which was known to be the green Fiat; and, (iii) sometime
an object could simply be ascribed to someone, as SHANNON PLATE which
looked just like the others or STAN COFFEE which referred to a nonactual
cup of coffee— Stan only drinks tea. It is not an important semantical
matter that these pragmatical situations differed from each other. When
Shannon was ascribing a basic genitive relationship between individuals
and objects, she could be understood by her parents in doing so no matter
how untrue such ascriptions might be to the actual circumstances. This
semantical distinction between individuals and objects is the consistent
basis for the syntactical categories of term and common noun. Her very
consistent distinction between term and common noun is reflected in that
properties of individuals (BYE-BYE
,
UP) are not asserted of common nouns
or vicaversa.
There is a primary semantical problem in the set of possible indi-
viduals denoted by term expressions in that they do not seem to corres-
pond to any natural kind. The most obvious set members are people who
engage in conversation or play with her. MAMA , MOMMY , DADA , D^DY
T9
were term expressions which semantically functioned as rigid designators
for the two specific individuals. At some point in the future Shannon
have to reanalyze these terms into common nouns when she learns to
refer to Vera's mother, Matthew’s mother, and others. BELINDA
,
STAN
terms to designate certain individuals and shall remain so.
DOGGIE are terms which do not function semantically in the pro-
per individuating manner as they can refer to any particxilar individual
of a specified subset of the individuals. BABY can be used to designate
any of the dolls, some plastic figurines, child-like individuals within
drawings or photographs
,
and her two teddy bears . Most of these indivi-
duals had no other designation at this time. In particular, naming of her
dolls was months in the future. DOGGIE is a function which picks out any
canine individual, including two Irish setters who were the family pets:
named BRANDY and GARTH . Clearly, the syntactical category of term con-
tains some expressions which seem like terms and some which seem like
common nouns at the level of their semantical function. Shannon's sub-
sequent development will be faced with some reanalysis with respect to
this category. Bloom's sample of Kathryn, 3.03, suggests a similar treat-
ment, although this distributional distinction was missed in structural
semantics for her study. Braine's 3.01 sample does not suggest much for
the term distinction. This may be result of the selective reporting or
the catch-as-catch-can sampling, or it may indicate some of the acquisi-
tional variablity observed between children during this early phase of
emergent syntax and semantics.
The second example in 3.21, MAMA HOT , is known as a relational
genitive and it is of interest because of the lambda-abstraction in its
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derivation. Since^ HOT means that mother has something which is hot,
the semantical rules require the lambda-abstract in S5-T5 for the common
noun entailment. As may be noted from the transcript (or 3.20 below),
this utterance should not be interpreted that mother is hot— such an
attribution would be noncategorial
,
given the definition of common noun
property and it is a proper semantical entailment that HOT is an attri-
bute of some noun-like thing related to MAMA
. The semantical transla-
^5 j supplies the additional entailment by conjoining two well-
formed propositions with a shared ^-variable, eg. Ax [z(''u) a H0T’("z)]
All previous treatments of early child language have been problemed by
such obvious compressed meaning for which underlying syntactic solutions
or covert lexical items failing under performance limitations have been
suggested. The use of lambda-abstraction at least supplies a direct
compositional derivation with no deletions with the advantage of giving
a simpler treatment for negation and some other relational constructs to
be seen later.
The noncategoriality of the common noun property conversion rule,
S5, is a notable weakness of this syntax in order to provide the entailed
semantical meaning and would not be motivated on purely autonomous distri-
butional evidence. As a metalinguistic principle, a purely categorial
syntax is preferred because of the explicit manner in which such rules
can be f\inctionally related to the semantics. Other rules besides S5 are
noncategorial— such as the lexical entry rules, the holophrase rules,
and the reject ive negation— so that Shannon's grammar seems inconsistent
with respect to categoriality in some parts, but then her early morpho-
logy also exhibits metalevel immaturity of similar sort.
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3.22 Negative constructs: analysis trees and derivations
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Negation in early syntax is not an easy subject to specify since there is
almost universal child interest in the function but many kinds of not.
Negation is a simple formal object semantically, but its acquisition in
syntax is somewhat complex. There seems to be some acquisitional varia-
tion between children, although most develop some form of the negative
very early. The negative is an important semantic function to children
and it usually preceeds the emergence of some form of affirmative by a
very considerable period.
Bloom's child, Kathryn, is said to have three forms of negative
in her early syntax: rejection, denial, and nonexistence. In the 3.03
grammar, the negative element is introduced in the phrase structure
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rules, S3 and S4, and the obligatory length-reducing transformation,
TFU
,
later in the derivation will selectively retain the negative mean-
ings . The three interpretations for those semantical categories was
inferred from observation of the contextual referent. Rejection was
interpreted when the referent was present or imminent; denial concerned
the inappropriate predication of a referent; and nonexistence was inter-
preted when an expected referent was not present. The formal relation
between syntax and semantics for these interpretations is not clear, as
some of the nonexistence interpretations involve nouns while others have
verbs— NO POCKET
,
NO TURN .
Shannon's early conversational performances provide evidence for
more complex restrictions on her use of the negative when compared to
Bloom's interpretations of Kathryn. The use of formal semantical corres-
pondence to syntactical structure gives a consistent and compositional
treatment for her negatives in combination with the other major categor-
ies, but it is substantially different from her holophrastic negation.
The 3.22 examples illustrate her early use of the negative in combina-
tion with other words. The first clear impression is that rejective
negation is strongly associated with the genitive construction. The
problems of integrating these two in the grammar gives much of its deri-
vational character.
The logical translations in her semantics makes much interpretive
use of variables ;u,x,_z_,^; which lack any syntactical or morpho-
logical correlates. The semantics supplies these non-indexed variables
for its own purposes in interpreting the simpler surface syntax and much
of the compression effect in meaning is accounted for by these devices.
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Ignoring for a. niomen't the issues of holophrase interpretation, the
u-variahles in the genitive translation are largely motivated by the
rejection meanings in the negative forms which are so strongly associ-
ated with the genitive in the conversational data. Since the t//e
common nouns correspond with sets of individual concepts in the seman-
tical component, the simplest formulation of the genitive with this
model ontology would be something like: 3("oi) in which the common noun
function directly selects some model individual for the a-term and the
interpretation of such an expression would be a truth value. The trans-
lation, 3.20 T1
,
instead gives a logically equivalent expression in a
longer form in which the (3~f''^iiction and its a-argument are separated in
different ;t-level entailments that are conjoined and share a u-variable;
V_zVu [3 ( ^'u) A U = a] . The reason for this additional complexity in the
longer form of the equivalent expressions is to provide a rather more
limited meaning for the negative expression: V^Vu [3( ^u) a H •
The claim of this form of rejection is that Shannon did not negate any
predication directly; but rather, she only negated entailed relations
to someone who could be determined pragmatically— the indexing, ,
on a semantically unbound variable is intended for pragmatical binding
with information that is formally unavailable for semantics. When she
said NO BANANA
,
Shannon was rejecting someone's relationship to the
fruit which had a presumptive existence. Usually the someone in the
position was herself, but occassionally she would meaningfully intend
that someone else was not to have the predicated item. NO BANANA never
meant that an expected banana was not present (although there would be
no difficulty in constructing nonexistence: V^-iVu
8U
nonpredication: VzVu [-» BMANA’ ( ^u) ] both of which were understood in
Bloom's Kathryn). All of Shannon's negations would be counter to fact
if they were interpreted as direct negations of single predicate func-
tions. The 3.20 grammar links the interpretation of rejection directly
to a genitive-like interpretation which is evident in the data. The
denial negation, NO WET
,
is an elegant demonstration of relational
specification rule, S5-T5
,
giving independent syntactical motivation
for the lambda-abstraction process for common noun properties. A good
sense of coherence is achieved in this grammar by the compositional
relationship between rejection and denial.
There remain a couple of nontrivial problems with this negative
fonmiilation for her rejections. 3.20 is clearly noncategorial
,
but
other such rules which violate the principle of categoriality seem to
be independently motivated so nothing is lost here. The simpler cate-
gorial negation rule: ;b t/t ^ , woiild massively overgenerate the sam-
ple as it would predict many forms of negation which were not observed
and some of these would seem counterintuitive. Neither Shannon nor
Kathryn spoke of individual nonexistence: * NO STAN meaning that no
individual named STAN exists: —j Vu [u = STAN'] ; or meaning that there
was an individual who was not named STAN: Vu [-j u = STAN'] , although
this last form is predicted by Bloom's grammar in her interpretation of
nonexistence and the lack of term and common noun distinction. The
categorial negation with the holophrastic negation would produce the
often observed child form: * NO NO but it would assign a compositional
meaning to affirm the presupposed proposition rather than the doubled
negative interpretation usually ascribed to children.
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A less tri’ivial problem of this rejective negation form concerns
the use of the indexed variables. As written the semantical interpre-
tation of most propositions will be technically incomplete since the
indexed variable is unbound resulting in an open proposition. Truth
values cannot be assigned to open propositions. The purpose of this
indexing of variables in the 3.20 grammar is to indicate where pragma-
tical information is needed in complete interpretation, and as such,
this practice violates semantical autonomy. This is a serious flaw as
one of the guiding motivations in this form of grammar is to couple an
autonomous syntax with an autonomous semantics. This indexing practice
is introduced here to tentatively suggest how pragmatics can be con-
strued to interact with semantical interpretation, although this direct
practice amounts to interference until the pragmatical component is
formally specified. Many child language studies since Bloom (19T0)
have been claiming that semantics and pragmatics are not differentiated
at this period of syntactical emergence so that semantical meanings
must be determined on the basis of pragmatical intuitions of any kind
of contextual information. If semantics and pragmatics did interact in
this way, the distinction between them is probably lost and a single
form of rule should properly account for their phenomena. It would be
difficult to account for nonactual state descriptions with such a gram-
mar, and that would be a nontrivial loss compared to the intensional
interpretations of this grammar. The forthcoming section, 3.3, on the
structure of intensional model specification will introduce pragmatical
information in a better manner, although not less arbitrarily.
36
Holophrases
:
analysis trees and derivations
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The semantical theory of the child's holophrastic speech is one of
the more extraordinary features of this grammar as it must attribute
fairly powerful logical devices in order to interpret the single word as
tr^ath related propositions. 'There has been considerable literature of
child language studies to indicate that these first -onitary expressions
are not merely isolated parts of speech, but rather they are categorical
interpretable— although no formal treatment of the holophrase has been
offered which can interact with the onset of combinatorial abilities.
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In this grammar, the ST rule produces a sentence from any term in
the category, and the corresponding TT translation supplies the meaning
that such an individual exists from some reference point in the model.
The holophrastic interpretation is very wide in comparison to expres-
sions which have some syntactical specification— the holophrastic MAMA
refers to any possible reference concerning that individual. This is a
remarkably broad interpretation from the semantical component, but the
pragmatics of the situation could sometimes narrow the range of model
reference when reference was obvious. In point of fact, there were
many instances in which holophrastic interpretation could not be nar-
rowed to a point where satisfactory propositional interpretation could
be made. In such instances the conversation might lapse or proceed
abruptly into a new topic, the adults being unable to interpret some
utterances very closely. Before the emergence of two-word utterances,
the distinctions between term and common noun did not seem so distinct
and became evident post hoc. It would be hard to specify exact lexical
membership in these categories during the period of purely single words;
although, replacement sequences and specification by properties (like
the t //e-modifying UH-OH which should contrast with the e-modifying NITE-
NITE) could help.
The holophrastic interpretation for common nouns in T8, however,
is an intuitively pleasing notion. The u-variable in the translation
ties common noun reference to a model individual, and there was usually
some person in the real world who indicated the actual object referred
to— holding it, pointing to it, looking at it, and so on. Where JUICE
could refer to any number of different things, such real-world tie up
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is not needed to establish the referent for many terms, like MAMA or
already be mentioned that terms like BABY and DOGGIE in
her emergent syntactical combinations suggests some inconsistency in
Shannon's grammar, because the syntactical categories seem to contain
mixtures of semantical functions. Shannon will need some major reanaly-
sis on the categorical distinction between terms and nouns so that
stage-like changes in her grammar can be expected with growth.
Expressions like WASH or BYE-BYE require a distinguishable and
different sort of interpretation from the term holophrase. This func-
tion is not uniquely assignable to an individual like the terms, but it
is an assignment to sets of individuals much like common nouns. These
expressions refer to properties of these sets of individuals, and whe-
ther a particular individual was a member of a property set could change
from one reference point to another. This categorical distinction seems
patently manifest even in the period of single utterances with only
holophrastic interpretation, as Shannon did not ascribe BYE-BYE to noun-
like things like JUICE nor ALL-GONE to departed individuals although it
might be sensible in the adult language to do so.
The holophrastic UH-OH brings with its TIO translation some addi-
tional logical interpreting equipment due to the categorical distinction
of terms and nouns mentioned above. In Shannon's speech, the expression
UH-OH referred to the property of something which has been spilled or
knocked over and there was usually someone who was either responsible
for its condition or its correction. The UH-OH is interpreted as a pro-
perty of properties of individual concepts and it carries in its
logical
translation a z-entailment that there exists something belonging
to
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someone and the 6-expression specifies a property of that something.
Holophrastic negative answering is not usually part of semantical
analysis since its use depends upon conversational sequence and it can
not be fully interpreted without the use of presuppositional informa-
tion which is not a proper part of the sentence grammar. Translation
Til makes use of such inferences as in the 3.23 NO holophrase and
specifically negates the pragmatical relationship of someone to that
inference. Again, this is a very broad interpretation as it applies to
virtually any proposition from any reference point in the model, but
there were circumstances— among the most bewildering to adults— when
Shannon would exclaim a series of negative holophrases without any
prior conversational precursor. Her mother adopted a strategy of pre-
senting sentences of any content that would come to mind and proceed
through a conversation by elimination. Appendix A, 27 Oct T6, 552PM
provides a brief example of this
.
This treatment of the holophrase utterances, the many semantical
variables, the pragmatical indexing, the presuppositional inferences,
and so on may seem counterintuitive to the naive notion that a child’s
first words are simple things by nature. Any theory of child language
is faced with the problem of semantical compression which seems evident
at the emergence of syntax: children seem to mean more with a single
word than a uniform lexical interpretation could provide. Most parents
begin to carry on holophrastic conversations with their child that quite
early requires some form of logical translation into expressions which
have more formal power than unitary syntax. This treatment is at least
descriptively adequate toward almost all of the presenting data, and
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when the earliest binary syntax emerges, the combinatorial operations
work directly with compositional meanings like the holophrastic devices
in a binary manner. The advantage for the child's communication in
combinational syntax is that it narrows the interpretive range which is
so very large with only a holophrastic grammar. Language acquisition
might be thought of as a developmental process of learning to specify
increasingly narrower ranges in the interpretive model. Nonactual
reference points woiild be among the most difficult to indicate with the
holophrastic devices. It should not be surprising, then, to discover
propositions concerning states of affairs which do not exist in the
actual situation as some of the most interesting utterances in the early
two-word stage.
3.3 Intensionality is the ability to adopt a different reference
point. There has been much in the child language literature concerning
the use of extralinguistic context in determining the meaning of early
utterances
:
"...the basic assumption that it was possible to reach the
semantics of children's sentences by considering nonlinguistic
information from context and behavior in relation to linguistic
performance. ..."
(Bloom 1970 : 10)
This assumption amounts to a claim that early child language is based
upon extensional interpretation— that is , there is fundamental refer-
ence by which all sentences establish their meanings and that reference
point is the here-and-now situation observable to child and adult
alike
Whenever a child produces a sentence, the meaning of that sentence
is
ascertained by pragmatical intuition upon the particular
circ’omstances
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of that moment. Indeed, Bloom's study maintains that the double-noun
surface structure is assigned any of its different meanings in accor-
dance with situational intuitions. The result of situational interpre-
tation is a fairly large number of equivocal circ’umstances in which the
meaning assignment could not be certain or more thaji one interpretation
could apply, resulting in ambiguity. This assumption of extensional
interpretation does not well fit Shannon's conversational performances
in which the meanings of her syntactical constructs were consistently
understood and were frequently referring to nonexistent states of affairs
which did not require situational reference. To illustrate her ability
to- adopt other reference points, especially the nonactual, it is neces-
sary to restore pragmatical features of conversation and introduce some
discussion of minimal contrast replacement sequences and the role of
false assertions in early child language. Fortunately, these are very
common occurrences
.
3.30 Transcript fragments: contrast replacement sequences
DAVID, Weir (1966)
31 months old
T GO DIS WAY
WAY BAY
BABY GO DIS BIB
ALL BIB
BIB
DERE
36 months old
STOLY
3T0L.Y HERE
WANT A STOLY
DAVE STOLY
STORY
STORY
STORY'S DE HA.T
STORY'S DE BIG HAT
STORY'S A HAT
STE’/EN, Braine (1965)
25 - 26 months old
MAN
CAR
MAN
IN CAR
MAN
'in the car
STEVIE GUN
TOMMY
STEVIE GUN
TOMMY GIVE GUN
GUN
TOMMY
GUN
TOrWf
GIVE STEVIE GUN
OITHRYN, Bloom (19T0)
22 months, 2 veeks old
CEREAL
HMMMMM
RAISIN THERE
BUY MORE GROCERY STORE
RAISINS
BUY MORE GROCERY STORE
GROCERY STORE
RAISIN = GROCERY STORE
92
Weir (1962) first discussed sequences of utterances as containing
interesting acquisitional phenomena in relation to her studies of early
phonology and intonation. Her method was to record presleep monologues
of her children in their cribs
,
and she noticed a rehersal—like pattern
of substitutions with newly acquired sounds and intonational contours.
The first of the David fragments (Weir I966) is focused upon consonant-
vowel-consonant intonational forms, while the second fragment practices
the /r/ phoneme which was newly acquired at that time. Braine (1965)
discussed replacement sequences in a more narrow form found in the con-
versation of children. Each of the two Steven samples are sequences of
utterances which vary in their syntax but are cumulative upon a single
semantic meaning. Bloom (l9T0 ) also presents a replacement sequence,
and, like Braine, she considers this as evidence for larger underlying
syntactical structures which are reduced to the level of surface per-
formance. Scollon (1976) has also brought this syntactical notion for
sequences of early holophrastic utterances called vertical construc-
tions. In the syntactical replacement sequence, a larger semantical
meaning is held constant while sequences of syntactical structures
approximate its components. The replacement sequence is a major con-
versational device for children, and it appears to have some sensitivity
for acquisitional phenomena in phonology and syntax, but a predominantly
syntactical explanation for its form falls slightly short of the mark.
There are comparable replacement sequences which hold syntax constant
and vary with the semantical components.
The following transcript fragment contains a drowsy monologue of
Shannon while nursing in which she systematically exchanges all of the
93
common nouns held in genitive predication with the possible individuals
who were present. The actual pragmatical situation remained constant
throughout: Shannon was nursing at breast; her mother was drinking
coffee; and Stan was drinking tea. At one point she picks up a teddy-
bear from the kitchen table, hugs it, and places it up to the breast;
but otherwise she returns to nursing and taJ.king for herself. There
three syntactical replacements within this sec.uence which involve the
noun property HOT and the apparent term property HUG . Otherwise, the
genitive construct is held constant while the semantical components are
systematically exchanged.
3.31 Transcript fragments: minimaJ. contrast replacement sequence
Shannon; 22 months, 26 days old; excerpt 27 Oct 1976
619PM... MAMA COFFEE
MAMA COFFEE
MAMA COFFEE
MAMA COFFEE
MAMA COFFEE
MAMA TEA
MAMA COFFEE
;4AMA COFFEE
MAMA COFFEE
HOT
HOT
;4AMA TEA?
MAMA TEA?
mama coffee
MAMA COFFEE
MAMA COFFEE
STAN TEA?
MAMA COFFEE
STAN TEA
620 (Nurses)
621 MAMA COFFEE
MAMA COFFEE
mama coffee
MAMA HOT
MAMA HOT
MAMA HOT
MAMA HOT
621... STAN TEA
STAN TEA
STAN BREAST
STAN BREAST
STAN BREAST
STAN BREAST
STAN BREAST
STAN BREAST
STAN BREAST
622 STAN TEA
STAN TEA
STAN TEA
MAMA COFFEE
SHANNON COFFEE
SHANNON COFFEE
BABY COFFEE?
BABY HUG
BABY HUG
BABY BREAST?
BABY BREAST?
BABY BREAST?
SHANNON BREAST
SHANNON BREAST
SHANNON BREAST
623 STAN TEA
STAN COFFEE
STAN TEA. .
.
(Noticing teddy
bear on the table)
(She .bugs teddy bear)
(Puts bear to breast)
Mother: Stan no coffee
The phenomenon in the focus of this replacement series involves
the semantical elements as the syntax is consistent and unremarkable.
The genitive structure is newly acquired, but it is her most secure com-
binatorial ability . There should be no doubt that the pragmatical situ-
ation and Shannon's behavior remained constant throughout this monologue
so that the exchanged interpretations cannot rely upon here-and-now
intuitions to uniformly determine the meanings of the utterances. MAMA
COFFEE has an extensional referent while MAMA TEA does not. What then
is being contrastively exchanged throughout this seuqence?
As an effort to maintain the extensional assumption as a basis for
the semantics, it might be considered that truth and falsity are being
contrasted. The extension of MAMA TEA in the here-and-now reference
point is the truth value: false. There are several problems with this
treatment. It was Weir's notion that these sequences were focused upon
some newly acquired linguistic forms as a practicing mechanism, yet the
rehersal of truth versus falsehood is not likely to be something new with
the emergence of combinatorial structures. The long holophrase period
before this is characterized by truth-valued single word sequences. Even
more to the point, the true-false distinction is not being systematic-
ally contrasted: MAMA TEA and 0 MAMA BYE-BYE are equally false of
the situation and yet there is no syntactical replacement producing a
falsehood in the sequence. False syntactical contrasts are not present
in this series.
A more general problem with the extensional basis for meaning is
that it becomes clearly nonintuitive with the emergence of syntax. In
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Shannon’s general speech, many of her utterances were extensionally fal-
se to the pragmatical reference, and some of them, like the negatives,
appeared systematically untrue of the actual situation. The adults who
spoke with her were uniformly disinclined to consider these utterances
as false assertions. The acquisition of syntax did not give Shannon
the status of lair making untrue statements about the actual world, but
she did acquire an increased ability to speak about nonactual matters.
Intensionality is the ability to adopt a different reference point
.
Shannon's mother was the first one to notice the intensional nature of
these replacement sequences: "Shannon has been doing a strange thing
lately. She has been switching things around. She starts with the way
things are and then puts them together differently— in ways that it is
possible for them to be." This is the focus of the 3.31 replacement
sequence: the intensional reference structure of a model interpreta-
tion. In the constant syntactic frame. Shannon rather systematically
switches around the four possible individuals with the three predicated
nouns into possible combinations. Some of the combinations were actual
at that time: MAMA COFFEE , STAN TEA , SHANNON BREAST , BABY BREAST ;
some were actual but at other times and places: MAMA TEA , SHANNON
COFFEE
,
BABY COFFEE ; and some had never actually happened at any
time
or place: STAN COFFEE , STAN BREAST .
It is possible to specify this replacement sequence with the
kind
of set theoretical model given in 2.25. Again, some arbitrary
restric
tions are needed on the exponential size of a total
cartesian-product
model of all possibilities. Given the two truth values,
the four pos
sible individuals, and the three common nouns for
genitive predication;
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there are U096 possible reference points and the actual situation is one
of these. Some of these references cannot be specified within a single
two-word sentence— such as the possible situations where mother has
both tea and coffee which cannot be adopted within a single token since
two words are syntactically available. It seems a simple matter
to exclude such reference points for multiple predication which her pre-
sent syntax lacks and claim that such meanings are unspecified in this
limited model. To further restrict the size of interpretation, it is
also possible to limit the model to this particular performance and
leave out any reference points not actually present in the circumstances
of this particTilar replacement sequence. These limitations which leave
portions of the complete model interpretation unspecified are adopted
here more for exposition than the more serious claim of psychological
reality for this kind of model limitations. The issues concerning the
exponential size of model interpretations of intensional logic are more
probably performance matters rather than issues of mental competence.
The 3.32 model below will distinguish two reference points in all
predicate specifications: II and 10 . This is introduce a method for
anchoring a model with pragmatical intuitions available from perceptible
information. The anchored reference point, II , shall contain informa-
tion pertaining to the actual situation; while the point, 10 , shall be
an antipragmatic world in which all predication is false. The purpose
of this antipragmatic anchoring is to specify that the assertion of a
single extensionally true predicate presupposes the knowledge of condi-
tions under which that predicate would false. This seems to be the
smallest part of an intensional model that would be used by a child who
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only spoke truely of the here-and-now. The nonanchored reference points
in 3.32 are added serially within each function. Taking the replacement
sequence as a collective or additive phenomenon in discourse, whenever
Shannon produced a nonactual predication it has the effect of specifying
the model structure where it is possibly true and possibly false.
3.32 Model interpretation for intensional replacement sequence
Sex: of Possible Individuals { {MA,3H,3T,D1}
,
Seu of Reference Points (.10,11, ... ,123},
3et of Truth Values {0,1},
Values of In.'censional F'jxictions
j {F(.^'iAMA') = {(I0,.MA) ,:il,.''lA) , ... ,;i23,MA)},
individual
concepts
?(SHAM0N') = {(I0,3K) ,(I1,SH) , ... ,(I23,3H)},
F(STAH’) = {(I0,3T) ,(I1,3T) , ... ,(I23,3T)},
F(3ABY, ') = {(I0,D1},(I1,D1), ... ,(I23,Dl}},
F(COFFTE') = {(10 ,{({(I0,yLA) , ... ,(123 } , O',
(II ,{(((I0,MA),(I1,:'IA), ... ,(I23,.WA)}, 1),
({(I0,SH) ,(I1,3H), ... ,(I23,3K)}, 0),
({(10, ST) , (II, ST) , ... ,(I23,3T)}, 0),
({(10,El), (II, Dl), ... ,(I23,D1)}, 0)}),
(13 ,{( {(10 ,.'!<!),( 11 , .'“lA) , ... ,(I23,.MA)}, 0) ,
( {(I0,3K),(I1,3H), ... ,(I23,3H) }, 0),
( {( I0,ST) ,(ll,3T) , ... ,(I23,ST)}, 1 ),
({(I0,D1),(I1,D1), ... ,(123,31)}, 0)}),
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(i4
.
{( {(io,;u) ,(ii ..''lA) , ... ,(i23 ,:ia; }, 0 /
,
( ‘idO.SE) ;i23 ,3H) }, 0 ) ,
( {(10, ST), (II. 37), ... ,(I23,3T)}, 0),
( {(I0,31),(I1,D1), ... ,(123,31)}, 1)}),
vis ,{( '(lO.MA) ,;il,:-!A)
,
... ,(I23,:''1A)}, 1,,
' {(I0,3H) ,(I1,SH} (123,SH)}, L),
( {(10, 3T) ,(11,37) 123,37)}, 0),
( {(10, Dl) ,(11,31) , ... ,(123,31)}, 0)}),
(16 ,{( {(IO,MA) ,(I1,:4A) {I23,.«A)}, 1),
( {(I0,3H) ,(I1,3H)
,
... ,(I23,SH)}, 0)
,
( {(10, ST) ,(11,57) , ... ,(123,ST)}, 1),
( {(10,31) ,( II, Dl) , ... ,(123,31)}, 0)}),
(17 ,{( {(I0,:4A.) .(II.I'IA) , ... ,(I23,:4A)}, 1),
( {(I0,3H) ,(I1,3H)
,
... ,(I23,3H)}, 0),
( {(10, ST) ,(11,37) , ... ,(123,37)}, 0),
({(10,31), (11,31), ... ,(123,31)}, 1)}),
(18 ,[( ((IO,MA) ,(I1,.VIA) (I23,.MA)}, 0),
( {( I0,3H) ,( I1,3H) , ... ,(I23,3H)}, 1),
({(10,37) ,(11,37) 123,37)}, 1) ,
({(10,31),dldl) ,123,31) }, 0)}),
(19 ,{({(I0,.MA) ,(I1,.'4A) , ... ,(I23,;-1A) }, 0),
({(I0,3H) ,(I1,3H) , ... ,(I23,3H)}, l) ,
({(10,37) ,(ll, 37) , ... ,(I23,S7) } , 0)
,
({(10,31), (ll,Ol) , ••• ,(123,31)}. 1)};,
(I10,{({(I0,:iA) ,(ll,MA) , . . . ',(I23,;4A) } , 0),
({(I0,SH) ,(ll,3H) , ... ,(I23,SH) } , 0)
,
({(10,37) ,(ll, 37) , ... ,(123,37)}, l)
({(10,31) ,(ll, 31) , ... ,(123,31)},!)}),
(I11,{({(I0,MA) ,(ll,M.A) , ... ,(I23,MA)}, l),
({(I0,3H) ,(ll,3H) , ... ,(I23,SH)} , 1)
,
({(I0,S7) ,(ll,3T) , ... ,(I23,ST) } , l)
({(10,31) ,(ll,Dl) , ... ,(123,31)} , 0)}),
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, i.,
,
(C(lO,oH) ;:22,iH)/
.
L)
,
(C(I0,3T) ,:;i,3T) ::23,3?!/
, D) ,
(C(I0,21) :i23,21); , l.l)
,
(I13,C;((I0,:'tA) /ll.-'-lA) , ... ,(:23,MA)> . 1} ,
;((I0,3H) ,(li,3H) , ... ,;i23,3H)} , D) ,
({(10,37!
,
In,3T; , ... ,(123 ,37!}, l!,
(((10,31! ,( 11,31! (123,31)}, 11})
,
(I14,(({( I0,.MA) ,( ri,.'-IA) , ... , (123,:-«.).} , 0),
(C(I0,3H) ,(I1,5H)
,
... ,(I23,3H!}, l)
,
({(10,37) ,(11,37)
,
... ,(123,37)}, l)
,
(C( 10,31) ,(11,31)
,
... ,(^3,31)}, 1)}),
(I15,(({(I0.:-IA) ,(I1,:4A! (I23,:1A.)}
, 1) ,
(C(I0,3H),(I1,3H), ... ,{I23,3H)}, l),
(((10,37) ,(11,37) , ... ,(123,37)}, l)
,
(((10,31) ,(11,31) , ... ,(123,31)}, 1)})},
?(7EA') = (do ,(({(I0,.viA),(ll,.'4A), ... , ( 123 ,^4A.) } , 0),
({(10,37! ,(11,37! , .... ,(123,37)}, O)
(31 ,;([(IO,MA) ,(:1,MA! (l23,:-iA!}, 0),
( ( ( 10,37) , dl , 37) ( 323 ,37 ) } . 1 ! ; ', ,
(I16,C(((30,;1A),(31,MA), ... ,(323,MA1}, 1),
(((30, 37), (11,37), ... ,(323,37)}, 0)}),
(I17,C({(I0,1IA),(I1,:4A)
.
... ,(I23,MA)}, 1),
(((10,£7), (II, 37) (123,37)}, l)})},
F(3RSAS7') = ((lO ,( ( (( 10, 3H) ,( I1,3H) , ••• ,(I23,SH)}, 0),
({(I0,S7) ,(n,ST) , ... ,(123,37)}, 0),
({dO,Dl) , (11,01), ... ,(123,01)}, 0)}),
(II ,{({(I0,SH),(I1,3H), ... ,(I23,3E)}, l) ,
({(10,37) ,(I1,ST) , ... ,(123,37)}, 0),
({(IO,D1),(I1,01), ... ,(123,01)}, 1)}),
(Il8,{({(I0,3a) ,(I1,3K)
,
...
,(I23,3H)}, 1),
({(10, 37), (II, 37), ... ,(123,37)}, 0),
({(10, Dl), (II, 01), ... ,(123,01)}, 0)}),
100
1
3. <<3,<<3.a>. *>>.*>>
properties of
properties of
iadiviiuaJ.
concepts
"
<
3 , <<3 , e> , <<3 . e> , >
>
intansionaJ.
relations
oetveen
individual
concepts
,;:i,5z: .isi.sh)-
.
:•)
,
io,3T) ii,3r)
.
... ,;i23.iT)}. i;,
(((:o,3i) (:23.3i)}
, 3)} )
,
( 120,1 ({( -0,3a}
,
V II, 3H)
,
... ,vl23,3H)}, 3),
(C( I0,3T) ,:il,iT!
,
... ,.:23,3r)>. 3},
({ '.10,31} ,:il,31< ,123,21,}
,
)}
; ,
(I21,':({(I0,3H} ,:il,3H)
,
... ,',123.32)}, 1),
(C ( 10, 3T),( 21,32), ... .(223,32)}, 1).
(((10,21), (21,31), ... ,(123,31)}, 0)}),
(I22,(({(I0,3H),(I1,3H), ... ,(I23,5H)}, 0),
(C(I0,3T),(I1,5T), ...
,
(123,32)}, D ,
(( (10,31) .(11,31) , ... ,(123,31)}, 1)}),
( I23,C (C ( I0,3H)
, V
il,3H)
,
... ,(223,3H)}, 1),
({ (I0.3T),(I1,3T) (123, 3T)} . D ,
({ (20 ,31), (21,31) (223,-1)}, !)>)>,
?(H0T') = ({20,(-;(I0,(C{I0.MA; ,(I1,:-1A)
,
... ,,I23,:4A)>, 3)),
(ii,({(io,:«.) ,(n,:.tA) (i22,:4a)}, l))},. o))
(I1,(((I0,(((I0,:<A) ,,I1,:'!A)
,
... ,(:23,:'!A);, 3)),
'ii,;{(ro,;iA) ,(n,.iAj
,
...
, ;
123 ,:ia.)
}
,
i))}, 1 ::
Kh-JG') = (do, ('(((lO.lH) ,(21,33)
,
... ,d23,3H;:-.
(({(10,33) ,,11,33)
,
... ,(223,33)}, 0)
,
(((10,31), (11,31), ... ,(123,31)}, 0)}),
(((10,31) ,(11,31)
.
... ,(123,31)},
((((10,33) ,(11,33) , ... , (123,33)}, 0),
({(20,31) ,(21,31)
,
... ,(123,31)}, 0)>)>),
(11, ((((10,33) ,(11,33) , ... ,(I23;S3)},
(({(I0,SH) ,(21,33), ... ,(123,33)}, 0),
({(10,31) ,(11,31) , ... ,(223,31)}, 1)}),
(((10,31), (11,31), ... ,(223,31)},
{(((10, 3H), (21, 33), ... ,(123,33:)}, 1),
({(10,31) ,(21,31) , ... ,(223,31)}, 0)})})}}}
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It seems to be the nature of the 3.31 replacement sequence to exer-
cise the newly acquired semantic ability to specify possible states of
affairs in a manner which suggests an intensional model structure, some-
thing like 3.32. Each of the individual concepts is uniformly treated
as rigid designators whose intensional functions select the same individ-
uals from all reference points. This is clearly not an adequate formal
treatment for the term BABY which selects some different referents in
situations other than the pragmatic instance of that afternoon. In this
setting the teddy bear was the only doll present in the kitchen at that
time, so it does not seem extreme to simplify its presentation in this
model so that it is like the other individual concepts mentioned in this
sequence. The other terms were consistent in selecting only those indi-
viduals in all circimstances . With model elements for these four possi-
ble individuals forming a restricted domain, the function F(COFFEE’) is
specified with all sixteen possible unitary-possession situations since
Shannon did predicate COFFEE of each of the individuals at some place in
this sequence. This method of constructing the model with the cartesian
principle applied only within each predicate as specified in a perform-
ance, uses only a subset of the total model interpretation for economic
exposition— that is. Shannon's mental competence is expected to be
complete for the total interpretation and not restricted to the size of
this particular performance. F(TEA') has but four reference points in
this partial model since only two individuals were provided within this
performance. The complete model would contain a uniform specification
for all of the properties of individual concepts— COFFEE' , TEA' , and
BREAST' . The more complete model is probably preferred for general
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purposes as performance limitations upon model structure is not a very
pleasing notion for the semantical component of the grammar. Since
Shannon has the ability to specify a partial model as in 3.31, it is no
large assumption to credit her with competence for the larger complete
interpretation because the recursive definitions for both are simple
knowledge. In actual performance it would be rare to find all possibil-
ities systematically stated and it is necessary to infer complete
knowledge from various fragments.
The syntactical replacement involving HOT did maintain an exten-
sionally true relationship with the real world, and so they are not
modeled with intensionally possible combinations, like HOT BREAST.
This combination would probably be understood by Shannon even though
no such referent had ever been encountered. It would be of interest to
find an intensional replacement sequence on the level of the properties
of properties of individual concepts in order to determine if inten-
sional reference is understood over all common nouns: (? HOT ICE ,
0 SHARP BANANA , and the like which might never have an extensionally
true referent in the here-and-now and yet are possible combinations
predicted by the grammar. 3.31 is evidence of intensional replacement
within the genitive construction but that does not necessarily require
that intensionality be uniform across the entire grammar. The con-
struction of interpretive models would be simpler if intensionality were
found to be uniform.
The model interpretation seems to be a better repository for the
informal pragmatical intuitions than the semantical rules. It would be
a simple matter to bind the indexed variables with existential
quanti-
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lication and thereby complete the semantical interpretation. The advan-
tage of doing this is to achieve semantical autonomy in the grammar and
to do this with only the forms of -cnowledge presently in 3.32, Simpler
grammars result from autonomous components and these should be preferred
in child language since less is required of learning. 3y claiming an
interpretation in the semantical component that is independent of syntax
and pragmatics, it is possible to evaluate child grammars in the same
manner as the adult grammacrs since their componentiaJ. integration would
be essentially the same. One could expect more complicated r-'des in
the mature grammar, but not rules which differ in Icind from the lower
level of communication with the child.
It should be noticed that HUG is assigned an extensional. str-acture
in II as an intensional relation between two individual concepts purely
upon pragmatical assumptions since the example * BABY HUG is a counter-
example to the 3.20 grammar.
Omitting the redundancies in the actual performance, it is possiole
to give the complete semantical specifications for the intensional repla-
cement sequence, 3.32. ’These specifications require ranges of intension—
al references in which the proposition is found to be true and Lii.ere ..o
no oarticular significance to the pragmaticalj.y anchored II except -n
those constructs which are ne'e part oi the intensional exenange,
3.33 Semantical specifications for replacement sequence
1
?V^Vu [TEA’("u) A u = i
?V^Vu [tEA’("u) a u = = 1
V^Vu [TEA’("u) a u = STAN
=
1
V^Vu [ ^("u) A HOT'("^) A u = MAMA’]^*^^’^^^^’^ = 1
V^Vu [breast* ( ''u) A u = sT^t ]3. 32;<I19 ,121 ,122 ,123> ;G _
^
V^Vu [coffee* ("u) A u = i
?V^Vu[ COFFEE *( "u) A u = = i
TV^Vu [BREAST*("u) a u = = 1
V^Vu [breast *( ^'u) A u = SHANNON* = 1
V^Vu [COFFEE*("u) a u = sTAN
*
= 1
3.^ Subsequent language development is a major theme in the proper
description of a child *s grammatical abilities. One set of formal devi-
ces is offered at one time to represent a child *s grammar; and then at a
subsequent time, another set is offered as evidence that learning of
some rule-governed ability has occurred within the same time interval.
Theories of language acquisition seek to explain how these grammars deve-
lop through chronological intervals; what new rules and categories are
added; how old rules are changed; and so forth.
A synchronic analysis is based upon collecting enough samples of
sentences to characterize grammatical abilities by contrasting different
structures and types. It requires a period of time to collect these
sentences and since there is a single grammar given to represent all of
these sentences, there is an implicit assumption that no great change in
the grammar occurred during the period of sampling. Evidence for rule
learning as discrete mental operations must lie somewhere between the
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sampling periods and not vithin them. Synchronic analyses in chrono-
iogical order are a rudimentary step in demonstrating vhat a child has
learned, when it was learned, but not how it was learned.
Shannon's subsequent development for the next month did seem to
concern common nouns
,
some new categories
,
and more abilities in com-
bining categories. These changes occur rather discretely as a composi-
tional rule theory would want it
.
Corpus
Entry Date Interval Age
28 21 Oct T6
8 da
6 da
IT da
22 mo 26 da
29 U Nov t6 23 mo 3 da
30 10 Nov T6 23 mo 9 da
31 2T Nov 76 23 mo 26 da
Each of these samples differ situationally so that Shannon's conversation
is the predominant feature common to all of them. The earliest sample,
3.11 presented below, was taken in her home with her mother and resear-
cher present while the latter directly wrote down each utterance as obser-
ved for a measured hour. This is hnown as an observational transcript
and was the most common form of data collection during the holophrastic
oeriod of her development. Shannon's clear articulation and high degree
of repetition made this form of transcription the most efficient process
to accumulate grammatical evidence. The twenty-ninetn sample, eight days
later, is again in her home alone with the researcher oaoy-sitting lor
the evening. Shannon's separation anxiety is registered in the .requency
of her .'lAMA COME-BACK assurances. Her 'ancle, Ronnie, who lived in the
basement, comes in toward the end of the observational hour. The nexv.
sample, number 30 in the corpus, was taken six days later during an even-
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ing when Shannon was visiting the researcher's apartment while her par-
ents were away attending a childbirth meeting. Shannon was helping her
adult friend, Sheila, in the kitchen and setting the table for supper.
The thirty-first entry was collected seventeen days later when Shannon's
father tape recorded and transcribed an hour's conversation while play-
ing with her before the dinner which mother was preparing. All of her
transcripts are about the same length and may be examined (Appendix A)
for their conversational sequence and the situation of their occurrence.
During the eight day interval between the first and second samples
very little learning seems to take place. By and large, the same kinds
of structures and meanings appear in her conversation. During the next
six days to the third sample, however, some additional rules and cate-
gories become apparent in her performance which were not reliably pro-
duced in the previous samplings
,
although some of the types appeared
infrequently as counterexamples. The last seventeen day interval to the
fourth sample is again stable as little change is evident from her abil-
ities of the third sample. This chronological sampling seems to indi-
cate that most of the grammatical change during this month occurred
during a relatively brief period between the second and third samples
with stable periods on either end of the chronology . This is indirect
evidence for the acquisition of discrete mental abilities which are here
formulated as categories and rules. The step-like addition of new rule-
governed abilities underscores the need for increasingly small intervals
for synchronic sampling. Certainly the five month interval for Braine s
(1963) sample of Andrew is too large for a single grammatical analysis
unless the variation in rate of learning from Shannon to Andrew is very
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large. Even Bloom’s (1970 ) sampling period of a week can be questioned
as it might incorporate the discrete addition of some new abilities so
that a very different grammar may be operating to produce the end of the
sample than was operating to produce the beginning of it. A synchronic
analysis is then a difficult device with respect to the task of develop-
mental explication since such analyses become more secure with larger
samples. The developing child, however, may be inherently an unstable
source for this kind of analysis as the time interval for changing the
grammar may be too small to produce a large enough sample for a reliable
and secure contrast. Indeed, the shortest sampling interval might be
between two utterance tokens— the earlier being produced with one set
of abilities and the second representing a new set of rules altered from
the earlier. If aquisition proceeded by merely adding new rules and
categories
,
the problems involved in the synchronic method of analysis
would be minimal, as it would be possible to go through a sequence and
show the first appearance of a new form not present earlier. The real
problem arises if acquisition can also proceed by the reanalysis of the
earlier forms into later forms which are substantially different. This
acquisition by reanalysis of earlier forms is known as stage development
while the acquisition by adding new forms without reanalysis is known as
phase development'; and, it appears that both are necessary to explain
how a child progresses through language acquisition to eventually approx-
imate a communication system compatible with the adult level.
These are problems with the general method of synchronic analysis
which cannot be solved here. Some form of diachronic analysis which
changes the grammar on the basis of evidence serially encountered within
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a sample is needed to explicate subsequent development; but such methods
are not readily available and generally lack formal consistency. The
traditional studies which examine how a language changes over time have
been in historical linguistics, but it is not clear whether the socio-
logical influences which alter a community’s language have much relevance
to the psychological influences which alter a child's language over time.
As the child grows, performance capacities for mental processes become
greater and the language changes by increasing structural complexity for
more detail in information. The synchronic analysis, even with its
weaknesses, may be the most detailed and explicit method to represent
development with a series of independent measurements. It least gives
a description of what has changed, even if it lacks an explanation of
how it was accomplished.
Each of the following grammars in this section are represented by
specifying only the changes from the previous grammar. Shannon's deve-
lopment is generally phase steps— usually adding new categories. There
is, however, a stage-like reanalysis of word order in term specification
which is the only syntactical change in her language since the pervious
sample
.
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3.^1 Grajnmar: Shannon; 23 mo 3 da
Lexicon of Basic Expressions
Common Nouns : t//e
Term Properties : t/e
Syntax of Phrase Structure
S2
^ t/e
S13 t//e
,
EH
,
. .
.
Semantics of Logical Translation
.
..
,
EH
,
...
. .
. ,
BACK
,
COME-BACK
,
. .
.
Example
MAMA COME-BACK
This grammar is pretty much the same as the previous 3.20 grammar
with only the phrasal order of a term property and its subject term
being reversed. This is a syntactical change so only S2 is specified
since the semantics of the expression remained unchanged: Vu [COME-
BACK* (^u) A u = MAMA*] . It shoiild be clear from the specification of
term properties in the lexicon that BACK and COME-BACK are treated as
separate lexical items, perhaps synonymous alternatives like MAMA and
MOMMY . Many child language studies have made similar decisions to
treat some multiple word chunks as single lexical entries even though
the components sometimes appear individually but having the same meaning
as the larger chunks
.
The common noun, EH
,
is not a new acquisition but it did not hap-
pen to occur during the last sample. For months during the holophrase
Ill
period this expression was used to refer to something that Shannon did
not know the label for. It might be thought of as a child paraphrase
for the advilt forms; 'this'
,
'something'
,
or with questioning intona-
tion, what?' . The translation, T13
,
for EH is one of the indexed
variables of the correct type for common noims. EH was used only for
items of the common noun category— it was not used when an individual's
name was unknown or for term properties and so on. She would sometimes
answer an adult's question, 'What is this?' with the response, EH
,
recognizing that it was something but she didn't know its expression.
On rare occurrences she was heard to refer to something in the genitive:
0 STAN EH , meaning whatever it is that Stan has.
This siommarizes the few minor changes in her grammar in the eight
days since the last sample: relative stability. Only the syntactical
change reordering term specification is a step in the direction of the
adult grammar. Her 3.20 grammar is more uniform in its common treatment
of modifier before its head for both common nouns and terms. This is a
pleasing result for those who favor more attract phrase structure like
the X-bar theories in which language-specific differences in major con-
tent phrases such as noun, verb, adjective must be learned individually
from empirical evidence if the universal base is more unifoimi. The
change in the order of the term specifier to its posthead position now
seems to set the stage for analyzing a new level of verb phrase which
is common for both intransitive and transitive predicates. That result
is sometime in the future as the next sample introduces a new category
of predicate— the prototransitive— which fails to have transitive
reversibility that is needed for a true double predicate.
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3.ij-3 Grammar : Shannon; 23 mo 9 da
Lexicon of Basic Expressions
Common Nouns
Neg Element
Prototransitive
Postnominal CN Specifiers
CN Determiner
t//e
t/t
( t/8)/(t//e )
( t//e)/(t//e )
(t-//e)//(t//e)
...
, ,
IT
,
...
NO
,
NOT
COOK
,
SPILL
,
DO
,
. .
.
ALL-GONE
,
DIRTY
,
...
SOME
Syntax of Phrase Structure
SIT t ^
Sl8 -V
319 t//e
520 t //e -*
521 ( t/e)/(t//e ) ^
322 ( t//e)/(t//e ) >
323 (t//e)//(t//e) ^
t/t t/e
( t/e)/(t//e) t//e
t//e ( t//e) /(t//e )
( t//e) //(t//e ) t//e
COOK
,
SPILL
,
DO
,
. .
.
ALL-GONE
,
DIRTY
,
. .
.
SOME
Examples
NO TOUCH IT
[EAT NOODLES^
, ]W M O / S
[COKE ALL-GONE^
SPILL [SOME SALT^^^J
SymbolizationSemantics of Logical Translation Examnle
T9 V£Vu [Y(-u)] V_zVu [COOK’(z^) ("u)]
T13 • • • 9 z , z , . . .
-n -n
TIT V^Vu [y( ^u) a ^ H: = ] VzVu [TOUCH' ) (
''±) A ~i i ]
T18 [n(3) (x)I Ax [EAT '(NOODLES’)
'(x)]
T19 Ax [8(3) (x)] A.X [ALL-GONE '(COKE' ) (x)]
T20 Ax [x(S) (x)] Ax [“iA^t [SALT'(x) = i^(-i)]]
T21 COOK’ , SPILL ' , V , . .
.
“n
I
T22 ALL-GONE
' ,
DIRTY
' ,
.
.
.
T23 [-1 Az [z( X ) = z ( X )]]
During the intervening week since the last sample. Shannon had
added complexity to her noun phrase structure and extensional relations
between semantical types and a wider application of the negative. Much
^be conversational redundancy is lessening as more variety of sen-
tences are available to her . Unlike the last change in the grammar where
an older form of term specification was replaced by a newer reordered
form, the changes in this grammar involve the phase-like addition of
of more structural abilities with additional categories.
The distinction between a common noun, t//e
,
and an intransitive
predicate, t/e
,
is purely a syntactical distinction as the two forms
share the same semantical type, extensionally : sets of individual con-
cepts. The major development in this 3.^3 grammar seems to underscore
this categorial treatment. First, the negative rule, SIT
»
is the same
semantical treatment as the earlier t//e negation, but now it is applied
to the intransitive t/e category, and this seems reasonable given this
categorial double-slash distinction that their negations be uniform in
the semantical component. As such, this negation does not represent new
knowledge, but generalization in a more uniform manner consistent with
categorial principles. Secondly, the new noun modifying categories also
have a common categorial definition, each differing syntactically from
the others by the number of slashes, making their structures distinct
while they share the same semantical type. The prototransitive, the
postnominal, and the determiner are all extensional relations between
properties of individual concepts and sets of individual concepts.
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This suggests that Shannon learned the semantical relation which serves
as a basis for this syntactical group so that their emergence is simul-
taneous .
The prototransitive is so named because its stock of words are
those which will eventually reanalyze into transitive predicates
,
but
the present relation is not yet so developed. For a true transitive
relation, the same kind of lexical item must be able to serve as either
the subject or direct object of the sentence. With this prototransi-
tive, however, it is clear that only terms can occupy the subject role
and common nouns fill the accusative. Subsequent development of the
determiner role will be needed to provide the syntactical operation by
which common nouns can be treated as full term phrases. As mentioned
earlier, the distinction between terms and common nouns seems syntac-
tically very clear from distributional data, but the semantical basis
does not seem to correspond to any natural kind. The term category con-
tains some lexical items
,
like MAMA and DOGGIE
,
which at some later
point will require reanalysis into common nouns rather than being the
individual denoting expressions as terms. The determiner category in
English is customarily given this semantical treatment which denotes a
particular individual within the no\in set when a specific naming expres-
sion for that individual is not available. The definite determiner
picks out a single individual within the set of the noun it is attached
to. Shannon's language at this time does not have the syntactical abil-
ity to definitely determine a noun phrase, although much of the develop-
mental activity surrounding the noun suggests that such a hypothesis is
not far removed.
The 3.^3 treatment of SO^ as a determiner is rather too specula-
tive, based as it is upon so few examples. It is not out of line to
suggest that some of the early acquired words have primarily semantical
meanings that is, they carry compositional information concerning
some other semantical composites and do not have a direct model-theore-
tical intrepretation independent of those other composites. Most of
the other categories in the lexicon carry expressions which are logical
constants that are unanalyzable at the translation level of the grammar
except this new determiner category in which a lexical item enters the
logic with an analyzed meaning. SO^ is here given a 'not all' meaning.
Klein (19TT) suggests a similar treatment for MORE as [3(X) A
[3(;^) A -1 X = i[i]] , meaning that there must be at least one other 3
for the expression MORE 3 to be true. ALL-GONE might also suggest itself
for a semantical treatment of this class, rather than an unanalyzed con-
stant; perhaps Vx [3(x) a i Vy_ [3(^) a x = zJl given the meaning oppo-
site of Klein's MORE . This kind of treatment for the determiners is a
natural consequence of this form of metalanguage permitting translation
into the level of intensional logic. Finding empirical support for such
speculations is difficult since eliciting a consistent performance from
young children is known to be something of a problem (Roeper and Matthei
197^ )• The method suggested here assigns words like SOME , MORE , ALL-
GONE different meanings in the semantical component by entailing extra
logical expressions, although there are general evidence (Fodor, Fodor,
and Garrett 1975) that a uniform treatment for all words as unanalyzed
logical constants is justified upon psychological grounds. There cannot
be much resolution of this point right now, and so both methods should
IIT
be generally known. Although the lexicon presently allows items which
are constants or variables in a single category, it is probably best to
syntactically distinguish those which contain analyzed compositions
even if the distributional evidence for this distinction is weak.
3.^^ Relational constructions: analysis trees and derivations.
t
UH-OH RED
i. cp exponent
ii. V^Vu A 6( “ z^) ] "by T3
iii
.
VzVu [Ax [z (x ) A 6( - z)] (^U) A 6( ] by T5
V^Vu [z{ ^u) A 6( A 6(^ A-convert
iv. VzVu [z(-u) A << UH-OH '
(
"
z
.)] by T15
V. V^Vu [^( "u) A RED ' (
"
z
.) UH-OH' .)] by T15
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*• cp exponent
ii. o
'ey 76
iii
.
?'/£V’u Cy' 'i)] 'ey 79
iv. ?Vz/u Cn(0) (
':i)] by 71S
V. ? V^Vu CnlH(3) ) ( 'a)] by 727
vi. ?VzVu [r|(K(Ax [^1 X ) o( '£)])) ('2^] oy
vii. ?V^'/u [?OU?.'(k(Xx [z(x ) A 6fV)])) i'-z)] by 721
i ii • ?'/zVu [{2H? ' [ “.( -1 ) X 'I](\x [z( X ) A 5( '_:)]) ) ( ] oy 722
C?OUH'(A^ [Xx Cz{x)a 6(-2)](x' = 1, ( x ;]]) ( '^i)] X-convert
?V£Vu [pour ' (Xx C-iAz^ [[2.( X ) A 6( ‘1 )] = z_, ( X ni ) ( 'u)] X-convert
I'Jz'lu [pour' [[ z.^'^) A 5(*£)] = 2.^(''u)])] X-convert
ix. ?V£Vu [PCra
' [[£( *u) A MORE ’ ( 'i) ] = ( -x) ] } ] by 715
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The relational constructs are among some of the most interesting
examples in the corpus of this period. On the surface level these sen-
tences appear to have missing nouns as their interpretations must clear-
ly involve sets of individual concepts in some manner. The use of the
variables and lambda—abstraction provides as elegant derivation for this
class of sentence types without syntactical deletions, covert lexical
items, or performance limitations. It may seem that lambda-abstraction
is too complicated for beginning compositional logics of such small
children. Much of this counterintuitiveness when first encountered may
be due to the unfamiliarity of formal semantics— lambda-abstraction is
needed to connect the most plausible syntax to a model interpretation
and it is really no more complex than other methods, such as Bloom's
obligatory transformation.
The sentence, UH-OH RED
,
is the earliest occurrence of a rela-
tional common noun specification. It is good to encounter such examples
since its form is predictable from the first 3.20 grammar although no
such actual example was found in earlier samples. This kind of differ-
ence in chronological sampling does not have much acquisitional import,
but it does give some measure of confidence to the details of the gram-
mar construction. The discovery of predicted types not only make the
analysis somewhat simpler as it progresses over chronological depth since
all new forms will not need new rules; but it also increases the cer-
tainty of the previous analysis in a post hoc manner. Once acquisition
begins through a series of samples, it becomes apparent what the best
analysis for the beginning of the series should be, but not necessarily
for the end of it. The discovery of predicted forms gives some confi-
120
dence, and subsequent development upon an older form also imparts more
certainty to earlier analytical results.
The sentence, POUR SOME MORE
,
is one of the most complicated of
semantical derivations in these samples, largely because of the above-
mentioned speculative meaning assigned to SOME with its double lambda-
abstracts. This example does illustrate the continued use of the holo-
prastic part of the grammar, in this case S9-T9, to permit the newly
acquired prototransitive phrase to be interpreted on its own. Previous
formal treatments of early child syntax have left the continued holo-
phrastic utterances as something of an unexplained phenomenon and these
examples are usually dismissed from the data a priori. The rules of
holophrase interpretation, however, are a very powerful set of devices
and continue to characterize many of the sentences being offered by
Shannon in conversation. The holophrase rules do not lessen in importance
but continue to play an important interpretive role with newly acquired
phrases. To discard them at this stage would be loss to consistent
formal treatment of the child’s language.
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3.1+6 Grammar; Shannon; 23 mo 26 da
Lexicon of Basic Expressions
Terms
:
a
^ • • • • 1 YOU , ...
Syntax of Phrase Structure Example
S2h t//e ^ (t//e)/(t//e) FOLD UP
S25 "tZ/g t//e t//e HAIR TRIANGLE
Semantics of Logical Translation Example Symbolization
T12 ...
,
u
,
...
—
n
T2U [^(^) ( X )] Ax [^’(z) ( X )]
T25 Ax [3( X ) A 0( X )] Ax[KAIR'(x)a TRIANGLE’ ( X )]
During this last seventeen day interval, there does not seem to be
much developmental activity. The conversion rule for postnominals
,
32^J—
T2U
,
allovs these specifiers of common nouns to behave as nouns in the
syntax by relying on the interpretation' of _z-variables in place of the
noun. This is much the same treatment given common noun properties in
T5, 3nd it doesn^t represent radically new knowledge. Indeed, a more
general notion of phrase structure predicts that all noun-modifying cate-
gories would have a generalized ability of operating upon semantical _z-
variables in place of a specified lexical entry. If this were tes'ced cut
and foxind to be the case, then a A-dummy could be placed in the lexicon
rather than requiring a conversion rule in the syntax for each of the
categories
.
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The rules, S25-T25, concerns a curious construction, here called
the protorelative. Again, this analysis is rather speculative, there
being so few examples encountered at the end of this series so that sub-
sequent development cannot be cited in its favor. Interest in its gram-
matical form is in finding evidence for a new ability which is likely
to put an empirical stress on Shannon's present stage of grammar. The
HAIR TRIANGLE and TRIANGLE PUZZLE examples are the first phrases
which can be interpreted with two members of the same category appearing
in the same construction. Since TRIANGLE appears in both examples in
either ordered position, it contains a minimal contrast indicating some
productivity for this construction. The semantical intuitions for these
sentences do not, however, exactly agree with the interpretation given
in T25. From the transcript it seems that the noun in second position
is modifying a head noun in the first position. HAIR TRIANGLE is refer-
ring to a hair, and TRIANGLE PUZZLE is referring to a triangle. The
simple conj\inctive meaning given in T25 does not specify that the latter
noun is important only to signify a particiilar instance of the former
noun. If this modifying-head intuition were tested out, it would pro-
bably be evidence for introducing a two-place function in the intension-
al logic, rather than the more conservative meaning given in T25- Two-
place functions take two arguments of the same type, and this is the
kind of knowledge Shannon will need to stage-change the basic structure
of her present grammar.
The coTinterexamples in some of the samples contain specimens of
similar constructs with both words of the same category.
^ MAMA SHEILA
in 3. ho and * MOMMY DADA or * DADDY DADDY in this sample
have two
12k
term expressions in the same construction; however, these examples were
completely uninterpretahle to those who spoke with Shannon. It is very
doubtful that either of the terms in these counterexamples could be
properly considered a head, while the TRIANGLE examples appear to have
such interpretation.
3.5 A summary may be here helpful. The grammatical analysis as
defined in section 2.0 has been applied to historical material of some
descriptive methods from Braine (1963) and Bloom (l9T0 ) to illustrate
the relationship between those more familiar approaches to child lang-
uage and the one introduced here. The major improvements in analysis
are primarily the result of an explicit semantical component which is
capable of work on its own— thereby simplifying the work of phrase
structure. By analyzing the developments of Shannon through the month
of syntactical emergence in productive ability, the descriptive method
seems particularly successful in capturing the integration of her
genitive and rejective negation, but also assigning a compositional
relationship between rejection and denial. It is nice to have a grammar
which accounts for the holophrastic interpretation in a specifiable
manner in the same kind of rules as the early combinatorial abilities.
Shannon's intensional replacement sequence and the model structure it
specifies are extraordinary because it fits so naturally in Montague
grammar and these structures apparently have been unnoticed by other
researchers relying on situational pragmatics to determine child seman-
tics. About a third of all Shannon's conversational utterances exercise
intensional interpretation in some degree. The treatment of subsequent
development suggests the acquisition of syntactical rules as discrete
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mental objects, but the method of synchronic description used here as
elsewhere needs to be replaced by diachronic methods which specify how
a grammar changes in relation to linguistic data. A more complete map
of a child's language through major stage-changing in the grammar could
help with the introduction of diachronic methods.
The next section attempts to plunge into the formal treatment of
language disability by distinguishing delay, disorder, and deviation.
Only language delay is relatively uncontroversial in clinical litera-
ture on the topic, but a simple disorder is easy to establish with more
data and it does not introduce additional problems for the descriptive
method. The distinction between complex disorder and deviation is the
most difficult matter to be attempted in the next section.
U.O Grammatical Description of Language Disability
Not all children learn language in the same manner; indeed, some
never learn it at all. It is the goal of this section to provide a for-
mal treatment for some simple case studies of people who are severely
disabled in commianication. An advantage to this method of description
is the central focus on how the target language is structured to compose
meanings. Most clinical approaches to communications -disabled clients
attempt to describe a disability by what is missing in their languages:
errors, omissions, substitutions, and the like. In the standard psycho-
metric assessment, the client’s performances are compared to the struc-
ture of a statistical standard of a normal population— that is, a popu-
lation with disabled people removed or, at best, with the disabled in
the population in accordance with their prevalence. While there is some
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advantage to these statistical standards, they do not provide adequate
description of the client's language as they focus upon some social
standard for grammar of the community rather than the grammar of the
client. Indeed, many of the basic questions on the psychological
nature of language cannot be answered by social standards since the
boundaries of 'normal' differ from society to society, and the issues
of psychological abilities must consider the entire biological popvila-
tions rather than the social standards of particular communities.
Direct inquiry into the language struct\ire of mentally disabled indi-
viduals has been attempted from time to time, but formal treatments
have been fragmentary or glossed into vague terms. It is unfortunate
that it has become rare to find a complete set of the unrefined data
so to verify the claims of disability or to suggest better alternative
forms of structural analysis. It is doubtful that theraputic efforts
or efficient prosthesis can be designed without a proper analysis of a
client's language, especially when the language may be very different
from that expected by the local commiuiity.
Language disabilities are generally thought to exist in three
forms— delays, disorders, and deviations— although the technical demon-
stration of these distinctions is still rather speculative. A language
delay proceeds through the same acquisitional patterns as children who
learn it in the usual manner, but delayed learning begins later, makes
slower progress, and terminates with a less-than-usual level of adult
competence. Delays are frequently referred to in relation to
mental
retardation, educational subnormality, and extremely disadvantaged
environments. A language disorder is properly characterized
by the same
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rules of grammar as the general community, but they interact inappropri-
ately and thereby fail in communication. The development of a language
disorder in childhood is imeven when compared to the normal population,
sometimes characterized by periods of regression. Disorders are usually
diagnosed in relation to emotional disturbances
,
organic pathologies of
the nervous system, and traumatic injuries of the brain. It is common
in cases of language disorder to suspect that a client possesses greater
intellectual competence than is being expressed in the disordered per-
formances. Language deviations have rules of the grammar unlike those
of peer or community
. A child with a deviant language fails to communi-
cate because there is some qualitative difference in grammatical ability.
Deviantly-speaking children are often observed to develop language in
the usual manner to an early stage and then remain acquis itionally sta-
tionary for a long period.
Most language delays and some of the simpler disorders in children
are probably related to performance features of the mental system; the
amount of memory available; unstable performance; or unique restrictions
on input data for learning. These seem to be problems of the brain, its
physiology, or of extreme environments. Some of the more complex dis-
orders— usually associated with personality disturbances or childhood
psychosis— and language deviations may be more directly related to men-
tal competence rather than brain performance.. These problems are related
to forms of knowledge, the nature of that which is believed to be true,
inference capacities, and so on. These are the problems of the mind.
Menyuk (1963) provides one of the earliest attempts to formally
describe language disabilities. Her clinical procedure combined psycho-
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metrics and an early form of transformational syntax, distinguishing a
population of children by age and disability. Since this time, greater
numbers of language diagnostic techniques have attempted to measure the
development of a child’s syntactical abilities with an analysis of some
linguistic performances. Menyuk (196U, I969) initiated a discussion on
the nature of language deviations in childhood. Through the analysis
of sentences taken from transcripts, Menyuk compared vocabulary-matched
groups of deviantly-speaking children with groups of younger normal
children. These studies presented only a very few actual sentences
selected to illustrate her grammar. Without a complete set of trans-
cripts, it is difficult to verify that the deviantly-speaking group
actually did so. In discussion of the Menyuk scoring protocols, it is
concluded that the deviantly-speaking children were not merely delayed
in their language development, but there appeared to be qualitative
difference in their linguistic abilities. Likewise, Lee (1966) compared
the transcripts (also not available) of two children and determined that
one of the children was not just delayed in development but failing to
make some linguistic generalizations upon which syntactical development
depends. The Menyuk-Lee type of structural psychometrics initially con-
cluded that it may be the case that some children do not follow the nor-
mal pattern of development.
Morehead and Ingram (1973) introduce a counterhypothesis into the
discussion of deviant language development. Their hypothesis of quanti-
tative deviance states that all children develop similarly constructed
linguistic systems, although some are noticeably delayed in acquisition.
The nature of their argument qualitative deviance seems to involve the
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frequency of phrase structure rules and 'forty different transforma-
tions which are found to be similar for a deviantly—speaking group
^l^hough delayed from the normal group. Again, the problems in under-
standing these conclusions stem from the failure to present a formal
of both data and grammar of even a single language sample. The forty
transformations are particularly suspect as a grammar of this size is
a complicated formal object and the Morehead-Ingram study claims to
have produced thirty of them. A transformational component of this
size suggests that the form of the phrase structure may be at fault,
resulting in the similarities found in the samples. Nevertheless, it
was concluded that linguistically-deviant children develop grammar
similar to normal children, but their acquisition is markedly delayed
in onset, and their progress is otherwise quantitatively different
from normal. Lee (19T^) curiously reverses the original conclusion of
developmental sentence-type analysis by stating that it ' . .
.
does not
bring out qualitative differences between normally developing children
and language delayed children.
'
Menyiik (19T3) continues to cite differences found in vocabulary-
matched groups of children to indicate qualitative distinctions in devi-
ant language. Her arguments, however, are subject to very general cri-
ticism on the psychometric use of surface structure testing and its
inabilities to determine qualitative deviance. Although Morehead and
Ingram (l9T3) claim they used generative techniques for grammar construe
tion, most other researchers into deviant language have used psycho-
metric methods which uses some rules of standard English grammar and
then searches the data for sentences which show such rules as
part of
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their derivation. This method is taken to he successful if it gives
statistical distinctions between groups of children with communication
problems from the viewpoint of clinical specialists and groups from the
general population. The Menyuk-Lee type analysis may be able to pick
the problem children without distinguishing those structural qualities
of deviance within their language. As such, language tests of the sort
being used in language assessment are, at best, screening instrioments
because they do not have the ability to specify structural differences
in grammars. A client's grammar may contain very different rules from
those in the psychometric test and yet converge in some degree upon the
same set of surface markers.
U.l Clinical language samples are collected from people who are
disabled in the task of communicating with others and it is the goal of
the language clinician to provide an analysis of how the client's gram-
mar puts words together into sentences found in the sample. This study
will give three language samples— two from a typical clinical setting
in which a clinician meets with the client for the purpose of collecting
a sample of language abilities, and the third from a school setting in
which a teacher prepares daily written exercises for a handicapped stu-
dent. All three clients are adolescents whose simple language abilities
are stable— subsequent acquisition of major new abilities is not prob-
able. The grammars given in this section may be close to their adult
level of communication. It would, of course, require a chronological
sequence of data to establish that a grammar is stable or changing, but
chronological depth in sampling is unusual in clinical psychology. Most
diagnostic procedures are based upon one-time measurements which result
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directly in or contribute to prognosis. Even in long—term facilities,
there are few psychometric procedures which require evidence of mental
change over a period of objective sampling. The next two language sam-
ples are the kind of first referral information available in many case
conference proceedings
,
but it is rare to see the actual samples of what
the client says.
The first sample of Janice, when she was almost twelve, is an
example of language delay. The grammar, U.ll, is in respects like the
grammar of younger children. The sample of 12-year-old Tyrome, i|.13,
is a simple disorder, probably not too disimilar in etiology from the
language of Janice. The grammar of John, U.21, is given as an illustra-
tion of language deviation, although it may indeed represent a complex
disorder. The appendices contain all of the raw data used for the these
studies of disability.
U.IO Language sample: Janice; 11 yr 10 mo 15 da
11 yr 11 mo T la
Noiins Protoverbs Adjectives
Truth
Functions
Categorial
Comterexamples
SUN 1 GO 1
DOLLY 2 WASH 1
SHIRT U LIKE 1
WATER 1 BRUSH 1
ROOM 1
YARD 1
BLACK 1+ NO 8 SUSAN
PURPLE YEA 8 HI
PINK 1 YEP 1 OH
RED 1 UM-HUM 1 OUCH
ALL-GONE 2 YES 1 UM
UH
WHAT
3
1
1
1
1
1
18
Locatives
WRITE ON A PAPER 1
IN YARD? 1
OUT IN YARD? 1
IN THE YARD? 1
HERE ROOM 1
Adverbial Particle
GO AWAY ^
COME ON 1
TAKE OFF 1
PUT SHOE ON 1
PUTTING PANTS ON 1
TAKING PANTS ON DOWN 1
Predicates
GO SHIRT 1
TAKE SHOE
DRY DOLL
COMB HAIR
DRAWING THE PURPLE
rH
CM
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Attribution
THAT'S PURPLE
THAT PURPLE
SOCK ALL-DONE
YOU A GOOD GIRL
SUN OUT 1
RAINING OUT? 1
SHIRT ON 1
COMB AWAY 2
Aspectuals
1 NOT DADDY
1 NOT RAINING
1 NO PULL
1 NOT COMB
NOT PURPLE
NOT BLUE
NOT PINK
NO WHITE SKIRT
NO PINK DRESS
NO LONG DRESS
NO WASH TABLE
Modification Nonexistence Negation
1 WHITE SKIRT
1 RED SKIRT
1 PURPLE SHIRT
1 ALL-GONE RAIN
1
2
1
2
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
SKIRT TOMORROW? 1
NO PURPLE SKIRT TOMORROW 1
GET OVER THERE RIGHT NOW 1
YOU GET OVER THERE RIGHT NOW 1
YOU STOP THAT RIGHT NOW 1
Possibility Assertion
MAYBE SKIRT TOMORROW 1
Combinatorial Co\interexamples
1
1
1
1
U.ll Grammar: Janice; 11 yr 10 mo 15 da
11 yr 11 mo T da
Lexicon of Basic Expressions
TOO BAD 6
TOO HOT 1
THAT'S IT 3
TOMORROW SKIRT 1
SHIRT UNDERPANTS 1
RIGHT THERE
WHAT JANET
SUSAN NO COMB
NO COMB FOR SUSAN
Sentences *• t S
Terms : T YOU
Common Nouns t//e : N THAT , SKIRTM^M ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ , CO^ffi ,
Verb Phrases t/e : VP
Protoverbs (t/e)/(t//e) ; PVB PUT , TA^ , COMB , .
.
Adjectives (t//e)/(t//e) : ADJ RED , ^L-GONE , GOOD
Locatives (t/e)/(t/e) : LOC OVER-THERE , AWAY , ON
Truth Operators t/t : TRU NO , MAYBE , YES , YEA
Aspectuals : t//t : ASP : RIGHT-NOW , TOMMORROW
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of Phrase Structure Example
SI t e t/e YOU GET OVER THERE RIGHT NOW
S2 t -y e t//e YOU A GOOD GIRL
S3 t -y t//e (t//e)/(t//e) SOCK ALL-DONE
Sh t y t//e (t/e)/(t/e) SUN OUT
S5 t y t/t t MAYBE SKIRT TOMORROW
s6 t -y t t//t YOU STOP THAT RIGHT NOW
ST t -y t ? RAINING OUT?
S8 t/e -y (t/e)/(t//e) t//e GO SHIRT
S9 t/e y t/e (t/e)/(t/e) PUT SHOE ON
SIO t//e y (t/e)/(t/e) t//e WRITE ON A PAPER
Sll t//e y (t//e)/(t//e) t//e WHITE SHIRT
S12 t//e -y (t//e)/(t//e) DRAWING THE PURPLE
S13 t/e -y (t/e)/(t//e) TAKE OFF
SlU t -y t/e GO
S15 t t//e SUN
Sl6 t y t/t YEA
SIT e -y YOU
Sl8 t//e -y THAT , SKIRT , COMB , ...
S19 (t/e)/(t//e) -y PUT , TAKE , COMB
S20 (t//e)/(t//e) -y RED , ALL-GONE , GOOD , . .
.
S21 (t/e)/(t/e) -y OVER-THERE , AWAY , ON , ...
S22 t/t y NO , MAYBE , YES , YEA , ...
S23 t//t y RIGHT-NOW , TOMORROW
13U
Semantics of Logical Translation Example Symbolization
T1 VzVu [VP( "t)] N Vz Vu [OVER-THERE
' ( "GET ') (" u)]
T2 V^Vu [n ("T)] Vz Vu [good
'
(
" GIRL
' )
(
"
u)
]
T3 V^Vu [ADJ("N) ("u)] V^Vu [all-DONE
'
(
" SOCK
' )
(
"
u)
]
tU V^Vu [L0C("N) ("u)] yzVu [OUT'("SUN' )("u}]
T5 TRU [S] WV^Vu [skirt' ("u)] V -jWVzVu [SKIRT'("u!
t6 ASP [S] NVzVu [STOP'("^)("u)]
TT ? [s] ? Vz Vu [out
'
(
" RAINING
' )
(
"
u)
]
t8 PYB("N) V^Vu [GO' ("SHIRT' )("u)]
T9 LOC("VP) V^Vu [ON'("PUT'("SHOE'))("u)]
TIO LOC(^N) VzVu [WRITE'("ON'("PAPER'))("u)]
Til ADJ("N) VzVu [WHITE' ("SHIRT' )("u)]
T12 ADJ("^) VzVu [drawing '( "PURPLE' (" z))("u)]
T13 PVB( ^z) VzVu [OFF'("TAKE'("z))("u)]
TlU v^Vu [pvbC'^) (''u)] VzVu [go' (" z) ("u)
]
T15 V^Vu [N ( ''u ) ] VzVu [SUN'("u)]
ti6 TRU [S"] V^Vu [unzipping"
(
"DRESS" )(
''
u) ]
where S' is part of the
presuppositional common
ground and S" is the re-
sult of operating TRU on
S'
.
TIT u
T18 z
,
SKIRT'
,
COMB' 9 • • •
T19 PUT'
,
TAKE'
,
COMB r
,
• • •
T20 RED'
,
ALL-GONE'
,
GOOD'
,
T21 OVER-THERE' , AWAY' , ON' , ...
T22 A,p [-1 p ] , A.P [p V —I P ] , [^] , AP 1 1 ) • • •
1
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T23 XP [n P]
,
XP [W P^]
X differsnlial diagnosis of languago delay ‘technically recjuires
evidence of: (i) a delayed beginning of whatever linguistic ability is
being measured; (ii) slower progress through a typical acquisition pat-
tern; and (iii) developmental termination at a level less than the
usual adult competence. In most clinical settings, it is rare to find
these data carefully documented since contemporary practice is based
upon statistical comparison of performance frequencies for a few isola-
ted structures of grammar typically found in the language of a general
population of children. If cumulative records are available, it is
usually the test scores and percentile rankings that is retained while
the basic data of client performance is not reported. It is sometimes
possible, however, to estimate delayed onset of acquisition from some
anecdotal records as social workers frequently ask parents about the
client’s first words or a teacher might note that someone began speaking
in short phrases. Slower development is the hardest to document in most
clinical settings since chronological depth in data construction is very
uncommon. Usually, diagnostics are scheduled in advance of an imminent
case conference so a clinician is not able to continue sampling until
there is an appreciable change in client performance to establish a rate
in order to document slower progress. Even in long-term facilities and
total institutions where years of client performance are potentially
available, there is emphasis on one-trial, short-term measurements which
are systematically less accurate to the cases with more extreme delay.
that statistical population procedures make itIt may seem perverse
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harder to dociament the more extreme disabilities; but, by and large, the
use of differential diagnosis in language disabilities is moot— there
are no effective treatments known which are differentially sensitive.
The third diagnostic point is really a prognostic indication for the de-
layed child and can only be established after it is too late for inter-
vention techniques to be applied in effort to enhance client development.
Since puberty usually terminates the primary mental development of lan-
guage abilities
,
the main evidence for delay is found in the synchronic
analysis of an adolescent with a stable child-like language. The 1.10
Janice sample is available from a practicing language clinic and the
severity of her disability can be intuitively established by direct
examination of the transcript, selected to represent her most usual lin-
guistic performances. Intuitive data should be the heart of clinical
reporting, because it is as essential to validity as reproducible obser-
vation is necessary to reliability.
It may be important to notice that apparently a different ontology
underlies the language which Janice uses in distinction from the model
constructed for Shannon. The ontology of a grammar concerns the kinds
of primitives used in the model interpretation. Shannon’s language is
modeled upon a distinction between terms and nouns. The intensional
functions in the 3.3 model for terms are specified so is always
denoting a single individual while common nouns like FECES denotes a set
of individuals, sometimes being true of just SH and other times being
true of others. The Shannon model is constructed with a rather parsimo-
nious ontology where the set of possible individuals is roughly
composed
of real world persons— things which can have some territorial
claims
137
over other object-like things which lack this property of possessive
ability. The intensional functions for common nouns in the Shannon
ontology do not denote primitive objects uniquely but characterize sets
of person-like individuals. If there were such a thing as a standard
model ontology, it would include a primitive for the object-like things
along with the person-like things
,
but this model foundation seems a bit
over-extended in Shannon's case. The basic transitivity of the adult
language is conspiciously absent in Shannon's language. She did not say
things like *(? SHOE DADDY meaning a shoe's father nor meaning that a
shoe possessed her father. She never referred to her grandmother as
*0 DADDY'S MAMA which may have been a description offered to her, nor
to herself as *0 MAMA BABY — although she would later learn these
things at different times, they were \inavailable to her present mode of
speaking about the world.
The kind of Shannon model ontology does not seem to fit the sample
of Janice. There are very few expressions in U.IO which designate the
people spoken about (excepting SUSAH) and there are frequent deictic ex-
pressions (you
,
THAT
,
RIGHT-NOW
,
OVER-THERE) which serve to indicate
a specific pragmatic reference. This emphasis on deixis an d common nouns
is a basic distinction in Janice's grammar which could modeled different
from the minimal ontology of the Shannon sample. The negative seems to
be a good test for these distinctions— Janice's uniform use of nonexis-
tence negation (poorly named so) is related to the common noun deixis in
much the same manner as Shannon's rejection and denials were related to
the fundamental genitive distinction in her ontology . The nonexistence
meaning given in T5 is probably inaccurate: NOT PURPLE should mean
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V^Vu [-1 PTOPLE'( ^)("u)] meaning there is something which is not purple
to get the proper nonexistence interpretation. This antideictic form
of negation would have to operate upon the level of verb phrases, and
it wo\ild be of some type. (t/e)//(t/e)
,
to create the property of
being not purple. Janice's T5 is given for its simple syntax since it
is not good to complicate the grammar without enough examples to indi-
cate the natiire of the complexity.
On the matter of intensional/extensional functional structure,
Janice also gives a variant perspective. If there ever was a child who
spoke entirely of the here-and-now situation, Janice is close to it.
With the possible exception of BRUSH if interpreted only as a noun, all
of her sentences are extensionally true. She produced no false utter-
ances with respect for real life occurrence; but even so, intensional
modeling seems warrented by the frequent nonexistence negations. Her
common assertion that such-and-such was not the case formally requires
an intensional treatment, and often these were spontaneous negations not
previously suggested by anyone. No one was likely to claim that dolly
was a daddy, nor that the black pen was purple, nor that the purple
dress was pink. These negatives seem to function as a minimal contrast
from actual to nonactual reference while remaining extensionally true.
Janice asserts NO WASH TABLE when washing the doll, contrasting possible
verb objects.
These differences between Janice's ontology and Shannon's do not
suggest deviation as the same kind of rules appear in both, but they are
evidence of variation as to the different kinds of relations with which
the early grammar begins. As discrete mental abilities, the i+.ll grammar
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does not have syntactical or semantical abilities which can be put to
fault. Her disability does not result from faulty mental competence
but rather suggests that performance capacities have not developed much
beyond this early level. Since this sample was collected across a 23
day period and there appears to be no change during the grammar as one
might expect from a 12-year-old, the optimal diagnosis of language delay
seems in order. If it were found that all children who developed this
deictic /noun ontology were disabled in subsequent development (an unlik-
ely hypothesis by all accounts), then a disorder might exist between
this possible variant pattern of acquisition and the performance require-
ments of learning. The U.ll grammar is well formed with respect to meta-
linguistic principles even if it were found to be ill-suited for the pro-
gress of continued development. Since Bloom reported nonexistence nega-
tives in her child's development, the U.ll grammar probably demonstrates
variance in acquisition which terminated at an early level of competence
due to limitations of the performance system. The mind be sound, but
the brain be weak.
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Disorders are almost always underdetermined by clinical procedure,
especially by first-referral synchronic methods. Disorders are among
the most frustrating of the disabilities to adequately analyze because
seemingly small performances produce very large grammars with inelegant
rules and many counterexamples. This sample from Tyrome has all these
investigative properties. Although the basic nature of the disorder is
simple, the grammar is large and clumsy, having many points of data-thin
speculation needing substantial empirical testing and follow-up that is
unlikely in most clinical settings. Simple disorders are the result of
well-formed rules of grammar interacting in a manner which is inconsis-
tent or inefficient for communication. Simple disorders rarely fail in
communication— unlike complex disorders and deviations which often mis-
inform or are uninterpretable. Like the language delay, disorders seem
related in etiology to limitations of the performance capacities: there
being inconsistent evidence for greater mental competence which the per-
formance system cannot uniformly access and utilize. Precise differen-
tial diagnosis between delay and simple disorder is bound to be somewhat
speculative until some adequate specification of the brain's performance
capacities is available, but until then description of mental competence
in a system of faulty performance may be of value on other grounds. Re-
medial interventions upon the organic structure of the brain may not be
possible for some time yet, but prosthetic forms of intervention may be
feasible in some cases where greater linguistic competence can be demon
strated.
The fundamental disorder in Tyrome ' s language sample involves a
marked inconsistency in phrase structure between a first-order logic
and
1U8
a second-order logic, this distinction hinges on the prototransitive
predicates. In the logical interpretation of such a language, first-
order treatment is the most direct combinatorial relationship between
the semantical fxinctions—
,
and the like— all being
categories with a first-order relationship to the primitives. In the
^.13 grammar, the syntactical rules, Sl-S8
,
are a portion of the gram-
mar where the phrase structure combines in first-order relations; and
the translation rules in the logic, T1-T8
,
are required to supply the
semantical interpretations in much the same manner as Shannon and Janice
did. The category of agent, t///
e
,
seems to be syntactically distinct
from common nouns, but Tyrome does not provide any evidence that they
should be semantically treated as primitive terms in category, ^ . An
agent expression is a semantical function which selects sets of individ-
uals rather than indicating a particular individual. This latter defin-
ite description must be supplied for first-order expressions with non-
categorial rules or through the holophrase portion of the syntax, S5-S8
,
in the manner of little children.
The second-order portion of Tyrome 's grammar, S9-S13 , gives yet
another phrasal method for constructing sentences. The nominative cate-
gory, t/(t/e )
,
requires an intransitive expression to produce a ;b-level
sentence; while the accusative category, ( t/e)/((t/e)/(t//e)) , has the
second-order relationship to prototransitive expressions, requiring one
to produce an intransitive expression. This second-order pathway to the
truth values is a method which gives a consistent treatment for the pro-
ductive use of proforms , agent demonstratives, and noun determiners which
do not seem present in the simpler first-order system of early syntax.
These categories and the appearance of the au.'ciliary aay be the ac^aisi-
tional evidence needed for the reanalysis from the earliest first-order
pnrase struct’ores into the subsequent stage of second-order treatment.
The use of the clinical term, disorder, in this case aeser'/es some
scrutiny. Clearly, there are enough minimal contrasts in this sample to
estaolish inconsistent use of* the demonstratives and determiners: GI'^L
COOK having the same interpretation as THIS GIRL COOK
; 30Y RIDING
SLiD contrasts with an intermediate first/second—order extression SOY
RIDING A BIKE and finally a complete second-order expression THIS SOY
RIDxNG A SiKE
. Contrasts like these suggest that a 'iniform semantical
interpretation in the model should be assigned to these structures so
that the small words appear optional. Previous grammatical analyses
like Braine ' s or Bloom's without rigorous semantical treatments have
been able to use autonomous syntactical optionality to simplify the form
of s^nitacticsu. r^'iles
,
but there is no such thing as optionality in seman-
tics. A meaning is either present or absent, and the syntactical option
in phrase str'icture is a short-hand form of notation, collapsing similar
relies. In the child language literature it has sometLmes been claimed
that obligator;^ forms are initially acquired as optional forms, but this
amounts to the claim that these forms initially have no meaning.
The semantical component of this analytic method must r'ole out s^-mtactic
ontionality as a formal device to account for the inconsistency on tne
demonstrative/determiner distribution in the sample. Assigning two ways
of building sentential propositions may seem inelegantly red’undant for
the syntax, but it is necessary for compositional meanings . Having botn
a first-order and second-order treatment in the same grammar at least
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s^SS^sts how acquis ition may huild upon the earlier phrase structure so
that both forms occur in the logic at the same time. Reanalysis must
proceed by adding second stage grammar before the earlier stage is no
longer available.
Viewed in this manner, the use of the term disorder does not seem
to suggest the sense of mental pathology in which the earlier child
rules are inappropriately interacting with later adult forms. The eti-
ology of a simple disorder may be the same as the language delay but
with a point of acquisitional termination occ\irring between two stages
of grammar organization. The apparent inconsistency of a disorder in
language development may be a transitional phase between stages which
has become elongated or fixed.
There are probably no simple clinical procedures which can adequa-
tely describe a childhood language disorder upon a single application of
the technique. The diagnosis of disorder should be the result of an
analysis which finds the usual kind of rules interacting to produce some
inconsistent or unusual expressions. A syntactical disorder, such as
suggested here for Tyrome, is not an easy matter to arrive at. For any
set of data there are an indefinite number of syntactical components
capable of generating the sample, and sorting through them becomes a big
analytical problem. Under the usual circumstances, metalinguistic prin-
ciples are used to constrain the analysis to the simplest grammars, the
smallest number of primitives, and so forth. But even a simple disorder
ing of the recursive devices goes against these principles and
results
in major inconsistency and diversity in a sample. One of the most dif-
ficult problems in the proper analysis for a disordered
sample is to
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find the grammar
-which does not have productivity within its set of
counterexamples. In Tyrome's case, this requires that both first-order
and second-order treatments of phrase structure be involved, resulting
in major metalinguistic inelegance for the grammar construction. The
clinician faced with such inconsistency in initial data should be pre-
pared for collecting much larger samples and devising elicitation tech-
to tease out the predictions and details of disordered r-ules
which might rarely occur in spontaneous conversation and be wholly un-
expected by standard psychometrics. It is not very easy to arrive at
certainty in the analysis of disorders, because in many respects they
converge or approximate the resiilts of the usual grammars.
U.2 A -written language sample from daily school exercises is
given in this section to provide a wider empirical foimdation for the
descriptive method of language disability. All of the data before this
have been of vocal speech since this is the most common form of communi-
cation, but this should not lead to the unfortunately common misunder-
standing that vocalization is an essential and primary form in language
and that the analysis of signed language or written expressions are some-
how secondary to auditory symbols. The primacy of oral speech is a myth.
Language is essentially a mental process and its perfromance by tongue,
hand or machine can all be the object of study in the construction of a
grammar. There are, of co-urse, systematic differences found within each
performance mode, but these are differences in style or task. Mental
principles of grammar are what any mode of comm-unication with a single
language must share in order to succeed.
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It is the case, however, that one performance mode has definite
advantages for sampling. There are some handicapped people who are less
able to communicate with speech so that the analysis of their grammati-
cal ability may better proceed in other symbol systems. Many deaf per-
sons find natural expression with manual signs, some cerebral palsied
people communicate with machines designed to handicap their limited
movements, and recently some children have been taught to place small
plastic shapes in grammatical sequences. There is nothing essentially
inferior about speech substitutes as the substrate for linguistic analy-
sis because the subject of analytic concern is the mind which puts the
order to the symbols.
The subject of this study is a fifteen year old boy, John, with a
long history of severe behavior disorder. The son of an Air Force fami-
ly, John was conceived in Japan where his father contracted a form of
viral encephalitis. John was born in England one week before his father
died of a recurrent attack of encephalitis on Christmas day . John had
developed a serious ear infection presumably from a transatlantic flight
in a nonpressurized aircraft when three weeks old, but the infection
responded to standard antibiotic treatment. The boy developed normally
until the age of two and a half when he unexplainably ceased talking and
begun communicating through screams, grunting, and finger points.
Since
that time a rich history of medical and psychological treatments
have
failed to make alteration or insight into his condition.
Psychiatrists
diagnosed him as autistic and prescribed treatments to his
mother;
neurologists described him as brain damaged and prescribed
tranquillizer;
psychologists found John to be mentally retarded and
trained him with
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reinforcers; educators called him learning disabled and assigned him
worksheets for eye-hand coordination. Through long and varied treat-
ments, John remained noncommunicative
—
prone to screaming and occasion-
al violence. When aged six years, his family’s supporting capacities
failed and he entered a state institution for the mentally retarded
where he rocked on a bench in a concrete room for six years. In this
institution's school he drew very elaborate cuckoo clocks. A fort\mate
remarriage allowed John, ages 12, to return to his family and enter a
community program for the handicapped. Medical diagnosis upon entry:
Chronic Brain Syndrome, causation unknown with lack of neurological
findings
.
During the period of this study, calender 19T3, John's ability to
communicate remained simple: he would infrequently utter short sentences
or phrases— less than six or seven words long— and these had a notice-
able stereotyped, memorized quality and peculiar intonation. Although
he could understand and act upon almost any concrete information spoken
to him in a direct manner, John produced very little spontaneous conver-
sation and he spent much time in strange nonexpressive movements , body
rocking, and intricate hand positioning. When aggitated he would scream
shatteringly and bite the palm of his hand; but, in general, he was very
pleasant to be with, clean and well groomed, and inventive in his amuse-
ments .
Throughout his lengthy history of disturbed behavior and low level
of communication, John developed near normal graphic and artistic abili-
ties— even to the point of talent. Reflecting this ability pattern,
those psychometric tests of a nonverbal or visual motor nature (Lieter,
Bsnder—Gestalt
,
Frostig, Merrill—Palmer
,
Goodenough—Harris ) usually pro-
duced standard IQ equivalents in the high 80's, while those tests of a
more verbal content (WISC, Binet, Peabody Picture Vocabulary) would re-
peatably score in the low 30 range. John greatly enjoyed drawings of
startling detail and precise execution. He was skilled in most school
art media, but his themes were usually of a repetitious and stereotyped
nature which conveyed little if any expressive content. For years he
drew elaborate deer-head cuckoo clocks with Roman numerals and long pull
chains— sometimes twenty clocks a day. There was a period in which he
drew the complete playing board of a television game known as Concentra-
tion, play the game by himself by erasing and redrawing each of the 6U
playing squares to finally expose a meaningless rebus. He understood
the movements in the game without understanding the purpose. John drew
the back of drive-in movie screens for a while; then detailed floor plans
of nonexistent houses; lollipops in cellophane wrappers. Once enrolled
in the long-term commimity school in 1971 » an. individualized special edu-
cation program began a daily exercise of writing words and drawing an
explanatory picture.
During the 1971-72 school year it was determined that John's lan-
guage abilities were limited to simple sentence patterns which he could
productively use in reading and writing expressively , although his vocal
communication for social purpose remained generally stereotyped and in-
expressive. Each school day during the morning schedule he was given
two worksheets, each scribed into six rectangular areas. Some of
these
areas contained teacher-drawn pictiires of objects and persons to which
John would write an explanatory description. Other worksheet
areas had
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a teacher-written sentence to which he drew a representative illustra-
tion. His writing was clear and unambiguous although his spelling of
new or unfamiliar lexical items was sometimes alphabet soup. When John
had completed both worksheets, the instructor would observe as John
would read aloud all of his words on both pages and the instructor would
mark all spelling errors in a standard manner. This read-back gives
complete certainty for intended word order, and at no time would the
teacher comment upon choice of worded description or alter his wording.
John was being taught only spelling through direct correction while the
instructional emphasis in preparing the teacher-drawings and the teacher
-sentences was to follow the forms of John's own language which was not
being expressed through spontaneous speech. He would write productive
descriptions when he would not or could not speak in conversation. His
writing samples represent his basic linguistic abilities better than any
vocal sample would.
The worksheets were sent home on a daily basis with other papers.
His parents were so pleased with the exercises as to save them to show
relatives and to read them with John on occasion. For long-term instruc-
tional control on this program, the teacher would receive the worksheets
back upon a bimonthly basis. The retrieval rate during 19T3 was 88.8^
and thus this sample represents a substantial part of his written output
for this year. Appendix D contains the complete set of student and tea-
cher sentences with John's original spelling retained— although this
text shall only concern word order and meaning. Since John produced both
sentences and drawings which are related through meaning and structure,
the procedural uncertainties of establishing meanings in
pragmatical
corit-exxs car: oe kept tc a mniciux as enough dravings shall be presented
for the reader to establish the relations to intuitional satisfaction.
This nethoc. of pictoriaj. elicitation does not sample some areas of
granmar such as the negative or pronominalizatior.
,
but it does supply
some rather interesting evidence of John's interpretation of sentential
structure concerning terms and predicates.
4.20 language sample fragment: John; 15 yrs old
All occurrences of selected verbs categorised
by major predicate structures.
teacher drawn : JOKIs EAI'IDWRITING
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HAS
-rajiEi- ive
29JA:;
iE.'—
izT13
2MA?.
=MAf.
^ 1 M.-—.
yj--~
Zioz
26.1-S?.
'
i
3yj:i
5MAY
LTyJ-.'i
I'yLVi
'“5Z?
SOC?
9CCT
2‘.0CT
300CT
i::ov
9K0V
19NCV
29^'CV
3r'EC
llEZC
=Ai a gl'a
— wrtT'-SivGi.
teacher drawn : JOHN WRITTEN
ClEl'LU; :-L^:£ A GOG
MQIGZY^HAS A GAJ>.GA.”
G--_r.«_yC ::A— A. VOMAE
i;*;y ea£ a two sjtai'Z
MA;: rJ^ A HCHSZ
lAF.GAN HAZ A GAP3AGECA:;
wcma:: :iA= a
mPHAjrr HAZ- ... FLOVZ?.
wckaj: eaz a PAiirr
TZAC:-ZF. EA£ A GRAYOK
lAGY A , EIP.YEAIL/C'/lebri-g/":. 30JAN TARZAN HAS A GARBAGE CAN
yjdl HAS A SLIPPERS
CLDMJU'T :-LA£ A IOC-
IA?.ZA!\ ;-LAS A IRZZ
PA3BII HAS A PEKCZ
SAV has a PZC=
MOITIZY ?_AS A SKAI-Z
KAI': HAS A ICY
^^A!; HAS AJ: ice TP-AY
3AI-' :HAS A PUMP
SUPEPJ^iAI'i HAS A 3CX
MCLKZY HAS A IPAZC:
JOE^' HAS A BALL
LALY HAS A IWC SNAKE
VOMAIs’ HAS A lEACHEP.
ZAr.LAN HAS A IPZE
MAJC HAS A ICY
SUPEPMAi: HAS A DRAGON
Co:Epcu::d Verb Pnrsse
6MAE TARZAN HAS A TARZAN FALL DOWN
-ja:: i.;rlan rlii has a moe-cti
9YIB lAPZAN RIDE IRE ELEPHANT EAS A PROG
oPiAP. I.AP.IAi; EAS A lAP.LAC: PAEL DOAT
T-lAY lARLAN HAS A MAC: PALL DOaT IHE w’AIIR.
LdSEP IARLA:: ride ZHE lion EAS a HiriPE
Lscci jo:-e: get cut ire hoyse has a garbagecan
5NCV SAI-; GEI CUT IHE CA!*!?EP HAS GARBAGE CADI
Coa.jsir.ed Sentence
8JAN JOHN HAS A SNAKE AND
TARZAN HAS A SNAKE
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— yj ru* •MCrriZY H.AS
127Z3 MOrejY HAS .
-:;cv mt: core u
Coaj"':
2TAT. vcmat: hzat
5:-As. UrS
130AS. TOHr: HAS A
16ma?. TAZLAir hit:
3CI.rAF. TAP.TAi; HAS
1-MAY VOMAY /PUT,
ZeSZr MCMHZY HAS
Imbedded rieia^ive Clause
HAS A :2::
AT.c-z rjicz or: :
HAS A VAZCZ
i^i ci^ed 7arc Zhrase
ris. Am HAS A 20C-
CllA Am HAS A CAT
AiZr HAS A TWO VHETrCH
lZ?HAr;T A2C HAS A miZZ
bOCT
2MAP.
taj.za:: zzsov tzz ZAi^MZ?. AirC' haz a
Cosbound Verb
clo'wt: has a. TH30V THZ ciovr:
Acbusa^ive-locarive
WCi4Air HAZ A. CLASS THZ TTI'C
TAP.ZAJ: HAS A FISH THZ WATZr.
15JAN MONKEY HAS A TARZAN
HAS A KNIFE
CosTJOuad Verb Phrase
22JAN WOMAN HAS A GLASS THE JIM
RUN
ipyAS
26M-S.
lOAPF.
2dSZ?
5
miAS.
-A~P.
3c::ov
Tatraasibivc
HA.Tr-iAj; p.ur:
vcrdAi: ?.ui;
ZLZPHArrT Am clov.!: ?;jr
SAI': HuH
-ia:: hit;
iiJAK hit; nAS JM MOmZY
^jAi; SAmY p.uii : fnu . 'ITT"
iSo'Ai; BATMAK hut; C*I THZ CeV
hut: V CZ
13MA?. LACY HUH Z Z TZlZPHOm
20MA?. t-ahtat; hut; TrIZ S .• tajC 'T’TTTOr'^* ’’-u L
26mAS TIM HUH m CK TrIZ BICYCLZ
9ASH worAj: ?:ut; HZ %'ASZZ
SOASP. TAlHTAS hut; SCHOOl
IT'A-Y SPACZMAt; h TC HccreT
20CT wqmat: hut; THZ BALI
26N0V taszat; ^»T»T SCHOOL
26ma?. TASIAi: *3T—
*
nr*
W V.. '^iAZ'^’7
Coaooined Seraeaces
l6rZB
26MAS.
Z STAIPS AI.T
STASPS
Locavi"e
BATHAT; HU!T
mat: fat ti-z
rIZ HAST
CrTJF.CH
TASIAi: RUT\ cure I."
jjTON HUl' TP -
woMAi: fxts A_m
_
TZACHZF. P-Ur: r.ALl OFT TT-b 'WA.u.-
Co'aaaerexaapie
Z CHTP.CHT-iAF. * mat: f.uI': o'tt
2:,yAS. * voola:: hit: to
2CSZP * TTC-ZP. hit; tc
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GO
Locative
zijij; HA22I': Ai;i ?::• mtz hcrsz sc ?c boat
ziJ.-s: s?:zz?. :-c tc schccl
17IB ZIP' sc TC H:?T5K0USI
5CCT TWO LIOK C-C TO AIPBLAUZ
IdOCT TPA.GCX SC TC STEPS
I"COT JOrD’ SC TC TREE
3C0CT WOldAi; sc TC SrIDEP.
2'':to\* tarda:: aic lady sc tc h;
Conpo'Liiid Verd riirase
3 CAR?. TARTAi; ?UT' SC TC SCKCOL
S'AczriAi: ?tt: sc tc 5choc
l
6:ccv LATY ccic c:: thi takcai; sc tc house
Conceited Cosipcund Verb
13NCV * TVe SHAIZ SET CUT THE AITT SC TC THE DOGHOUSE
l^rriCV * TVe SHAiCE SET OUT THE AiCC GC TC THE DOGHOUSE
Coc.joined 3en^eaoes
312-IAY THACHEH HIDE THE HC7.SE AJID LADY SC TO HORSE
Co'un'ti srexasipie
2dJAK * LADY LAY DOWN SC TC SUEZ?
ON
Transi"ivc
-ua:; azfplaiz ck the sox
IPZE HELL AX’D HOOH AI~ CAJTDLE OX THE TABLE
LMAR. tarda:; ox the EHERIHAITI
22:-1A?. DCS OK ZHE BALL
5AR?. HIRH OK THE HOUSE
iMA.Y SHTDH? CX THE LADY
ITSE? L.Z;Y .2
~ TZl CX “HE CCU'CH
19SE? SA.T OK ZEE SAP.
2CCT BIRD HOUSE OK THE TPZE
290 CT CAT CK THE SAI-ZEP.
Ccrccined Sentences
2LPEB SLOTH CK THE OPJZP. AIZ HAT CK THE COUCH
T'lA.Y MCin-ZY CX THE TABLE ADTE UOHIi .'JB A -
’ ODES LOOK UiZZP. THE TABLl. AB- SAjj- OK ..
l6o
GET OUT
-•ZT -ITT locaciv?
iCo'-aj:! 3:iakz :z: out r>:z :cgzci;3z
loJAii :4a:i :-z? :'jr rzz z-rjzcz
23ZZ3 VCMAII 3zr TZZ :a?.
l-k?Z3 3NAKZ 3ZT 2'JT rHZ 3^-!ZZ?.
IjMae nvo 3ifAiCi ;-ZT :t7r rzz 3:?3:K0t;3Z
3A:n3Y 3zt ;Lr rzz caz
23Mia zi2?Z;\:."r ;-ZT zjz rzz r^'o rzAiz
rr.iAS vc’-LAiY :zT :uz rzz 3tcrz
5A??. vcMAir :-zz :ur rrz iiz?ZA:i'r
26Ar?. vcii-Air r-zz :irr rzz rzAiz
:may lazy rzT ruz rzz 3?rrz?.
--SZ? 3:iAXZ :-zz :uz rzz 3c:c
23SZ? 3:taaZ rzz rrr rzz 3zr?z
irocz CAT rzz :uz rzz rz:rr
i:icv vcMATi rzz ruz rzz 3zzfs
2i:;ov 3:rAKZ rzz rzz rzz zzzzhclzz
132ZC rir^zArr rzz rzz rzz rzurcz
Coapoiiacl Verb Phrase
i3ccz rcHTT rzz ruz rzz zcusz ;iAS a rAZZAGZCAr
5 .'rev 3a;4 rzz ruz rzz rAi'!?zR zas a r.A?3AGZ rAJi
ron.'oirsd ranpourdad Verbs
r2:icv r.vc rr.Ajr: rzz ruz rzz .ato ro ro rzz rcGzcusz
'.-ucv » rve 3za:-c: rzz rur rzz .diz re re rzz rcc-zcusz
Conjoined 3ei:t;acce3
2A??. MAi'i ror-ipriG .a:ii! riousz rzz ruz rzz rzuez
GET
rzz rransiaira
an3 vcMAJ rzz rzz rrsz
~rz3 m rzz rzz 3all
5FZ3 :f_agc:t rzz rzz iiz?z.a;iz
2CZZ3 rp.AGciT rzz rzz 3?acz:^a:i
Zabedded ?.sl3.zire riauss
i5£Z? 3?ac2:za:i rzz a roiiAvP. pp.cm rzz 3c:c
2’-sz? spaczT'La:! rzz rzz .^riz r?.CM rzz sex
255Z? rzACHZH rzz rzz ArzeicH pp.cm rzz recu sox
eon.joiasd Verb Phrase
29JICV LADY P.IZZ rZZ ZOZ.SZ .ATC rZZ rzz 3.A3Y
PUT
r/'-Par-iais rerairal
rAvrz Pur rzz reez r:i
2'-i.;.A:T
*
s-ArdA:! puz rzz 3ecz ::
22JZ3 rz-ACzsr. p'jz rzz reAZ
•
rezrr put rzz zve 3ccz
22TCV ;la:; p'jz rzz r^’c 3cez
'^ZZZZ 3Ari.A:r ?'zr rzz vArrz
l6l
GIVE
I^a-ive
16712.
1-MA?.
5MA.;
25ccr
?::dv
12N0V
lAH-'jd: zmi: :
VC'LiJs GI~£ Tz
yj^i: c-r.^s --z
LADY C-r'ZS Z-L
—
?II DC MCM?<Y
DCLLAF- DC ZACY
DCLLAL DC DIDIA:;
:-Z I Cl CPZAM DC DAHLAi;
; Hc?c: DC joz:
: PDMPrz:: DC sd?di^:.ia:;
: DCLLA5, DC 3CX
Caunterexaapis
loJAi: * BA.DMA:: GDYZ Z-Z DC 5A.DKAIi
LoJAJn * JOHIT - C-nZS AJZ SQCi: DC MAI«'
25JA:: DZACBZ?. GZ.ZS Z-Z DC JOHX AKD ?A?Z?.
9772 * DZAZ-Z?. GI'ZS Z-Z DC ZAI'Y AIZ PAPER
IcNCV * KAi; GI’ZE DEI DOLLAr. AICD FROM BOX
CUT
22JAI^
SOJAK
l-FEB
IsFEB
BZIAP.
26MA?.
2 SAZ?.
lOMAY
15MA.Y
l^SE?
LOCD
2i£Z?
-ODD
190CD
230CD
2;JCV
i;i:ov
BREAK
Dransi'iive
6X0V SAt-! BEZAE DEI CAI-ZE?.
15IICV DEAGOi: 3FZAK DEI DPZE
Sta-cive
IBEEB BPZAK Z-Z MCDOP. CYCLE
leMAP. BrZAi: ZZ MODOHCYCLE
ILSE? SrZAE DEE AIRPLACZ
CNOV BPZAi; ZZ ROZZD
Conpcusd Verb Phrase
26~Z
LMAP
Instr'jaer.val
LADY ZJD ZZ IZZZA AIZ ZJZZ
MAX ZJD DEI CEAIX AIZ: SAW 27A?R
LADY ZCD DEI WADZF. ;ZLCN AIC rDflPZ
LADY ZJD DEE COPJt AJG KLZFE
LADY ZJD Z-Z CAKE AIZ ZTZE
LADY ZJD DEE CAKE AIZ ;DZ?E
SAITDY ZTT DEE CArZ AMD OZPZ
SAIZY ZJD Z-Z 3AKAKA AiZ KKIEE
WO'CAX ZJD TEE DRAGCK AUD :ZDPZ
ma;^ cud dee 3a:iadia a:z zcze
yjU; ZJD DEE CEEZSE .AIC iDCPZ
eazia:: zjd dee pzzkix aic ccpz
LADY ZJD DEE PIE AIC KICPZ
LADY ZJD Z-Z 3UDDEP. AIC STIPE
^ZCKEY DEE MOUSE DUD Z-Z PZZ^ZX -AIC STIPE
SA:-; ZJD DEE ZZE ADC EAl-iMEP.
DAELAIT CUD DEE LICIT .AIC STIPE
LADY ZJDS DEE DPJAGOIT .AIC STIPE
BAZlAi: ZD ZZ PIIIA AIC ST“E
LADY CUD ZZ CT-ZESE .AIC STIPE
ELEPEAIC SID DCWIT BREAK DEE COUCE
Z’C CLOWN DEP.OW DEE CAI-Z BPZZ: ZZ SAD
Compound Verb
DwC MAJ: BPZAK Z.E P.IDE Z-Z CAP.
Imsbrumenv-sss Snsvrumer.va-
^TT-
-.SAY
3CCD
.21
Grammar:
John;
15
yrs
old
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«> « I >H J
Ph 1 W J < I
<ti i W 1 5 1 C5 J P X
^ 1 s { CO 1 0 1 ^ i
CO 1 0 1 K 1 H 1 ft
1 0 1 «« P ] ftW 1 Eh X
rt W X A H 1 Ph 1
^ 1
rt 0 1 CO 1 PP 1S J 0 i Q X ^ 1§ i 3 X p 1 m X fs 0 10 1 K XS J H J r\ M 1 P ! *\
«s m 1 P XP X fs W X « J
** P 1 P X
Oh J s ^ K 1 CO X p 1W 1 ^ 1 S X h4 2
!xl 1 Eh i 0 X P » § X *\ p JU j <3 J H 1 K X § 1 •
* PQ i P J M X 5 1 p 1 P X ftW 1 < X tn i • P X 2 i M J p 1
EH 1 #\ •\ <3 J 5 i § i 0 1 S X
rt A P X Eh 1 0 i 0 i
«N !>H X 0 i ft
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Before the main discussion of predicate structure in this sample,
a few comments may he in order about the relationship between words and
general cognitive concepts— the graphic samples of these data provide
a nice window into lexical semantics. The identification of word value
can be made nonambiguous since John read each word aloud so the teacher
could correct its spelling, thereby permanently identifying his intend-
ed seq^uence of words even though the spelling of some items seems to be
random letter sequences. John did recognize that each word was proper-
ly spelled in one and only one manner as he did not alter spelling once
mastery was achieved, and before mastery he would consistently reenter
the same approximations. This permanence of spelling approximations
may be observed in:
TI4AR SNAIL AND /SEML/(NAIL) AND SNAIL AND /SEML/(NAIL)
and other examples from the sample where nonstandard spelling is preser-
ved in differing contexts. Word boundaries are also nonambiguous since
he wrote with cursive script. It is noticeable that some words like
MOTOR CYCLE and MOTORCYCLE or GARBAGE CAN and G^AGECM receive some-
what different entries although it seems safe to treat them as single
lexical items though a boundary is occasionally given. OLDMAN was always
entered as a single word much like SUPERMAN and BATMAN and WOMAN . Both
BAT and MAN are known to be separate words.
John's interpretations of graphic information into syntactical
arrangements is remarkably consistent. In fact, it is possible to offer
the following feature system as a guide to exploring the details of his
drawings
.
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human
; short hair
human; long light hair
human; long dark hair
L^Y
; flipped hairstyle; housecoat; slippers
¥0^^; straight even hairstyle
M^; scalloped hairstyle
MAN; tie
I^; long dark hair; loin cloth; muscles
pointed-ear cowl; fluted cape
MAN, S on chest; even cape
MAN
; helmet ; gloves
MM; long dark hair; feather headdress
MM; receeding hairline
MM; short dark hair
This kind of graphical featiire system can be interpreted either
from John's statements about teacher drawings, or from these minimal
features in his own pictures. It is tempting to consider these features
as being the graphical equivalents of semantical individual concepts of
type < s ,e> which are the basis for term expressions in ^.21. Such a
feature system is not of much importance in a sentential grammar as there
are no apparent grammatical distinctions in either syntax or semantics
which are contingent upon such subcategorization. It may seem siirpriz-
ing that John interprets the distinction between a woman and a lady to
be the color of their hair, and that his mother is a lady but not a woman
but these distinctions are testable from the present data only in the
MM
WOMM
LADY
MOMMY
SMDY
JOHN
TEACHER
TARZM
BATMM
SUPERMM
SPACEMM
INDIM
SAM
JIM
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graphic array and not in the sentential. The metalinguistic features
of Montague grammar stipulate that most lexical entry rules bring logical
constants into the translation for most of the content words, and this
is a very natural fit for John's grammar as sublexical information like
that given above do not effect the derivations of sentences.
The predicate verbs can be given a similar system of graphical
features
:
HAS touch X
-1
-2
RUN : bent leg
THROW : movement lines from
GO TO facing x^; path
GET OUT facing away x^; path
GET : X, reach toward x^
—1
-2
GRAB : x^ reach toward x_
—1 —2
KICK
:
21i
bent leg x^
GIVE : x^ HAS x^; X, reach toward x„
—1
T^ : X
-1 in bathtub or x^ dressing with X2-garment
POT
: 2Li
dressing with X
2
“gs''^nient
COME : X
-1 or x^ reach toward ^
or x^ respectively
These graphical features do serve to predict the string of words John
would select to describe a drawing, but the features do not tend to put
these verbs into subcategories for grammatical operations. For instance,
GO TO and GET OUT are antonyms while GET and GR^ are synonyms by
their graphical features yet there is no evidence of purely grammatical
source which would distinguish these relationships. Both and
grammatically distinguished as part of a subset of verbs vhich
permit IV-?article termination in their sentences involving garments,
but the particle-movement subset also includes ... ON involving
appliances. There may be some point in analysing submorphological con-
cepts in this manner for developing lexical semantics, but for the gram-
mar of sentences there are little data to indicate that these graphical
relationships affect the grammatical operations or categorical distinc-
tions. It may be an interesting fact that grammatically equivalent
con.juncts— say, subjects— are uniformly ordered from graphic right-
to-left, but not much of the grammar hinges on such an odd fact.
31JAN RABBIT AND PIG .AND HORSE GO TO BOAT
teacher dravn : JOHN WRITTEN
23MAR ELEPHANT GET OUT THE TWO TFAlIN
teacher drawn : o'OHN WRITTEN
i7ii
30APR DRAGON GET THE SPACS:4AN RUN
It seems hest tc proceed with the discussion of the granmaticai
analysis upon the usual basis of translating words as ’unanalyzed con-
stants of the logic rather than introducing formal methods for decompo-
sing inno zangible feature systems. .-11though this information is hers
in John’s work, it is doubtful that such distinctions would make any big
difference in his syntacc or semantics as presented in ^.21.
The term exnressions in the ^.21 grammar are given as a somewhat
large collection of lexical items which do not have much phrase struc-
tural involvement in the rest of the syntax. .An inirequent mouiiier
will attach to a term but by and large there is littleeg. RED
,
TWO —
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evidence to suggest that there is much activity in the grammar around
this assortment of lexical items. Indeed, it is the fundamental claim
of the k.21 grammar that the terms do little else than fill in the posi-
tions of the case system that is based and marked upon the predicate
verbs. This is to assign a very different grammatical role to the arti-
words, THE and A
,
than the usual English grammar and to
suggest that John's language is a complex disordered system with respect
to English
—
perhaps an example of deviation in language development.
The principle facts in establishing the predicate structiire of
U.21 seem to center around the role of these small words and their rela-
tionship to the larger content words. By separating all instances of
a particular verb, as in 4.20, it may be known that each verb (with few
exceptions) is followed by a uniform sequence of small words with the
term expressions alternating at fixed positions between them. Indeed,
having separated all the sentences of the sample in this manner, it can
be shown that the major distribution of the word A strongly coincides
with the distribution of the words HAS
,
TAKE and BATH . Since the
expression TAKE A BATH is a fixed sequence (other than two instances
of 6FEB and 12FEB ...TAKE THE SHIRT ON ), the primary productive distri-
bution of the expression A is that it immediately follows HAS which
is the most frequent verb in the language corpus.
Most of the other verbs in the sample are immediately followed by
THE with some having particles intervening, but even these particles
are strictly controlled by choice of verb. Thus, the five most frequent
verbs in the sample are: HAS A in all 71 entries; RIDE TOE in all 51
176
entries; GO TO in all 28 entries, RUN as a bare intransitive expression
or followed by other verb phrases in 25 of 33 entries; GET OUT THE in
the 'away-from* meaning or GET THE in the ’acquire’ meaning in 33 of 3U
entries. This kind of distribution continues through most all of the
52 verbs of the corpus. The small words are strongly related to the
distribution of the verb rather than the noim-like terms. The U.21
lexicon is organized by its verbs, the number of arguments they take,
and the kinds of small words which follow them. This is the basis of
the case system which distinguishes accusative, instrumental, dative,
and locative by marking the verbs rather than the nouns.
The role of case systems in languages is to distinguish the seman-
tical roles played by the major content words in a sentence. English
distinguishes the semantical roles of its nouns by strictly controlling
word order in relation to the verb. The first one in front of the verb
is usually the subject unless other small words are about to indicate
a different role. Other languages do not control word order so closely
and they usually mark the nouns with small words or inflections to indi-
cate their role in the interpretation of the sentence. English is his-
torically a descendant of case inflected languages, and its pronoun
system remains marked for the nominative, genitive, accusative. John’s
language is not only rather fixed in word order, but he appears to be
marking verbs.
The compound accusative verb is the principle syntactical evidence
that the small word belong to the verb. The TWO SNAKE counterexample
is included with them because its redundant locative THE is also
sjLssiRg 3Ln inrernal objecx whose in* erpr“cation iepends upon information
in a different part of the syntactioail str’o.cfure
.
6?SB TZACEZH HAS A HEAD THE BOOK
2MAH CLOWN HAS A THROW 'THE CLOWN
2TAPR TWO MAN BREArZ THE RIDE THE CAR
13N0V * TWO SNAKE C-ZT OUT THE AOTD 00 TO THE DCGHOL^SZ
liiNOV * TWC SNAKE C-ET OIT THE AND OC TO THE DOGHOUSE
4.22 A compcimd accusative construction
teacher dra'wn ; JOHN WRITTEN
jREAK ’ ( "TWC ' ( " ZXc.
'
RIDE
' ( "TW( 'MAITA
1
''p
Sven wi-ch this stmcture, there is a continued problem in the
treatment of the plural subject. The tvo men seen in the car appear to
be equally involved in the breaking and the riding of it
. The tvo snakes
are a different situation in vhich one is getting out of the doghouse
vhile the other is getting in. The dual subject cannot be assigned
individually to the compound predicates with any ease.
teacher drawn : JOroi WRITTEN
13N0V * TWO 3NAKS GET OUT THE AND GO TO THE DOGHOUSE
If the tvo men form a collective-level subject in breaking and
riding the car, the tvo snakes form a different kind cf semantical col-
lective for an anton^-m compound of getting in and getting out of the
doghouse. The counterexample of 26?EB * SUPERMAN TWO HAS A. DRAGON shows
the man of steel holding a dragon in each hand. One can -onderstand per-
fectly veil John's intended interpretation but there is no comfortable
feel about the grammar involved. Certainly English does not permit a
simple adjectival modification of the verb phrase, but
level of phrase structure would predict such forms.
a more abstract
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teacher drawn : o^OHN WRITTEN
26FEB * SUPERMM TWO HAS A DRAGON
teacher drawn : JOHN WRITTEN
23MAE TWO CLOWN SHOOT TEE HORN
JOHN DRAWN : teacher written
15MAR Three clowns fall down
'These examples suggesz that there is some instabili'y
sub: ect-cositione-:
in John's
.
5:>’nta;c isinternretation of he plural although its
l8o
unremarkable (with the exception of the Superman example). The problem
of an unstable relationship between syntax and semantics can be detailed
in the distribution of the predicate, COME .
There are a few verbs in John's language which seem unstable in
that their functional relation between the individuals wo\ild shift with-
in different syntactical structures. These suggest that John may have
been troubled in his analysis of English as a verb-marking case language
with fixed word order. The counterexamples from the dative GIVE indi-
cate that he has some uncertainty with the indirect object in syntax.
He would probably encounter many examples in the language of others that
would make it difficult to decide on the sequence of determiners which
follow a newly developed verb. His verb COME is the most unstable
lexical item in the sample— its chronological sequence makes it a pro-
blem to decide how the semantics and syntax are coupled. There are many
contrasts to suggest that the one-to-one correspondence is not yet esta-
blished for this predicate.
The functional relationship for COME in John's graphics selects
an individual proceeding toward another individual who has an outstrech-
ed hand. The hand is an essential feature of the function— coming to
some location involves someone's manual extention from that place. It
should be clear from the following sample fragment that the hand-person
is sometimes in subject position of COME and sometimes in the postverb
case structure, rendering the verb unstable for interpretation.
I8l
4.23 A semantically unstable predicate: cor^E
Subject Hand-Attribute
lOMAY MAK COI'iE HERE THE LADY OPEN THE- DOOR
250CT yAH COME TO THE W0MAI\"
6N0V lady come oh THE TARZAH GO TO HOUSE
THOV MAH COME LADY HAS A WATCH
12DEC I'lAi: AHD OLDMAH COI-ffi WITH ME GET OLTT THE CFJRCH
13DEC MAt\ COME WITH ME LADY
13DEC MAH COME WITH ME
teacher drawE : JCHK WRITtZK teacher iravc : JOKIi VRITTZK
12DSC /lAN Ailt OLDMAK COME VITE ME
get out the CHUHC-:
Object Hand-Atxribute
12]'-iAR WOMAH COI^ KEHE THE MAH
23MAR SAHDY COI'dE WITH 1-IE THE MAH
28mar cat come heph the lady
USE? 3AEY COME TO HORSE THE SAHDY
121'iAF. WOMAIJ COME HERE THE MjUJ
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^aacier irawTi ; 7CSI VRITTZII
22;4AE 3AIJ3Y :CMS '/-TTH :-[£ THZ MAII
•J^r-ZI 3?AW7I : ^•iacner vri"“42
JOHN DRAWN : *aacher -Ti';t:ea
John's language has a number of odd structures in it, but many of
them are systematic with the analysis of a case system as in 4.21, sug-
gesting that the basic forrni of his disability is based in mental com-
petence— his knowledge of the rules of grammar are structured to gener-
ate the novel structures. Most case-marking languages mark the nouns
rather than the verbs, but the descriptive metalanguage has no problem
arriving at formal interpretations for such structures. Such an analy-
sis is possible at least as a hypothetical language even if no actual
natural language had ever developed such a system. Some of the problems
in John's communication might stem from learning a wrong hypothesis
about the nature of English which he is somehow unable to disconfirm.
The complexity of a disorder like 4.21 relative to standard English
interprets surface structure in a very different manner from the rest
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of "ths linguistic community although there is a marked degree of conver-
gence for simple sentences. Children with language deviations (if this
he one) have been observed to develop an apparently normal early stage
of acquisition and then to remain stationary for a long time. It may
be that some possible hypotheses about language form a cul-de-sac or an
acquisitional dead-end where subsequent development might require some-
thing quite uninterpretable by these wrong-way hypotheses. A complex
disorder which approximates the early stages of development could ac-
count for these observations. This leaves open the issue of language
deviation as being a breakdown in the actual rules of the language where
a formal treatment would presumably require some violation of metalan-
guage. Such a language may be thought of in the class of impossible
languages so a person with such a language would be disabled to the
degree deviant.
18U
5.0 Conclusions
Theoretical work is highly valued in science because it is rare
and difficult to weave the threads of data into new fabric— the old
cloth seems to cover so much and the new patterns seem forbiddingly com-
plex when first encountered. Child language as an academic study has
been collecting data for structural theories since it*s beginnings in
the early part of this centirry. Generative theories of syntax made an
early entry through the work of Lois Bloom, but has remained rather
stationary since then, lapsing back into structuralism.
Much of the labor in this study has been the struggle to sort out
the thin strands of semantical interpretation and introduce a formal
treatment for compositional meaning which can hold it own beside the
best generative syntax. Many of the fine details in the grammars have
been selected to exercise the theory at points where the empirical data
is rarefied and uncertain, producing prediction rather than verification.
The history of empiric ally-testable knowledge shows that paradigm revolu-
tions occur frequently from prediction and the control of previous theory
counterexamples. Formal semantics have been developing for a long time
within philosophical circles, and it is hoped that the time is here for
an empirical connection into psychology and application in education.
The description of child language and how it changes with learning shoiild
have direct consequences for the understanding of language disability,
and our efforts to understand mental incompetence helps to
complete the
formal specification of human abilities. There will
be a time when
these grammars— now so complicated— will be child's
play.
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